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Personal experience, a pprehended as 
completely as po ssible, analyzed as 
thoroughly as possible, t e sted as 
experimentally as possible, and then 
grasped synoptically as a system or 
totality--that is the basis and 
method of metaphysics. That is the 
process of all verification. 
Brightman, Phil. Rev., 46 (1937), 155. 
THE CREATIVE ACTIVITY OF MIND 
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER 
THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION 
The problem of mind rarely arises, or at least never 
becomes acute, for the majority of human beings. As 
Aristotle observed, wonder does not arise in people and 
stimulate philosophical questions until "practically all 
the necessities of life are supplied," and then it is "with 
1 
a view to recreation and pastime.n Unreflecting co~mon 
sense or spontaneous thought simply takes mind for granted. 
Familiar possessions and common objects, no matter how 
really intricate, rarely provoke either analysis or appre-
elation. They are accepted naively, complacently, and 
uncritically. A flower is merely a flower until the poet 
sees the flower "in the crannied wall." Mind develops so 
slowly and unobtrusively that it usually does not become 
very much aware of itself. It is assumed, and consequently 
excites little thought or reflection. 
Mind is sometimes regarded as only an effect of the 
environment or of brain activity. Some of the skeptical 
maintain that the mind is real, but since it creates the 
facts it recognizes, that the external world cannot be 
1. Aristotle, Met., 982b (For abbreviations see the 
Bibliography:T." 
2 truly known. It is only the nighly developed mind that 
r eflects, introspects, and becomes de eply conscious of 
itself and the questions concerning its source, nature , 
development, and its significance for knowledge and exist-
ence. At least as far back as Anaxagoras' Nous, s ocrates ' 
"Know Thyself, •' the Psalmist's question tt what is man, 11 and 
Augustine's complaint that men study everything exc·ept 
3 themselves, philosophers have ponde r ed the mystery of the 
nature of the mind, and from time to time have voiced the 
need of its study, and have advanc-ed opposing theories con-
cerning it. Indeed, "one might almost say that the bone of 
contention in all philosophy is the importanc~e of conscious-
4 
ness." 
AIM 
The aim of the study is to try to discover as muc h as 
possible about t he nature of mind, its limitations, poten-
tialities, and powers. The problem involves the questions: 
What have great thinkers and teachers of the past had to 
say about mind? Is mind active or passive, agent or patient, 
2. Bowne, ST, 42. 
3. Ps. 8:4; Augustine, confessions, X, 15. 
4. Brightman, J. Phil. studies, IV (1929), 497; cf. Bowne 
MST, 300. 
2 
or is it both'? If the mind is active, how and why does it 
act, upon what does it act and what does it accomplish? Is 
mind creative? If so, how does it create, i.e. by what 
processes and functions? What does it create and what sig-
nificance has creativity for metaphysics, religion, and 
ethics? 
PRELIMINA .. "tY DEFINI'l'IONS 
Lai rd appropriately says, "A preliminary definition is 
only an indication of t he route to be followed, and there -
fore it is indispensable. The chief difficulty, in this as 
in so many other cases, is to find a definition which merely 
asks questions without begging them, and, probably, it is 
never possible to ask the right sort of question without 
begging or assuming something. tt5 He adds that though a 
word cannot be defined in such a way as to sati sfy all 
parties, it does not follow that there can be no concensus 
of opinion as to the right line of inquiry into its nature. 
In the spirit of Laird, only tentative and minimum defini-
tions will be given at the outset. They should be regarded 
as hypotheses to be verified and enlarged, or to be dis-
carded fo r others mo r e ad equate and comprehensive. This 
is part icularly true of the definition of mind, which is 
5. Laird, PS, 8. 
3 
the c entra l object of i nvestigation. 
1) Mind . 
The closest r elativ e s oi' t:o.e · v1o r d mind see n: t o be the 
Anglo-saxon gemynd and the Latin ~' nentis (memi ni) in 
both cases f r om roots meaning t o remember. It is also a 
strik i ng fact that the vwrds f or mind in Ic elandic, s wed ish, 
nani s11, and Gothic root in words relat i ng to memory. This 
seems to indicate a natural human tendency to regard rerne m-
beri ng as t he chief function of mind. It may be defined as 
that which feels, perceiv e s, r emembers, wills, and t hi nks, 
or more concisely, it is that which e xperiences. Perhap s 
it may be called 11 the sum total of the con scious states of 
any ind ividual.n It mi ght be said t hat 11 Philosophically, 
it means spirit, or t hat which is commonly contrast ed with 
6 
matter. 11 These may b e t aken as preliminary hypotheses . 
2 ) Mental Activity. 
Probably everyone who has thought a bout mind at a ll 
will admit t hat it ha s processes such as memor y and i mag ina-
tion, a nd that it evidence~ g rowth and change . In this 
sense it may be agreed that mind is active. However , t :O.i s 
is not the definition here int ended, f ol'' t h is may mean 
passivity . For i n s t ance, a bridge or building und er con-
structi on may be said to have processes i n its developu ent, 
and to grow from day to day, although all of t he materi a ls 
6 . Webster, NID, 1374. 
4 
are under the control and manipulation of external forces. 
Hence me nt a l activity is to be constrlJed as sel f -ini ·tiation, 
or determination, at least to some extent fro m within. It 
implies response to exter nal forces wl1l ch may mean resis-
tance or cooperation. Me·ntal activity in t h is sense in-
dicat e s the possibility of ac hieving a certain amount of 
self-direction, independenc·e, and fre edom. 
From the natural almost instinctive, 7 materialistic 
point of view mental action seems to be the result of the 
forces of environment on body. some hold t hat mental 
activity is merely matter i n motion in a universe of natural 
law and change, and consciousness is ph enomenal. For either 
definition this means passivity, for mental action is here 
only an appearance and is not the product of will. Man is 
a mere robot, the r esult of accident and the blind forces 
of a purposeless universe. on the other hand, there a re 
those who hold to the activity of mind and see in it a clue 
to the secret of the universe and its deepest reality. If 
on investigation the facts point to a rejection of complete 
passivity, t he problem will then concern mind either as 
ac t ive, or as both active and passiv e . In either case the 
further question of creativity will be involved. 
3) creative. 
The most difficult and controversial term involved in 
7. Brightman, "some Advantag es of Personalism, 11 Luminar, 3 
(1939), 41-49. 
5 
the field of i nv estigation is the word creative. rt is a 
derivative from the Latin~~· Bowne , Lo tze, and many 
others obj ec t to the use of t he word exce pt with reference 
to Deity . 11 Positively , creation means to posit in exist ence 
so me t h ing which before wa s not; negatively it denies that 
this . some thing is made out of pre - exis t ent mat erial, or 
that t he creator is less a:t' te r the creative act t han be f' ore . 11 8 
''The utmost the f inite can ho pe t o do is not to create t 11ings , 
0 bu t t o understand them af t er they are created . 11 -" Mcc onnell 
says tha ~.:, t he inventor is a creat or onl;y- i n a practical 
sense, '' ti:le will of man is di r ective a nd not creative.nlO 
Brightman says , "no human c reati on is i n the full sense a 
creation ." 11 11 }Por God to create means for h i m t o brine; 
into b e i ng by an act of will (some t hing ext ernal to h i mse l f ). 
Hu;nan 7-Tills canno t create ; they c an only sel ect from that 
which has already been created or co mbine factors in such 
a manner thati po·,vers beyond their control will create some-
thing · nevi . pure creation is indeed superhuman and myst,er -
ious.1112 
Lotze says tha t God created t i:1e world out of noth i ne; , 
3 . Bowne , MET , 100. This agree s with Plato, So uh., 265. 
9. Bowne , ST, 16 . Also, M8T , 41. 
10 . Mcconnell, BPB, 124 . 
11. Bri ght man, FG , 158 . 
12 . Bri ght man , PG, 123 . 
6 
and feels that t :ne term should be r estricted tQ God. 11 The 
will to ~reate is an absolutely eternal predicate of God , 
and ought not to be used to designat e a de ed of his so much 
as the absolute dependenc e of t.he vvorld upon his will in 
contradistinc tion to its involuntary emanation from his 
. 13 
nature." Similarly, ward says, uif creation means any-
thing, it means something so far involved in the divine 
essence that we are ent.i tled to say as Hegel was fond of 
saying t J.1at 1 Ohne die Welt 1st Gott nicht Gott. 1 In calling 
God the creator then it is simply the world's dependence on 
Him that we mean to express. 1114 
some writers oppose the use of the word creation under 
any circumstances. schiller discredits the .term bec ause of 
its ambiguous history and for what he take s to be its origin. 
He explains similarly the complexity, vagueness, confusion, 
deception, even 11 dishonesty 11 of the terms evolution and 
emergence, then he states that "novelty is the right word 
for what has been variously called evolution,, emergence, 
and creation. It is the right word because it is the 
simplest and t he freest from pomposity and contamination by 
irrelevant is su e s." 15 It is a little puz~ling to be told 
13. Lotze, PR, 79, 74. (Nevertheless he uses t h e term in 
t h e human sense, see Mik., II, 13f, III 283, 312, 327.) 
14. 'Nard, RE, 233 and Heg el, PdR, I 210 (200). 
15. schiller' II creation, Emergence' Nov elty . 11 Personalist' 
11 (1930 ), . 244. 
7 
that one simpl e "Nord with t he l ong establish ed meani ng 
"quality or state of nevmess or freshness" can take the 
plac e correctly of three different and very difficult con-
c ept s with which man has struggled for c enturies . It does 
violence to the acc epted usag e of words on insufficient 
grounds. Nov elty r eally states the problem whi le creation 
states a so;Lution. It might be that "novelty" d id express 
for schiller all that he wished to say about evolution, 
emergence , and creation •. However admirable his empirical 
intentions and desire to simplify and clarify, it is doubt-
ful if very many others would be willing to accept such 
limitation of vocabulary, and oversimplification. 
Dean Knudson says, "C reation in ·th e strict sense of 
the term is a divine affair,n 16 ye t he more than anyone else 
has coined and 
of Thought . 11 l7 
championed the phrase, 11 The creative Activity 
. 18 
Bowne took the idea from Kant, but used 
other more Kantian forms of expression such as: "consti-
tutive mental ac·tivi ty, 11 11 constitutive activity of thought 11 ; 19 
11 Constructive aotion of the mind as an absolute condition 
16 . Knudson , DR. 24. 
17. Knudson , PP , 114-139 . (It was this treatment of the 
subject ·which first interested t h e 'Nri ter in the 
present study.) 
18. Bowne , TTK, 275f ., 280. 
19. Bo wne, MET (1), 440; TTK, 364, 118 , 38 , 55. 
8 
20 
of externa l perception11 ; 11 A compl ex constructiv e activity 
on the part of mind"; 21 
•· 
11 s ynt hetic and i n t erpretative ac tion 
22 
of mi nd" ; Mind must actively con struct knowledge f or 
itsel f ; 23 11 But knowing is no t a passive reception of r eady 
made knowl edge ; it is an activ e con struction and i nt e r pre-
24 
t a tion by the mind of its raw material 11 ; 11 Howev er real 
the object may be,. it becomes an objec t f or us only t hrough 
, II 25 
our own a ctiv:J.ty ; and 11 The ac tivity of the mind i n kno w-
i ng is a principl e which rational philosophy will never 
26 
consent to give up. 11 
Nevertheless, Bowne does use f orms of the word c reate 
with reference to human beings as shown in t he f ollowi ng : 
27 
11 Th e mind creates its ideas from with in"; "Wherever the 
28 
mind acts creatively"; 11 The mind create s some of its 
20. Bowne, MET ( 1) , 410, 429 ; and ST, 122 . 
21 . Bowne , TTK, 280 , 113. 
22 . · Bown e , PER , 71. 
23. Ibid ., 64 · 
' 
THE , 129. 
24. Bovvne , ST, 121. 
25 . Bowne , TTK , 116 . 
26 . Bowne , ST, 1 20 . 
27 . Ibid ., 122 . 
28 . Bowne, TTK , 1 22 . 
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objects by definition and invention11 ; ncreations of the 
. 30 31 imagination11 ; 11 Airy creations of -mind 11 ; 11 Tl1e creations 
. 32 .. 
of' mythology or the characters of fiction" ; 11 Purely men-
33 tal creations11 ; "In mathematics our objec-.ts are our own 
creation . 11 34 
Buclroam says, "personal ity oy its very nature is 
creative. Al l persons create . It is the nature of' self-
activity to express itsel f , to empl oy itself in form. 
Human persons create according to their capacity and charac -
ter ••• • Yet wonderful as is this creative gift and its 
resultants, it is al l subcreation . All of its c onstruc tions 
are secondary , fashi oned out of creative material already at 
hand. The material out of which man creates is all given 
him. n35 
Recognized authorities in many fields use the word 
creative in i ts practical or human sense . It is a great 
favorite with humanists. A number of wel l known writers 
have given prominence to the idea in books of a wide 
29 . Bowne , TTK, 121 , 128 . 
30 . Ibid ., 76 . 
31 . Bowne , ST , 132 . 
32. Bowne, TTK , 135 . 
33 . Ibid . , 72 . 
34. Ibid. , 179f. 
35 . Buckham, HG , 60f. 
10 
vs.rlety of interest. A few of the more prominent are: 
Bergson, Creative Evolution, 
Dewey(et al.), Creative Intelligence, 
Flewelling, Creative Personality, 
Follett, Creative Experience, 
Herman, Creative Prayer, 
Mathews(S), Creative Christianity, 
Page, Living Creativelz, 
Spearman, Creative Mind. 36 
One of Brightman's most important chapters is, "Worship 
37 
as Creativity." He says that 11 The Law of the Best Possible" 
in ethics may be called "the Law of Creativity," and "the 
Law of the Ideal Personality is a law of free creativity and 
38 
of personal diversification. 11 He says that "man is capable 
39 
of creating and enjoying value." He summarizes the philo-
sophical work of Bowne in the formula: "personality a cre-
40 
ative synthesis and reconciliation of opposites. n As long 
as the .philosophical and humanistic meanings arekkept clear 
there is no valid reason why the word creative may not be 
used without confusion both with reference to God and to 
man. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
In the first place, human creations con-
sist always of a rearrangement of pre-
existing materials, while divine creation 
For a longer list, see the appendix. 
Brightman, RV, Chap. IX (Here he mentions other lit-
erature on Creativity). 
Brightman, ML, 156, 250. 
Brightman, PR, 16. 
Brightman, Bostonia, 8(Dec.l934), 2lf.; RV, 129, 210. 
11 
is creation out of noth ing, by mere 
f lat of will. In t he second place, 
a ll human creat ions are dependent f or 
t h eir existenc e on the constan t coo per-
ation of God's will and his laws, vlhlle 
divine creation is dependent on noth ing 
above or beyond God . In the third place, 
human creation at mos t produces someth ing 
new within the human mind, for objective 
paintings and cathedrals are rearrange-
ments of pre-existing matter in accordance 
with man 's spiritual con c eption and the 
creative novelty which ~e sults is rath er 
God's work than man' s. 11 41 
Divine creation then will b e taken to mean metaphysical 
creation or the independent production of new entities e x -
ternal t o the producer, while human creation is in the 
field o :f thought a nd knowledg e . It is always s econdary, 
partial, and conditioned. It may be the production of 
ideas, hypotheses, desig ns, or Hegelian synthe s es , wholes 
having pro perti e s which the parts do not possess. Th ese are 
a l ways orig inal for each individual mind, y e t from the soci a l 
and h isto r ical viewpoint v e ry few of them are orig i nal or 
new to the world of persons. some of the constructs may 
lead to creations o f a nothe r type: a mat erial inv ention, a 
musical composition, a book, a poem, or a picture.. Altho ug h 
thes e are not outright creations, they are new assemblages 
and hence unique contributions. A b oo k may be creative 
because it conta ins ideas never before expressed, or because 
it presents t hought so organized as to a ppeal to t he r eader 
41. Brig himan , FG , 158 . 
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and inspire worthful act ion. That is, i t may be c reative 
both for Vihat it is, and for t he effect it produces on 
othe rs. 
It may be said with this understa nding tha t eve ry in-
dividual is a c reator from his own viewpoint, in that he 
has to create his own ideas. A fe w are creators in the 
estimat ion of the world when they produce, make, combine , 
construct, or build something unique. Also, t hose are 
c reators whose work or life inspires worthwhi le activities. 
l~ ) Ex peri enc e . 
To avoid conf usion, the narrow meaning of t he term 
will be indicat ed by 11 sense-experience 11 , and t i.w word ex-
peri ence will i n its br oad sense be taken as equiva l ent to 
consciousness and hence not be opposed t o reason. The re -
sul t s of reasoning become part of experienc e . T£1e t no c a n 
tnen b e vi ewed as compl ementary and interpenetrat i ng . 'HJ.1.en 
it is desired to emphasize all-inclusiv e experience, the 
express ion expe r i ence in toto may o e used . Anything one 
can s ense , think, or v:ill is part of his experience . 11 All 
t hat we kno'7 and feel and do, all our facts and t heor i e s, 
all our emot ion s, and ideals, and ends, may be included in 
. ,,42 t~1i s one term--- experi ence. 
5) Heason. 
The terms 11 log ic 11 , 11 i n ferenc e 11 , or r easo ning will 
42. J . \lard in ·;[ebster , :i.HD, 771. 
indicate trl8 narrow meani ng of r eason, which in its broad 
sense will be the s earch for a comple t e view, or it is "the 
will to establish unity, relation, and system within exper-
ience, and t:O.us to find truth, in a process of never-ending 
43 g rowth." In this sense reason stands close to coc1erence 
or Hegelian logic rather than to formal or Aristotelian 
logic. Reasoning may be opposed to emo tions, and also to 
experienc e but reason is not to be opposed to either. 
11 Reason and experience are not two separate powers , but 
reason is a function of experience, and experience is a 
movement toward r a tional totality. 111+4 
METHOD 
1) Historical Evidence. 
The first consideration will b e the examination of the 
thought and theories of the past concerning mind, its 
definition, reality, passivity , activity, and creativity . 
In surveying t he Greek philosophers interest will be cen-
tered on those who first recognized the existence of mind, 
and were concerned about its nat ure and relation to the 
universe and to divinity. Did they regard mind as passive 
and mechanical or as active? Af ter the Greeks what have 
been the outstanding contributions and most valuable sug -
43. :Rri r;htman, in The Americ B.Q_Schola r, ~ (He.r. lD;;s;;:.), ?17. 
4L~. Brightman, Phil. R.ev., 46 ( 1 937), 155. 
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ge stions? What beari-r13 ha s t he pas s iv e vi ev:; of' mind on 
freedom, reason, and t h eology? It is only b~ knowi ng so me -
t h i ng of t he past that one may ge t direc t ion for hypotheses. 
2) Empirical Evidenc e . 
Next and equally important is t he empi rical approach. 
What does his t ory reveal about man's experience? What have 
proph ets and sages found out about relig ious experience? 
V\'hat hav:e they contributed to the pr actical and ethical 
realms? What powers , activities, and processes of mind have 
the centuries of recorded history revealed? Tihen t he pro -
ducts or r esults of mental ~owers are examined , do they 
show any development or increase? I f so how can it be ex-
plained? 1,lilhat has been learned about mind by introspection, 
and by observation of the experiences of others? What part 
has feel i ng played in life? 
3) Resultant Hypothesis. 
Drawing together all t h e facts gleaned from the history 
of thought and experience, what interpreta tion c an be mad e 
from t he whole and what is t he most coherent explanation of' 
the nature of mind? 
a. What is mind? How is it related to conscious-
ness, to experience, ·to the s el f , and to personality? How 
is it related to the physic a l world, to body , to other 
selves, and to God? 
b. Can purely passive, mechanically receptive mind 
15 
account for t he facts of experience either i nd ividual or 
socio-historical? In the realm of history can matter and 
abstract physic al force adequately explain great per son-
alities, progress, inv ention, art, poetry, literature, 
music, science, and religion? Can they explain a single 
idea or ideal value? 
c. can inert substance, or brain explain mind 
which is something higher, or is it more r easonable to ex-
pect t he higher to explain the lower? 
d. can one hold the passive conception of mind and 
consistently believe at the same time that he can think or 
choose, or pass valid judgments? 
e. Is it justifiable to speak of various functions 
of mi nd such as perceiving, feeling, remembering , imagining, 
''emoting ", willing, judging, and reasoning, or must the 
mind be regarded as a synthetic, functioning unity? If one 
may speak of different functions of mind, are some of them 
especi.ally creative whil e others are not? Granting that all 
functions are indispensabl.a , which is the de epe st, most 
fundament al, most characteristic, and most inclusive? 
f. Vihat kind of expe rience is most certain? 
g. Is mind both passive and active? If active, is 
it creative? If so, what does it creat e and how may cre-
ativity be promoted? 
16 
4) Relation of t h e hypo t heSis to other fields. 
a . Epistemology . 
Do e s t he hypothesis t hrow any light on the probl em 
o f knowledge? Doe s it in any way mak e clearer how kno wledge 
is possible or how learning takes place? Do e s mi nd create 
its objects and its knowl edge? If so, are other factors 
involved? 
b. Psych ology .. 
Does the hu man discovery of essences such as log ic· 
and mathematical truths have any relation to the qu e stion 
of ac tivity and creativity of mind? could they be passiv e ly 
received , or is effort on the part. of each individua l nec-
e ssary to gain such knowledge? Do minds otherwi se active 
t ake passive a ttitudes toward some subjects? If so, what 
is the result? With what psy ch ological theories is t h e 
hypothesis of cre a t ivity harmonious'? What t heori es does 
it cont radict? 
c. Metaphy s ic·s. 
Will the hy pothesis f it i nto a coherent accou n t o f 
r eality '? To wha t world vi ew doe s i t l ead? What is its 
relation to the prob l ems o f f reedo m and neces si t y , c hang e 
and identity, u nity and plura lity, mi nd and b ody , matter 
and spirit, personal and i mpersonal, mec hanism a nd teleology , 
experience and reason? 
d. Re lig ion . 
17 
Has t:he hy po t hesis anytning to contribute to the 
realm o f individ u a l duty and practical li f e? y;hat bearing 
has it . on perso nal ideals, standards of action, r espon si-
bility and character development? What i nfluence does 
belief about mind or the nature of man have on socia l action 
and int e raction? noes t h e h y pothesis suggest any t h ing for 
the i mprovement of social efficiency and vwrld coo peration 
amo ng n a tions'? soci e ty must be retrog rading , progr e ssi ng , 
static or cyclic. '• ith which of t he se vi e Y!S does t h e 
hy pothe sis harmonize and why'? Can ne w s ocial values be 
created? 
f . Educat i on. 
noes the hy pothe sis suggest anythi l~ as to the con-
tent and meth od of education, privat e and public? What do 
t he educational me t h ods o f the various forms of g ov e rnment 
suggest as t o b e lief in an a ctive or passive mind? Of t he 
old absolute stat e s, recent totalitarian, and de mocra tic 
g ov e rnments , which support educational systems in h a rmony 
with the. :hypothesis and whic h d o not? 
5) Conclusion. What f urthe r may be d rawn f rom t h e 
whol e by way of summary? 
18 
Fai t hfulness to '1istory 
is 
t h e beg innint; o ~ cr2ative '::risdo m. 
F,oyce, S:WP , Viii . 
CHAPTER ONE 
HISTORICAL SKETCH 
INTRODUGTION 
Western civilizat ion has been derived mainly from t wo 
1 
sources, the Hebrews and t he Greeks. It is necessary to 
examine both for their contributions to t he subject of t h e 
creative activity of mind. Logically, it seems best to 
begin with the Greeks and trace tne history of though t on 
the subject of mind, although criTonolog ically, since man 
lives f irst and t hen thinks afterward, 2 it may seem t hat 
the prac-tical aspect of the subject should be pr e sented 
first. The Hebrews will be considered in the empirica l 
approach of the next chapter. This does not mean that any 
rigid s eparation of the intellectual and empirical is to 
be at tempted , or t hat it is even possible, but only that 
the Greeks were predominantly intellectual and the Hebrews 
• were more prac.tical and r elig ious. Although t h e two 
streams of influenc e soon unite in actual fact, they will 
not. be final ly drawn together unti l chapter t hree. 
The immediate consideration vrill begin w· i th the so-
call ed beginnins of philosophy among the early Greeks . 
Only the more important t h inkers can be considered and 
1. M. Arnold, CA, 128-149 . 
2 . Illingworth, PHD, 3 . 
t hat v ery briefl y . ~ffo rt will be made to l et them speak 
f or• themselv e s concerning mind and creativity. Many volumes 
t est i fy to t he r adical disagreement of i nterpretation as to 
what their words meant t o them, and as to the reliability 
of t he sources. The attempt 1ilill be made neither t o over-
interpret nor to i gnore the deeper possible meani ng s i n -
tended. ~'lhile ideas appearing early, and persi s tently 
meeting t he t es t of the ages are surely entitled to respect3 
and thorough examination, the tendency of some unduly to 
rev erence the Greek s and use t hem as props or proofs f or 
modern theories will be avo ided. 
An i mportant fact to be recogni zed is that t h e very 
efforts to obtain the true intended meanings , of which we 
can never b e sure , always result in fresh insights . Old 
words of doubtful meaning of ten stimulate nov el idea s. 
Perhaps the glory and va lue of Greek t hought has always 
been not so much its own intrinsic meaning --great as it 
undoubtedly is--as its power to sugg est other thought 
which may transc end it. 
PART ONE 
THE GREEK PHILOSOPHERS SP~AK 
1. The designation of Thal es as t he first philosopher 
is due l argely perhaps to Aristotle who ca lled h im the 
3 . AS Aristotle agrees, ri c. :8t h ., ll73a I. 
2 1 
founder of the Ionian (monistic) School, and sa id that he 
believed water to be the permanent entity underlying all 
things. 4 Theological tendencies are noted by Plutarch, 
Cicero, and Aetios ·l'vho say Thales believed God to be the 
int elligent princi ple of the world , the quickening mind who 
forilled all things out of 5 water. Ev en stronger is the state-
ment of Aristotle: 11 some think that the soul pervades the 
who le universe, whence perhaps came Thales' view that every-
thing: is full of gods , 11 and 11 Thal e s too, judg ing from what 
men recall of his work, seems to suppose that the soul is 
in a sense the c ause of' movement, since he says that a 
6 
magnet has soul because it causes moverqent to iron.·~ These 
statements sugg est the immanence of divine mind in the 
physical world, and an often revived and still modern d e f -
inition of mind as that whi ch acts. 
2. seeking to avoid infinite regress, Anaximander 
called the f irst principle "the boundless) 11 which is some-
thing abov e and beyond a ll elements, ruling and encompassing 
them. It is one, mobile, eternal, and divine. 7 As a com-
promise , Anaximenes named "the boundless 11 Air, and held, 
4. Met., 983b. 
5. Ferri er, PW, II, 38; Burnet, EGP , 49, 13. 
6 . De An., 4lla, 405a. 
7. Phys., III, 4; Diog. Laert., II, 1; Bakewell, SBAP, 3- 6 . 
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according to Aetius, that it is God. "Just as our soul, 
which is air, ho lds us tog ether, so it is brea th and a ir 
t hat enc ompasses t h e whole 11o rl<i . ' ~ 8 Here is an early in-
stance of t he argument from the microcosm to the macrocosm. 
3. Pythag oras, or t he Pythag oreans, hel d t hat number 
is t he essence of all things, 9 and the organi zat ion of the 
univ erse in its vari ous determinations, is a har monious 
system of numb ers and their r elations. This is a bold and 
amazing assertion, 11 a stumbling block11 to many. As Heg el 
states , it displaces sensible exi stence, and make s thought 
and not sense to be the criterion of the essence of t h i ng s.10 
one fragment states, "Everyth ing which is known has in it 
number, for 1 t is impossible either to thinl~ or know a ny-
t . · ' th t b ull n~ ng vn · ou num er· • . Thus he ma ke s number or form t he 
source and condition of intelligenc e and the g round of the 
intelligible universe. Whatever we think, we think under 
some form either of unity or multiplicity. Number seems to 
b e a category of reason and univ ersality. pythagoras was 
try ing to rise above the thraldom of the senses into the 
realm of reason. He wanted to comprehend the univ erse in 
8. Met., 984a; cornf ord, GRT, 42; Bakewell SBAP, 7. 
9. Met., 1080b. 
1 0 . Hegel, 1,Verke, XII I , 237f.; Ferri er, PW, II, 60. 
11. Ferrier, PVT , I I 67. 
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language whic:i.J. could be grasped by an intelligenc e wi1ich 
12 does not posses:sthe hu::nan senses. Number or form seemed 
to b e the true universal because every sense has its own 
special objects and is not a ffected by the objects of the 
other senses, but no sense ha s number as its exclusive ob-
ject. Hence number is not an object of sen se but of t hought 
or reason. Matter or objects of sense then are unessenti a l. 
Py t h agoras combined philosophy and religi on forming a 
real brotherhood similar to the Orphic_ cult •13 11 The 
Pythago~an Way of Lifett became proverbial before t he time 
14 
of Plato. r_t said that many of his followers believed 
t hat he was divine and worshipped him. His purpose was the 
lt . t• _,. , 1. 15 cu ~va ~on OL no ~ness. He held firmly to transmigration. 
"we are strangers in this world, and the body is the tomb of 
the soul," and this life is a chance to get release from the 
16 11 wheel of birth" by the purification of philosophy. By 
rigid discipline he believed immortality could be achieved, 
and by the study and contemplation of the universe man could 
become li ke God. 17 
4 . Critics seem ag r eed that xenophanes wa s more 
1 2 . I b id., 78. 
13. Gomperz, GT, 138 ; Burnet, EGP, 89f. 
14. Bakewell, SBAP, 40f. 
15. BUrnet, EGP, 90 . 
16. Oornford, FRP, 201; Burnet, EGP, 93. 
17. Hack, GGP, 47. 
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t:aeol og i a.n than ph iloso ph er, a sort of travelling r hapso-
dist.18 He stre ssed the mental but did not deny the r eality 
of the s ~nsible world for the human mind. 19 He f earlessly 
attacked the sacred tradition of t he Greek cont ests. "It 
is ill done to cherish the strength of the body h i gher than 
beneficent wisdom; better is our wisdom than the strength 
of horses and men." 20 He was not dogmatic in religion. 
11 There nev er was nor ev er will be, any man who knovvs T:i th 
certainty the things about t he gods, 11 for "The gods did not 
reveal all thing s to men at the start; but as time goes on, 
21 
by search ing, they discover more and more .•• 
xenophanes scorned the crude anthropomorphism of his 
day. ":aomer and Hesiod have ascribed to the g ods all deeds 
22 
that ar e a shame and a disg race among men. 11 Mortals 
fancy tha t the gods are li l{e themselves. If oxen could 
paint, their g ods would resemble themselves. The 
Aethiopian s have black snub-nosed gods, and the Thracians 
23 fair and blue-eyed. It is generally said that xenophanes 
18. Burnet, EGP, 129; Thilly, HP, 26f. Ferri er, PW, II, 
80; Hack, GGP, 59. 
19. Ferrier, PW, II, 86, 88. 
20. Gomperz, GT, 156; Fr. 19. 
21. Frs. 14, 16. 
22. Fr. 7 (Bakewell). 
23. :F'rs. 5, 6 , a nd 16 (Dials). 
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was a pantheist but Ferr i e r has g round for calling h i m a 
monotheis t i n a passage whi c h says : 11 Th ere is one g od, 
supr eme a mong gods and men ; resembling morta ls nei t her in 
form n or in mind . The whole of him sees , the whole of 
him t h ink s, the vih ole o f h i m hears. W1 t h out toil h e rules 
24 
all t h i ng s by the power of h is mind." Eor h im God is a 
conscious being , One, transcendent a nd supreme. 
5. Heraclitus was the profoundest t hinker before 
Plato and join t founder with him of idealism, according to 
25 26 Diels. Fire is the f irst principle. Yet fire seems 
' 27 
to be only the symbol of log os, t h e uncreat ed and un-
28 
c hanging l aw of r eason pervad i ng all things . Hocking 
says that t he h onor of the discovery of mind as part of 
reality must be shared by Heraclitus and Anaxagoras, t he 
forme r 11 teaching that there is a princ i pl e of universa l 
Reason (logos ) which like an infinite ly subtle flame pervade s 
29 
all t h e proc es se s o f the eternal Flux." Heraclitus s ay s, 
"It is wise to harken not to me , bu t to the logos and to 
24. Frs. 1-3 (Diels) or 23-25 (By water). 
25. see ERE , VI, 591. 
26. Frs. 30, 31, 90 (Di e ls) or 20-22 (Bywater) . 
27. Ferri e r, PW, II, 112 . 
28 . Thil l y , HP , 25 , 109 . 
29. Hocking, TP, 219. 
26 . 
confess that all 30 things a r2 one. 11 He be liev ed that none 
need be i gnorant. 11 1/Jisdo m is common to all," and '1it is in 
the power of all men to know themselv e s and to practise 
31 
temperance . 11 Hence, he s eems to ho ld t hat man r eally l1as 
the power of self-control, s e lf-knowledge, and self-
direction, but does not use it, for he adds 11 Although the 
logos is co rmnon to all, yet most men live as if each had 
a privat e wisdom of his own. 1132 
Heraclitus raised the difficult problem of flux or 
identity and chang e. "one cannot step into the same river 
t wice. 1133 11 Into the same rivers we step and we do not 
34 
step; we are and we are not •11 1Ve maintain our identity, 
and yet we are ever changing . His immediate successors 
often attributed to him the statement 11 All thing s flow, 
nothing abides, 1135 but t hi s omits the abiding logo s of 
change. In another passage Aristotle limits the flux to 
t he sensible world. 36 socrates says it is a hard questio n , 
and decline s to condemn h i mself to an unhealthy sta t e of 
30. Fr. 50 (Dials) or 1 (Bywater). 
31. Frs. 113-114, 116 (Diels). 
32. Fr. 2 (Diels). 
33. Fr. 91 (Diels). 
34. Fr. 81 (Bywat er). 
35. De An., 405a; Bakewell SBAP, 33. 
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unreality or to b eli eve t hat al l t h ings l eak like a pot. 37 
Her ac l itus certainly exempted the law of reason fro m the 
f lux . He believed in 11 The Given, 11 f or he says God did not 
make t he univ ers e , 11 it always was and is and ever shall be 
an everlasting f ire.u3S 11 The Logos is everlasting but men 
a re unable to comprehend it before t hey have heard it or 
even after t hey have .i.1.eard it f or the first time. u 39 Also, 
-
he calls logos 11 the guide of all t h ings, 11 and says that 
wisdom is one and one only, it is something apart from all 
other things. 40 11 All human l aws are fed by one divine 
41 law. 11 If all were in f lux t here would be no unity and 
t here could be no standard, no guide, no l aw . 
Deepest and darkest perhaps is his princi ple of life 
or of mental achievement which may be called t h e dial ec t ic 
principle of opposites . "O ppo s i tion brings men together, 
and out of discord come s the fai rest har mony , and all things 
42 have t heir birth in strife. 11 ''Men do not understand how 
that whi ch is t orn in different directions c omes i n t o accord 
with itself, har mony in contrariety , as in the case of the 
37. e-r a t;ylus' 440. 
38 . Fr. 30 (Diels). 
39 . Fr . 1 (Di als); " (Bywater). .::: 
40 . Frs . 72 , 32 , 41, 108 (Di els). 
41. Fr . 113-114. 
42. Fr. 8 (Di els) . 
28 
bow and t he l yre ."43 All t hi n:s s arise t hrough stri f e and 
44 
necessity . He says the immortal are mortal, the morta l 
i mmortal, each liv i ng in the other's d eath and dying in 
the other's life . 45 It is disease that make s health 
46 pleasant; evil, good; hunger , plenty; weariness , r est. 
These contain great truth in spite of their obscurity and 
f r agmentariness. Ferri er calls t he principle 11 the embryo 
of t h e solution of t he enigma of the univ erse. rA7 
one of the most suggestive f ragments is, "I have 
sought to understand myself 1; 11 which is less significantly 
. 48 
rendered, "I hav e sought for myself •11 It has been inter-
preted, 11 I had no teachers, so had to s t udy alone. 11 However, 
it seems qui te possible that he may hav e meant his method 
was introspection or a study of his own experience. This 
view is supported by h is complaint, 11 Mo st men have no com-
prehension even of such things as they meet wi th, nor do 
they understand what t hey experience though t hey t hemselv e s 
t h inlt they do. 1149 Also, he must hav e studied his own inner 
43. Fr. 51 (Di els). 
44. Fr . 80 (Diels). 
45. Fr. 62 (Diels). 
46 . Fr. 111 (Diels). 
47. Ferrier, PW, I I , 145. 
48. Fr . 101 {Diels), 80 (Bywater). 
49. I.Pr. 17 (Di els); Pl at inus, En ., IV, 8, 1 also supports . 
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consciousne s s and experience, and have compa red hi s ideas 
with t h ose of other people and general iz ed , or else he could 
hardly have gained t he concept of law or have reached t h e 
conclusion t hat human l aws are fed by one divine- law. Per-
haps it is not unrea sonable to think of Heraclitus as a 
forerunner for the principle of self-certa inty in Augustine 
and Descartes,. and also as an embryonic introspectional 
psychologist. 
6. Parmenides started the first great clash between 
the exponents of t he active a nd passive views of reality. 
It seemed to him to be rank contrad iction , and impossible 
to admit that reality could be both permanent and chang ing. 
so he had to choose one or the other. In this controv ersy 
there was no disagreement about ·the unreliability of the 
world of appearance. The senses were discounted in both 
instances; by Heraclitus because they g ive a fals e impres-
sion of a static c ondition in a changing worl d ,. and by 
Pa rmenides because t hey g ive a f alse impression of change 
when all that is real, is per manent. 
Parmenides stood out uniquely among the Greek s in-
sisting that Being and Thought are one.50 Being is t h e 
universal apprehended by reason .. It is a world of law, 
logic and ideals, a world t hat is abiding , eternal and 
unified. Not -be ing is the particular a pprehended by sense , 
50 . Fr . 8 (Burnet); Bakewell , SBAP, 13; Brightman, ITP, 78 . 
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the world of chanse which has only a spurious existence. 
11 What is, is b irthless and deathless, who l e and only-
begotten, moveless and everenduring: never it was or shall 
be; but the All simultaneously now is, one cont inuous 
51 
one. 11 Hence reality was for him a stagnant undiversified 
unity, an unending monotony. This means that he viewed 
mind as void of activity, a crystallized essence, 11 the 
Given.'' such a world, no matter how g ood and perfect, 
would be unbearable for conscious s pirits, if it were 
possible. However, the work of Parmenides is monumental, . 
and will ever serve to contest the opposite extreme of 
those who maintain that all is activity and deny any per-
manent or abiding elements. 
7. Empedocles, the prophet-philosopher, is unique in 
his explanation that God is mind. He says that we cannot 
reach him with our eyes, nor lay hold of him with our hands, 
for he has no human organs. 11 He is only mind sacred and 
ineffab le mind, flashing through the whole univ erse with 
52 
swift t houghts." He b elieved firmly in transmigration, 
and that J.1.e had already passed all the lower stages, and 
would achieve the stage of an i mwor t al god in the next. 53 
He explains at length ho w wisdom may be won by striving for 
51. Fr. "On Nature, 11 Bakewell, SBAP, 11. 
52. Frs. 133, 134 (Diels). 
53. Frs. 112, 117, 146-147 (Burnet); Gomperz, GT, 228. 
~.1 . 
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the right thing s. This indicates belief in a free a ctive 
mind. He urged tne keeping of t h e universa l law of the 
sacredness of all li fe . 55 
Empedocles recog nized the influence of body and other 
environment on mind. "For according to t hat which is 
present to them doth thought incre ase in men, and as t hey 
change into a different nature so it ever c omes to them to 
think differently.11 "The blood round t he heart is t h e 
thoug ht o f rnen."5 6 Aristotle interpreted t h is as meanine; 
sense -perc-eption is merely physical alteration. some have 
called Empedocles a materialist because he designates four 
roots o f all things, earth, a ir, water, and f ire; but they 
overlook t he fact that his e f fi cient cause s, lov e and hate, 
are independent o f matter, not its properties. He believed 
consciousness wa s immanent in matter. "All things draw 
breath, 11 ''All things have wisdom and a share o f thought." 57 
Empedocles announced as a new fact t hat Love, the uni-
versal power that attracts and unites, is t h e very same love 
that men know in their bodies.58 strife or hate divides 
and destroys. Here for the first time the emotional factor 
54. Frs. 110, 129; Gomperz, GT, 251. 
55. Frs. 135-137; De Rhet., 1373b. 
56. Met., 1009b; Frs. 105, 106, 108. 
57. Frs. 100,, 102, 110 ; Gomperz, GT, 245. 
58. Burnet, EGP, 232. 
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is given r ecognition as a universal and causal principl0. 
Most important perhaps is t~e frag ment whic h state s 
t hat t h e thing which knows must be of a nat ure cognate or 
analog ous to that which knows it. 11 For it is with earth 
tnat vve see Earth, and water with water; by air we see 
bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. BY love do we see 
Love, and Hat e by grievous hate. 1159 It is by means of 
the earth, water, air, fire, and love of our own nature 
that we are abl e to apprehend t !1e earth, water, air, fire, 
and love that are external to us. Plato sugge sts similarly 
that the human soul is of the same elements as the soul of 
60 
the universe. Regardless of the orig inal meaning of 
Empedocl e s, the passage seems vaguely to suggest that epis-
temological dualism may be transcended and explained by a 
higher metaphy.~ical . monism. 
Empedocles should be remembered for his belief in 
universal law, the emotional factor, a significant theory 
of knovlledge, and for the immanence of Niind,. or God. 
8. Anaxagoras first thought reality to be Nous_, and 
61 laid the foundation for an intellec;tual view of the universe. 
He was the first to introduce the concept of ends or· final 
causes, combining intelligence with the power upholding 
59. Fr. 109. 
60. Timaeus, 41. 
61. I-Iegel,. PG, 46 (PM, 114); WdL, III, 31 (PhB). 
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and designing the universe. Thus he turned philosophers 
62 into an unexplored channel . He says: 1) In everything 
there is a portion of everything exc ept nous . There are 
1 h th . 1 603 2) some things in wnic ere ~s ~ a so; Nous is 
infinite, self ruled and mixed with nothing, it is the 
thinnest (subtl e st), purest, and strongest of all things; 
64 it knows all things and has power to set them in order; 
and 3) Nous, which is eternal, is certainly there, where 
everything else is, in the containing envelo pe, and in what 
65 has been united with it and separated off from it. The 
first gives the classification of animate and inanimate. 
In the second Nous is the transc-endent power above and 
over all. In the third, which is often overlooked, Nous 
is also immanent in the world ,. in the inanimate as well as 
the animate . Aristotle adds in substance: Anaxagoras 
held that mind is the first principle which set the universe 
in motion, and is the of goodness and order. 66 cause 
There has b een a great deal of misunderstanding about 
A.naxag oras: 
1) socrates assumed that because he 'Nrote much con-
62 . Ferrier, PW, II, 175, 177f. 
63. 
64. 
65. 
66. 
Fr. 
Fr. 
Fr. 
ne 
11 
12 
14 
An., 
(Di els). 
(Diels). 
(Diels). 
404b, 405a; Ph~ sica, VIII, ix, 265b 2 r' <::: · -
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C'erning efficient causes that he wa s denying final cause. 67 
r_t was not , however, a ca se of "either-or11 but of "both-and 11 
for Anaxagora.s. 
2) Similarly but more vigorously Aristotle accuses 
him of making no use of mind as cause except as a last re-
68 
sort when nothing else will suffice. However, the life 
and character of Anaxagoras testifies that he lived as if 
he held the philosophy of Nous, and if he did not, it must 
at l east be said that his prac.tical li fe laid t he foundation 
for such a theory.. socrates says t~nat Pericles wa s imbued 
with the higher philosophy and knowledge of Nous_ which 
accounted f or his superb accomplishments, and sublimest 
6 
s entiments. 9 Also, according to Plutarch, 
Pericles learned from Anaxagoras to 
overco me those terrors which the various 
phenomena of the heavens raise in t hose 
who know not their causes, and vrho enter-
tain a tormenting fear of the gods by 
reason of their ignoranc e . Nor is t here 
any cure for it but the study of nature, 
which , instead of the frightf Ql extrava -
gances of superstition, implants in us a 70 
sober piety~ supported by a rational hope. 
In the light of this it appears that Nous as final and 
supreme cause was the very warp and woo f of h is consc ious 
life rather than _"an artificial device" dragged in for 
67. Phaedo , 97-99. 
68 . Met ., 935a, 1075b; Also , 988a , 939b, l009b. 
69 . Phaedrus, 269D- 270A . 
70. Plutarc i.l ,_ Life of Pericl es , c. 4-6 ; Ferrier , PW, II, 165f . 
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theore tic a l emergencies. 
3) Aristotl e 's statements regarding Anaxagoras as an 
activist are not in accord with the f rag ment s , and are con-
fused. He says Anaxagoras holds t he impassiv e vi ew of 
71 
mind (i.e. that it cannot be acted upon), commends him 
72 for not viewing mind as passive, and t hen condemns h im 
for contradiction .. 73 It seems that Aristotle simply in-
ferred fro m 11 the s eparateness of nous" (transcendenc:e), 
that no passivity is possible. He failed to note the frag -
ment on immanence mentioned above or if he did, thought 
that mind could not be both ac.tive and passive but must be 
one or the other. This may be due to his interpretation of 
the ~ of Anaxagoras (a compreh ensiv e term) a s mer ely 
the rationa l part of the soul. 
It is r easonably certain t 11at t h e vi ews of Anaxagoras 
are not opposed to i nt er act i on, or to t he view t hat mind is 
both active and passive. Zeller found a garbled passage on 
Anaxag oras which he interprets, 11 All living being s have 
passive ·bu·t not active intellige~ce." 74 Everything living 
is i .nfluenced by environment but only a f ew creatures exert 
will on the environment. Th e separateness of ~ is not 
71. De An., 405b 22 (Hicks); ~., VIII, v. 256b 25. 
72 •. De An., 429a, 17 (Loeb). 
73. Ibid., 429b 23. 
74. Zeller, HG'P, II, 364 from the Placi ta, v, 20 , 3. 
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meant to deny c ontinui ty , f or he say s , Things are not "cut 
off' f r om one ano t her as wi th a hatchet . 1175 Even opposites 
t hen , have f undamental likene s s . Spirit is spirit, and has 
no qualitativ e difference. Things are to be distinguished 
only according t o the quantity of nous in them . 76 11 In all 
t h i ng s are part s of all exc·ept Mind, but i n some (i.e. the 
animate) Mi nd is also. 1177 In other words , while Mi nd is 
immanent in all t h i ng s, it is not identifi ed with all, 
onl y a f mv thing s pos sess Mind, or are Mind. "All nous 
is alike but one is gr eater , another less." 78 
4) Aristotle tried to show t ha.t Anaxagoras denied 
79 
t he law of contrad ic t ion. In regard to ~ Anaxag oras 
is perhaps more empirical t han Aristotle. He seems to 
have chosen experience as f undament a l but without rejecting 
r eason, f or it is said that he declared the log os to be 
. 80 the criter~on. Immanenc e and transcend ence seem on t he 
surface to be contradic-tory, but from hi s own personal d is-
covery of his own nous and its interaction wi th nature he 
i nferred t hat supreme Nous was dist inc t from nature yet 
i mmanent i n it. Also, on the basis that contraries are not 
75 . Fr. 8 (Diels). 
76 . Ze ller , HGP, II, 343; :b.,r. 8 ( 6); Bri ght man , I.TP , 22lf. 
77. Fr. 11 (7); and Zeller, HGP , II, 363. 
78 . Fr. 12 (Diels); Zeller, loc. cit. 
79 . Zeller, HGP, II , 369f. and note 1. 
80. Ibid., 370. 
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predicable oi' t :.1e same subject, Aristotle make s a false a nd 
ridiculous interpretation of fragment 11 when he comments , 
11 For when Ana.xago ras says that in everything there is a 
part of everything , he eans t hat nothi ng is sweet any more 
than it is bitter, and similarl y wi th any of the other 
pairs of contrari e s. 1181 It is clear from fragment 12, 
"Eac·h single thing is and was most manifestly those thi ng s 
of w·hich it has mo st in it, 11 that he meant, even the 
sweet e st things c·ontain some of the sour and bitter par-
ticles. This illustrates how Aristotle failed to grasp 
the depth and significance of Heraclitus as well as 
Anaxagoras . Their teachings v1ere obscured Ylhile the world 
follo·w ed Aristotle until .Hegel unfolded their more profound 
thougi1 t anew. 
Anaxagoras held with Heraclitus that sense-perception 
is called forth not by likes but by opposites. He gave 
preference to thought ov er the sensible, though little is 
to be found as to the share of ~ in sense-perception. 
However, in the statement that the ears do not themselves 
perceive objects but transfer t he sensation to nous, it 
seems to be regarded as percipient subject. 82 some see in 
83 
this a polemical attitude toward the t heory of Empedocles 
81. Met., 1063b 18. 
82. Zeller, HGP , II, 367-369 and the li'r. from Theophrasto s. 
83 . Burnet, EGP, 273f. 
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mentioned above. Honev er, it would se e m t nat both theories 
grope for the trutn and contain significant sugg estions 
which can hardly be said to be opposed. Anaxagoras seems 
to speak from the viewpoint of the sense-processe s them-
selves, while Empedocles may be thinking of something more 
ultimate, which would now be called t1e metaphysical ex-
planation. Although the theory of the latter is usually 
interpreted in the crude, purely materialistic sense, it 
may well suggest another meaning. The two theories mig nt 
be viewed as complementary. In the world of s ense, per-
ception comes through opposites; or idea and object on the 
phenomenal level are different and o ppo sed. On the meta-
physical level it is only because there is real likeness 
between object and subject that knowledge is possible. 
Also, Anaxagoras could have acc e pted the latter, because 
he held to the continuity and qualitative likeness of all 
nous, and to the ordering and control of the cosmic Nous 
over all things. 
The most interesting question in connection with 
Anaxagoras is probably, to what extent his philosophy 
grew out of the discovery of his own mind. Because he 
said in the beginning of his treatise 11 All things were 
tog ether; then came Nous and set them in order, 11 he ac-
quired 11 the nickname of Nous or Mind and Timon in his 
Silli says: 'Then t::O.ere is Anaxagoras, a doughty champion, 
39 
whom t h ey call Mind, because forsooth, his was the mind 
which suddenly wo ke up and fit t ed closely tog ether all t hat 
84 had formerly been in a medley of confusion .' " Plutarch 
says t hat the people called him Nous either in admiration 
of h is g reat understanding and knowleG]ge of the works of 
nature , or because he was the f irst who clearl y proved that 
the universe owed its formation neither to chance nor nee -
essity , but to a pure and unmixed Mind , who separated the 
homogeneous parts from the other with which they were con-
85 founded . 
Zell er thinks that Anaxagoras defined his conception 
of Nous according to the analogy of the human mind. "our 
experience affords no o ther anal ogy f o r inc orporeality and 
for design towards an end than that of the human spirit; 
and it is , there fore, quite natural that Anaxag oras should 
define his moving cause according t o this ailalogy , as 
thinking . 86 The h onor for the discovery of~ or the 
sel f as the clue to the myst e ry of the univ erse must surely 
b e g ranted to Anaxag oras . 
9 . socrat e s cente red his deepest intere st in t h e 
philosophy o f mind . He mi ght well be called the s e arc her 
of t he soul or it may be said t hat i n a ll anti quity he wa s 
84 . Dio6 o La ert., I, i, " u 0 
85 0 Ferri e r , Pi""r , II, 165 . 
86 0 Zeller, HG·P , II, 346 , 348 , 351. 
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t he g reatest inquirer into t he soul . As a c~ild he practised 
i ntrospec t i on37 and i n aclult life was subject to t rance s. 88 
As an old man he sa id, "The unexamined l ife is not ·worth 
89 90 livine; . 11 He vras constantly l ed by signs and warned by 
. 91 a voJ.ce. "God orders me to f ulfil the philosophers ' 
mi ssion of searching into myself and other men ." 92 V[ith 
him, according to Hegel, began t !.'le gradual change of opinion 
from t he time when external agencies , such as the Greek 
oracl es , were regarded a s determining the will, to the ti 1ne 
when the power of origination is felt solely to belong to 
ourselv es . He brought within mind, '.Vhat had hitherto ruled 
it from without. 93 He made his contemporari es deeply con-
scious of the i njUDction KNOW THYSELF . It is not a call to 
humanism. It is no "text or motto of an empty and common-
place morality, 11 but 11 the hardest task in which a philosopher 
94 
can be engaged." Hegel says it did not and does not mean 
a psychological study of the single self, but involves man's 
8T. Apol., 31. 
88. sym. , 220. 
89. Apol., 3~. 
90. ~., I, i, 4; IV, iii, 12, & viii, 1. 
91. Phaedrus, 242 ; ReP ., 496; Theaet.; 151; Euthy ., 272. 
92 . Apol., 33 , 281' . a 1d Pnaedrus , 230. 
93 . Hegel, PdR, par . 279 ; Zeller , SSS, 80 . 
94. Ferrier , PTI , II, 218 ; of . Knudson, PP, 238 . 
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genuine r eality,, t he h i ghest and hardest of studies , becau s e 
it is t he most concrete . 95 
For socrates, man is not merely a passiv e creature of 
s ensation. He is not a sort of Trojan horse where a number 
of unconnec ted sense s are perched, but man is mind, the 
power ' that unifi es sense data . 96 The world of sense is like 
t he worl d of shadows i n the myth of the cav e , wh ich seem 
97 
r eal and are not. The senses are untrustworthy and often 
hinder the soul. 11 The unchangi ng thing s you can perceiv e 
only with mind-th~y are invisible. n 98 Nevertheless, s ensa-
tion 1s primary and nec·essary, and thinking iS· voluntary 
and difficult. 11 The simpl e sensations which l"each the soul 
through the body are giv en at birth to men and animals by 
Nature , but their reflec tions on the being and use of them 
are slowly and hardly gained, if t hey are ever gained, by 
education and long experience. .. 99 Reason and experience 
hand in hand . 11 The soul vi ews some t h ings by hersel f and 
11100 . 
others t hrough the b odily organs, ~. e. the soul is 
g o 
passive in sensation and active in reason. The soul is ev er 
95. Hegel , :E:nc ., 377. 
96. Theaet., 184. 
97. Rep ., 514-520. 
98. Phaedo , 65f.' 79. 
99. Theaet. , 186 . 
100 . Ibid ., 185. 
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in motion and ti:lat which ceases to move ceases also to live. 
The nature of' the soul is such that it is moved from 
101 
within. The passive abiding element is essential f or 
communication and knowledge. He says, if all is change, 
while we use a word its object is escaping in the f lux and 
. 102 
there can be no language of expression. "If the trans-
1tion is always going on, there will always be no knowledge, 
and according to this vieYv , there will be no one to know 
and nothing to be known. 11103 Here he seems 11 to land into 
the egocentric predicament. 11 
Man is not body but soul, for "The soul is man. 11 Both 
-ro4 
are real, but the soul is more real. He who cherishes 
his body cherishes not himself but what belongs to him. If 
the eye would know itself, it must see itself mirrored in 
t he most perfect part of the eye of another. Then the soul 
that would know itself must look at that divine part of the 
soul in vvhich virtue, wisdom, and knowledge reside.105 Man 
may well be "the measure, 11 if with socrates, the highest 
functions of the h ighest man are chosen for the standard. 
Mind rul e s the w1iverse. our bodies contain t he same 
101. :Phaedrus ;·. __ : 245 • 
102. Theaet., 182. 
103. crat., 440. 
104 . Alcib., 129-131; Re p ., 585; Phaedo, 115 . 
105 . Alcib., 130 -133 . 
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.elements as t h e un iv erse and are evidently deriv ed fro m it, 
106 
then h u man souls must b e derived from the univ e rsa l soul. 
11 The soul of man, which mor e tha n all else tha t is human, 
partake s o f the d ivine, reig ns manifestly within us, and yet 
107 is itsel f unseen. The very nature of t h e soul is to b e 
108 
alive and imperish able and hence immortal. "Th en i f t he 
soul is really i mmortal, wh a t care should b e t aken of her , 
not only in respect of the portion of time Yvhic h is c a ll ed 
life, b u t of etern ity! And the danger of neg lecting her 
fro m this point of vi ew does indeed appear to be a wful. 11109 
This explains why socrate s f elt t nat his whol e li f e '!vas 
und e r 11 the command of God" to persuade old and young ali k e 
not to care f or t h e e x t e rnal a nd mat e ri a l but 11 first a nd 
chiefly t o care about the g reatest i mprovemen t of t h e 
1 11 110 sou • 
Is Any creativity of' Mind Sugg ested? 
socrates would not say that man create s his own ideas, 
but that by rig orous eff ort, perseverance, a nd t he aid o f 
t he divine, eithe r t hat h e may bring his innate i d eas to 
106. Ph il., 28- 30. 
107. Mem., IV, iii, 14; Ph aedo, 80. 
108 . Phaedo, 105. 
109. Ibid., 107. 
110. Apol., 30; also, 29, 33 . 
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to birth (into consc i ouB pos session ) or t hat he may di scover 
or recollect e t ernally existing ideas . Also, he would say 
t hat it is possible to achieve a higher mode of life in 
another world . The great e st aim of socrate s was to d evelo p 
his oiTn soul to t his end and to help others to the same 
ac hievement. To develop a great personality and i spire 
others 11 to care about t he greatest improvement of the soul 11 
is certainly to live creatively. His whole li fe work in 
the science of Maieutics was itself creative activity. He 
g ives some suggestions as to how the abundant life may be 
achieved . 
For him the key to creativity is in kno wl edge of t h e 
Good or that "Virtue is knowledge , 11 underg irded by t he 
assumption that tJ:1e supreme value and highest ideal is 
11 Tl1e Good • 11 so great wa s his own love of truth and desire 
for the g ood t hat he believed it to be innate and universal 
for man to choose the g ood . When he did not do so, it was 
due to lack of knowledge as to what is truly g ood. To ac- . 
quire knowledge requires the highest mental activity and 
11 In the world of kno v1l edge t h e idea of g ood appears last of 
all, a nd is seen only with effort, 11111 and 11 Hard is the 
knowledge of t h e g ood . 1111 2 Although t he power and capacity 
of learning exists in the soul already it is only by degrees 
111. Rep., 517. 
112 . Crat ., 383 ; Ti.1eaet ., 186. 
and by the exercise of the whole soul that it can comprehend 
113 being and the good. Thinking is not only hard , it is 
free , and individual. Socrates cannot transfer his thoughts 
to Theaetetus, he can only help him ·bring his own ideas into 
. t 114 ex~s ence. 
To find the Good three ideas are necessary, Beauty , 
Symmetry, and Truth, but 11 Unless Truth enter into the 
115 
composition, nothing can truly be created or subsist." 
116 
But Truth is knovm only when illuminated by the Good. 
The idea of the good is the immediate source of reason and 
truth and the power upon which he who would act rationally,, 
117 
either in public or private life must have his eye f'ixed. 
As the eye shines only in the light, so the soul perceives, 
understands, and is radiant with intelligence only when 
illuminated by the good which is higher than science and 
118 
truth. socrates identifies the Good Vli th God, ll9 who 
120 
sees all, hears all, and is everywhere. He s p eaks of the · 
113. Rep., 518. 
114. Theaet., 149-151. 
115. Phil ., 
,.... 
04. 
116. Re p ., 508. 
117. Ibid., 517, 534. 
118. Ibid., 509. 
119. Phil., 22. 
120. Mem., I, iv, 18. 
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internal oracle as 11 the source of the divine :t"acul ty, 11 i.e. 
a sense or the divine had developed by means of the culti-
121 
vation of the inner voice. 11 That knowledge only which is 
of being and of the un s een can make the soul look upwards. 11122 
His perception of the Absolute Good was attained by the 
light of reason only-not with the assistance of sense but 
123 
by pure intelligence and persev erance. However, socrat e s 
does not ignore the non-rational factors. The ~elation of 
reason to the lower desires and love is expressed in the 
figure of the charioteer. Reason as guide, aided by noble 
124 love can conquer the unruly steed. 
Because of its mysterious power, it had long been held 
that love was an important g od i nfluencing men, and some 
thought that there were two gods to account f or the high 
and low types. vrhen Pausanias interprets noble love as 
creative , "making the lover and the beloved alike eager in 
1 25 
the works of their own improvement, 11 socrates adds that 
love is a great spirit mediating between divine and mortal; 
through him all is bound together, through him the arts of 
prophet and priest find their way , for God does not con-
verse directly with man . The wisdom which understands this 
1 21 . Apol., 40. 
122. Rep., 529. 
123. Rep ., 532 , 529 . 
1 24 . Phaedrus, 246-255. 
125. sym.' 185. 
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is spiritual. Love may lead to creations of V' isCi. om, virtue , 
poetry, and f air thoughts, and in the attainment of such 
11 human na t ure ·:.rill not easily f ind a helper better than 
1. 11126 ove. 
nemos says, 11 Eros is nothing if not creative. 11127 It 
is creative because it is innate desire for beauty, truth, 
and perfection. It involves othe~s as well as the sel f . 
One desires to be like the god he has chosen to worship 
and. wi .shes his friends to conform to this god., \'{hen a 
person is loved it is not as a particular individual, but 
he is selected because he is an image of the ideal. The 
lover want s the loved to grow more and more nearly like 
128 the ideal. There will ever be friendsnip among the 
good, because they are striving for tne same goals, and 
129 
each inspire s and aids the others. 
The quotations given from the Dialogues are the words 
of Plato, and it is an unsolvable probl em as to just how 
much of the thought is that of socrates and h ow much was 
added by Plato. However, there can be no doubt that 
socrat e s l a i d the foundation for the development of Plato's 
thought . socrat e s gave no arguments fo r immortality or 
126. Ibid., 212 , 185 - 212. 
127. nemos, PP, 84 , 82f. 
128. Phaedrus, 252f. 
129. Ibid., 255. 
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proofs for t he existence of' God, but h e liv ed a creative 
life similar to t i:w se of the Hebr ew· prophets, and hi s death 
foreshad ows t hat of J e sus four c enturies l ater . He d emon -
strated hi s faith in the world of invisible s pirit. Theories 
had to fo llow to explain h i s conduct. It is due t o socrates 
more than to any other individual t hat belief in immortality 
among the Gr eeks was so far i n adv anc e of the Hebrews . 
10 .. Moo h i f not a ll whi ch has b e en attributed above 
to socrat e s may be vi ewed as Plato's thought a l so. The 
follo wi ng endeavors to add some of Plato 's later thought 
conc·erning the univ erse of spirit, and creativity . 
The Nature of Mind . 
Concerning the nature of t he soul,, her true f orm is 
ever "a t heme of l a r ge and more t han mort al dl sc ourse. •• 130 
1 31 Mi nd is t he firs t, t he oldest, most divine, and rules all. 
1 ""'" 2 Mind is pri or to t he b ody which is the vehicle of t he soul. :; 
The soul has three parts; reason, spirit, and a ppetite , 133 
or the r ational (the immortal part plac ed ab ove the midrii' f ), 
134 passion, and desire. The lovter intellect · uses image s, 
130 . Phaedrus, 246 . 
131 . ~~ O Q ''' o:;;~ c:., 895f .' 899 , 966f. 
132 . La v;s, 896 ; Ti m., 34 , 87 . 
133 . Rep ., 435 -442 . 
134 . Tim., 6.9f .' 90 .. 
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135 
the h i gher does not. In the battle as to b e ing and 
essenc e , "the children of the dragon's teeth11 assert that 
nothi ng is r eal which they cannot squeeze in -· their hand s •136 
Thought is not an image. 137 The great e st states are in-
v1sible.138 some thing s have sensible images, the greatest 
~ h" · t do not •139 ana: . ~gnes 
140 Mind is active; it orders and controls. It is the 
motion which moves itself. Where t here is no motion there 
141 
is no mind. 
142 
Being is power. only the soul c.an 
143 
reason. Yet, however essential activity may be , , mind is 
not solely ac·tiv-i ty, for passivity is essential to activity . 
The stranger says that rest as well as motion is necessary 
to the existence of mind. The philosopher demands both ''the 
moveable and unmoveable in his definition of being and 
11 ,1 144 it '' - 1 . 1 a ,. or as Demos expre sses , Tne r ea ~s a comp ex 
135. Rep., 510 . 
136. so ph •. , 246f .; Theaet., 155. 
137. Phaedo, 99f. 
138. S0}2h., 286. 
139. states., 285f. 
140. Laws, 896. 
141. soph., 249. 
142. Ibid., 247. 
143. Tim., 46. 
144. soph., 249. 
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being with a pole of rest, on the one hand , and a pole of 
145 
motion on the other. 11 The soul is patterned activity, 
"the principle of life operating in accordance with law; 11 
it is movement with a shape, teleological movement, a 
process of realizing the g ood, or the achiev ement of 
146 
value. Human souls are made of the same elements as 
the universal, but diluted.147 
Plato's c.oncept of mind or soul is further illuminated 
by his arguments for immortality: 
1) Ideas are e ternal. The soul has these ideas be-
cause it recollects them. Then it must have pre -existed, 
148 
and if so, it will continue to exist. 
2) The nature a nd essence of the soul is life . It 
cannot admit of' its opposite death . The immortal does not 
149 
admit o f death~ Then the soul must be immortal. 
3) The soul is self-moving, self-determining, and in 
ceaseless motion . It is like world-soul, the beginning of 
all motion, which cannot be destroyed without the collapse 
of heaven and all creation. That which is ever in motion 
145. Demos, PP,; 97 . 
146. Ibid., 82. 
147. Ti m., 41. 
148. Phaedo, 73-77; Meno, 86. 
149. Phaedo, 105. 
·-· . --- ... ~ . · --:.'":" ·-
_ . .. ___ .,_ 
. i t 1 H t ' 1 · · t 1 lSO 
. :Ls mmor a . : ence ne sou ~s ~rumor a • 
4 ) God , the father of t he gods , who is g ood and per -
feet is the artificer and creator of souls ~nd of all that 
is g ood . He says, liMy c-reati ons are indis solubl e , if so 
I will . All that is bound may be undone , but only an evil 
being would wish to undo that which is harmonious and 
151 
happy . II Here is somethi ng quite different and it has 
been apprec iated only in rec ent t imes , immor t a l ity rests 
simpl y on the v alue of souls and the goodness and will of 
God. Howev er , Pl a t o did not mean univ ersal iwnortality . 
It is somethi ng a few may win . Men by their ovm efforts 
through true educ ation must a chiev e r eason ,, harmony , 
mioo . 152 All men may share in true opinion bu t "mi nd is 
the attr ibute of the g ods and of very few men . 11 153 The 
pri ncipl es prior t o bodies 11 God onl y knows , and he of men 
154 
who i s the friend of God . 11 Those oc cupied with the 
crav ings of desire and ambit i on have onl y morta l thought s 
and will pas s into l ower f orms of life , bu t he who has been 
earnest in the love of knowl edge and wisdom, exerci_s i ng his 
intellect has divine thoughts . If he attains truth , he will 
150. Phaedrus, 245 ; Phaedo, 80 ; Laws , 894ff . 
151. Tim., 41. 
152 . I_bid .' 44 . 
153 . Ibid ., 51. 
154 . Ibi d. , 53 . 
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155 be immortal and happy . 
Plato's conc -3 pt of mind involv e s his conc ept of God , 
for he mu st be Mind creat i ng mind . He is 11 father of the 
ruling active principle ."156 "The father and rna er of a ll 
this universe is past finding out; and even if we f ound 
him , to t ell of him to all men would be impossible. 11157 
Nevertheless, it is profi tabl e to find out all t hat is 
possible . 11God and the things of God a r e in every way per-
158 f eet," and he is "perfect righteousness . '' He is un-
changeable. He is author only of t he g ood, "Whatever is 
saved and come s to good is saved by the power of God . 11159 
QUite in contrast with Aristotle, Plato believ ed i n a 
personal God who care s for his world and for h uman souls. 
11
'J.'he best soul t a lres care of the world and guides it along 
h d th 1, 160 11 , d , n h t e g oo pa • Tne go s nave a care o! any one w ose 
desire is to become just and to be like God, a s far as man 
c an att a in the divine l ikeness , by t he pursu i t of virtue .. 11161 
God i s not the all, nor the omni potent . He reveal s a 
155. Ibid., 90f . cr . Laws, 904 . 
156 . Epistle VI, 323 , writ ten i n his old age . 
157. Tim., 28. 
158 . Rep ., 381; Theaet ., 176 . 
159 . Rep ., 493 . 
160 . Laws, 897. cr. 905, 907 . 
161. Rep., 613. 
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162 
finite element of' exi stence a nd also a.n infinite. The 
infinite or unlimited is the factor of indefiniteness, 
f • 163 II ' i .._ th f 11 v agueness , con us~on. Goa s nov e cause o a 
164 
things , but of g ood only.'' The created g ods provide 
the mortal elements which are responsible for much of the 
evil . God is the active cause but there are other non-
mental causes or hindrances, ·timeless and uncreated,, t he 
165 
rec eptacle and the pattern. Fire, water, air,, and 
166 
earth 11 were prior to the creation of heaven. 11 All of 
t hese eternally existing factors constitute (in Tsanoff '·s 
words) 11 a cosmic drag'' or they are part of 11 the Given. 11 
Evil is a real fac ·t for God , but reason the ruling power 
167 
conquers necessity,. and God does control 11 the Given . 11 
In the immortal conflict going on between good and evil the 
. 168 
gods are our allies . The human soul , since it is like 
world-soul must have this passive element also. But what 
of the active creative factor? 
162. Phil., 23 . 
163 . Loc . cit. ; Demos, PP, 7f . 
164. Rep . , 380. 
165 . Tim. , 48- 50. 
166 . Tim., 48 . 
167. Loc. cit. 
168 . Laws, 906. 
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Creative ACtivity . 
God is creative , and since he d esired that 11 all things 
170 -be as li ke himself as they could be, 11 and 11 gave the 
sov ereign part of t he soul to be t ne div i nity of each 
171 
one," then human mind is, or was meant to be creative. 
lt h . d di . ti t ~ k" d 172 A .iJ.oug numan a n v~ne crea on are no o:t one ~n , 
173 yet every one is in some sense a creator. There are 
t hree beds; the "idea" mad e by God, t he material object 
fashioned by the carpenter , and that made eith_er by the 
painter or poet . The f irst onl y is real, t he oth ers are 
imitations but "Imitation is a kind of creation."174 
:;,!lind may a lso work crea tivel y on t i1e b ody . "Every soul 
wears out many bodies ••• ,and a l ways weav e s another garment 
and r epairs the waste . 11 175 If mind controls body , which 
is rna terial,_ tD.en there must be continuity in the universe . 
I _s Pl ato 's Univ erse an Organic crea tive "vhole? 
'rhe usual vi ew of 11 Pla tonic ideas" rJay need reinter-
pretation. Although they are said to b e far removed from 
particulars , stat ements often occur favoring an organic 
170 . Tim., 29 . 
171. Tim.,. 90. 
172 . So ph ., 265 . 
173. Rep ., 596f. 
174. So ph., 265 . 
175 . Phaedo, 87, 80 . 
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vi m'f of t he universe and opposing abs traction: 
l) 11 God created i n each t h i ng i n rel at ion to itself', 
and i n all things i n rel a ti on to each other, a ll the 
measure s and harmonies which t hey could possibly receive" 
176 (Timaeus speaking). 
2) The human soul is of the same elements a s universa l 
177 
s pirit (Ti maeus). 
3) The cour ses of our intelligenc e are akin to those 
178 
of heav en (Timaeus). The soul r e sembl e s t he divine 
(Socrat e s). 179 
4) "The ruler of t he universe ha s ordered all things 
with a vi ew to t he excellence and preservation of the whol e , 
and each part, as f a r as may be, has an action and passion 
appropriate to it •••• one portion of the univ erse is your 
own which however little , contribut e s to the whole and 
every other creation is for t he sake of the vvhol e , and in 
order tha t the li fe of the ;,yhole may b e blessed" 
180 (Atheni an). 
5) 11 In speaking of something we speak of being, f or 
to speak of an abstract so me t hing naked and isolated from 
176 . Ti m., 69 . 
177. Ibid., 41. 
178 . Ibid ., 47. 
179. Phaedo, 80 . 
180 . Laws __ , 903. 
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181 
all beine; is impossible" (stranger ) • 
.. 
6) 11 J.l,or any single class to be left, by it self pure 
and isola t ed is not good, nor altog e ther possible 11 
182 (Socrates). 
7) To try to abstract motion from a mover is as im-
possible as trying to think of a mover unless something be 
183 
moved (Timaeus). 
8) "c an we imagine that being is devoid of life and 
mind and exists in aw·ful unrneaningness an everlasting fix-
184 
ture 11 (stranger) . 
9) 11 The attempt to separate al l existences from one 
another is a barbarism and utterly unworthy of an educated 
185 
or philosophical mind" (Stranger). 
10) The attempt at universal separation is the final 
annihilation of all reasoning" (Stranger ) •186 
These statements by important characters are numerous 
enough to lead one to think that Plato probably accepted the 
concept of an organic· universe. If so, then to be consis-
tent, 11 ideas 11 or 11 the pattern11 as well as the receptacle 
18l . soph., 237 . 
182 . Phil ., 63. 
183 . Tim., 57. 
184 . sonh.' 249 . 
185. Ibid., 259 . 
186. Ibid ., 260. 
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must be eternally existing factors within God. In his theory 
of 11 ideas" Plato clearly meant to emphasize the objectivity 
-
a nd reality o f values, but if 11 ideas 11 and e ssences could 
exist independent of the De miurge, then the universe would 
not be an organic whole. Hence, it may well b e concluded 
that the universe is mental in structure and is an org a n ic 
creative ',7hole. 
11. Although Aristotle criticizes Plato in many minor 
points, the t wo g enerally agr ee on the main issue s~ To 
avoid r epetition only the important differences or unique 
ideas will be mentioned. Aristotle makes a cl ear distinction 
between soul and mind. The former is the primary substance187 
188 
and is expressed as form. It is with all of its affec-
189 
tions inseparable from the body. The parts of tne soul 
190 
are the nutritive, sensitive, and rational. Mind is that 
part of the soul by which it thinl{S and atta ins belief; it 
has no existence until it thinks, and it is unreasonable to 
suppose that it is mixed with the body. 191 The soul is 
b d ( i t 11 t d I • J ) o ti 192 passive, ut min · e ec accor ing ·c,o H~C Ks ~s ac ve. 
187. Met., 1037a. 
188. De An., 412a, b. 
189. Ibid., 412b, 4-03a,. 4-08a. 
190. Ibid., 415a, 432ff.; Nic. Eth., I, xiii. 
191. De An., 429a. 
192. Ibid., 408b, 409a, 4-30a; Met., l072b. 
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The t h inking (speculative) faculty is the immortal. part o f 
193 
the soul. Mind s e ems to have an ind epend ent existenc e , 
h e say s, and not to suffer decay, but me mory and love fall 
With +h b - 194 u e oa.y. 
Here is the explanation f or his indiff erence to the 
subject of immortality. He does say "we ought so far as 
possible to achieve immortality and d o all that man may to 
live in accordance with the highest t h i ng in him, 11195 but 
he has pre-existence and transmigration in mind and believes 
that the nex t life will have no individuality and no more 
memory or consciousness of t h is, than the present life has 
of its previous existence. Although he divides the soul into 
perishabl e and innortal parts he still tries to take an 
organic view of 1 t. 11 summing up what we have said about 
the soul, let us assert once more t h at in a sense the soul 
is all the existing univ e rse. For the universe consists of 
objects felt, and objects thought of, and knowl edge .relates 
196 
to the latter a.nd sensation to the former.-" In other 
instanc·es Aristotle upholds the organic view and condemns 
abstractions: 
1) The objects of mathematics do not exist in s epara-
193. De An., 413b. 
194. Ibid •. , 408b. 
195. Nic. Eth., X, Vii, 2--viii. 
196. De An., 43lb. 
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197 
tion. 
2) 11 lt would se em impossib le t !1a t t !1e substanc e and 
t he tilling of which it is t he sub stanc e exist in s e paration; 
henc e ho w c an t h e Ideas, if t h ey a re the substances of 
thi ng s, e x i s t in s eparation from t h e m? 11198 
3) If there is motion, t n ere is somethi ng moved, for 
199 
there is no motion a pa rt f rom things. 
4) Those are wrong who say all t h i ng s a r e a t r e st, 
200 
and also those who say all is in motion. 
5) Time is not independent of consciousne ss. There 
could be no time with out a soul to count. 201 
6) Universals must not be sepa r ated from pa rticular s. 
They a r e practically the same k ind o f t hing. With out the 
202 
universal vve cannot acquire knowledg e. 
7) For s ensa tion Aristotle is a dualist. Besides the 
. t - . t . t ' . . t . -'- 203 b . f s ensat~on nere mus oe so me n 1. ng pr1. or o l.u, ut. or 
s peculative kno wledg e h e is a monist. 11 Th ought and t h e 
197. Met., l077b, l090a. 
198~ Ibid ., 9 9lb. 
199. Ibid., 1063~ , l065b. 
200 . Ibid., l012b. 
201. Phys., 2 23a. 
202 . Met., l086b. 
203 . I b id., lOlOb-lOlla; De An., 432a , 424a . 
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204 
object o f t h ought are t he same ." There is no parallax 
between rational thought and reality. 
creative Activity. 
Aristotle should b e freed from t he a ccusation of ad-
vancing t h e tabula rasa t h eory. It might apply to h is 
passive soul but he d oe s not even say that. 205 He thi nk s 
206 
that. the soul is universal, active, and causal. Mind or 
activ e reason is the divine eternal part o f t he soul and 
yet it is dependent on the lo wer part , f or there could be 
207 
no knowl edge without perception. He glorifies imagina -
208 
tion and nev er gets beyond it. 11 Even when one thinks 
209 
s peculatively , he must hav e some mental picture . '' Hence 
it must be admitted t hat Aristotle d oes not rise to the 
height s of Plato. He never attains the idea o f imageless 
thought or of creative t h ink ing in t he d iscov ery o f the 
truth i n the r ealm of 11 idea s. 11 
204. Met., 1072b; De An., 430a. 
205 . De An., 430a the n earest . see Hegel, Enc., par . 226 . 
206. ne An., 415b ; Met., 1032a, 1070a. · 
207 . Ibid., 432a. 
208 . LOC. Cit. 
209 . De An ., ' 43la , b ; Also On Memory, 449b, 450a . 
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SUFJ[MARIZING THE GREEKS 
Excepting parmenide s only, who fought the extreme s of 
activism, all of t,he philosopners mentioned, viewed sou1 
as active or causal, and all had a higher concept of God 
t han t h eir c ontemporaries. For them it is certa inly true 
t hat metaphysics and theology are inseparable. Gradually 
the idea of matter as ultimate substance faded. pythagoras 
made thought, not s ense, the clue to reality. The battle 
between permanence and change l ed finally to a recognition 
of the reality of both, or that there are both active a nd 
passive elements in the universe. A crude anthropomorphism 
t ends toward the recognition of an organic universe, mental 
in nature. Empedocles discover ed love as t he binding , con-
structiv e principle, and said God is Mind. Tilth the dis-
covery of t he s elf came the concepts of logos and nous, and 
belief in Mind as the creative power and unity of the 
universe. The mind of man as part of it, may by effort 
acquire wisdom, d evelop into more complex stag es, and 
achi eve a higher existenrr-e. More specifically, t here are 
suggestions of creative Activity through: 
1) Effort, striving, 11 exercise of the whole soul." 
2) The idea of the Good--virtue the key. 
3) Imagination and thought. 
4) Imitation. 
5) Love. 
This survey has been mad e v..r i th care because Gre ek 
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though t is t h e main sourc e and inspira t i on f or t he g r eat 
philosophical sy st ems that follo wed. A f e w of t he most 
significant and r e levant ideas f rom some of the s e sy st em s 
will no w b e considered . 
LATER CONT~ I BUTIONS IN BRI EF 
1. Plo,t .i nus i s often c a lled 11 t he . l ast of' t he Greel{:s , 11 
and a new Pla to; but .i.J.e wa s v ery d i fferent , f or a l though 
living i n t he midst of christianity , he v1a s probably l ess 
chri sti an i n s pi r it than Pla to. 
a ) 210 Soul, he t hought, is immat eri a l . It is 
neither body no r a state or experi ence of' body bu t is act 
211 
and c reation. It i s the Reason-Princ·iple of t he uni-
?12 213 214 
verse ,-- other than s ense, and of divine order . It 
' 215 has existenc e no where and everywnere . It is the principle 
of sel f -living motion neither mass nor quantlty . 216 But the 
217 i nd ividual not only ac ts, he is acted upon. 11 'rhe re-
cipient i n us rec eives from both sides absorbing not merely 
218 1ntellec_t1ons but also sen se-perc-eptions. 11 
b) However, perc eption is not mere passive r eaep-
210. Eru~eads, IV, 7, 10. (Her eaft e r numbers only will be 
given.) 
211. IV, 7 8E also D. 
212 . LV , 6 , 3 • 
213 • v ' l ' l 0 • 
214. IV, 2 , 1. 
215 . v ' 2 , 2 . 
216 . IV, 7, 12. 
217 . IV , 4 1 45 • 
21 8 . IV, 3, 31. 
64 
t . 1... 21 9 l . d d t t lV ~y. T~e m1n oes no accep impr~ssion, but acts , 
220 
is master no t victim . 11 Sensation and memory are no t 
221 passivity but power . 11 
. 
"The organ is not the only req -
uisite to vision or to perception of any kind: there nust 
be a stat e of the soul inclining it towards the sphere of 
. 222 
sense . 11 
c) There can be no perception without a unitary 
percipient whose identity enables it to grasp an object as 
223 224 
an entirety ," yet it is ''identity in variety . 11 
d ) soul is one and many . 225 
e ) "Perc ept ion of every kind seems t o depend on the 
fact that our universe is a whole sympathetic to 1tself. 11226 
All things spring from one source. An imals and even plants 
227 
have souls. 
228 f) Body obscures t he truth. Higher truth is 
21 9 . IV, 6 
' 
1 & 2 . 
220 . IV, 6 , 2 . 
221. IV, 6 , -;z: ..)• 
222 .. IV , 4, 25 . 
223 . IV, 7, 6 . 
224. IV, 9, 5 . 
225. IV, 2 
' 
2 . 
226 . IV, 5 , 3 . 
227 . IV, 7, 14. 
228 . IV , 9, 5. 
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attained by revelation through contemplation and by s ep-
arating t he s elf f'rom the body . 229 The soul may be utterly 
ab sor·bed in the Intellectual or in reality, where all is 
230 
Divine Mind or God. This is the highest duty an~ noblest 
source of purification and enlightenment. 11 All creative 
activity is the unconscious result of this steady devotion 
to what is higher than ourselves. we always create after 
some pattern in a higher sphere; and the whole worl d thus 
produc ed is an image of the mind and· thought of God. u 231 
summarizing, Plotinus holds: 1) The human soul is 
immaterial, real, active and passive, and creative; 2) The 
self maintains unity in change and reconciles the many .and 
the one; 3) The universe is organic; 4) creativity is 
through worship and revelation. 
2. Augustine emerged from Greek and persian environ-
ment to become one of the first great systematic christian 
thinkers, and t he strongest influence since Paul. His 
expressed aim vms to know nothing more than God and the 
232 
soul. His greatest a nd basic princ i ple was s el f -
certainty. 11 I know nothing surely except 1 I think. 111 
Thought and therefore the existence of the thinker are the 
229 . v, 8 , 1; v, 3 , 9. 
230 . IV , 5, 1; V, 1, 4. 
231. Inge in ERE , IX, 3llb • 
. . 
232 . Solil., I, 27. 
66 
most certain of all t hings . 233 I t is impossible to doubt 
one's own exist ence , f or if he doubts, he t hinks . I am 
most certa in that I am, f or i f I am deceived I am, for he 
234 
who is not cannot be dE;Jceived. 
The soul is immat erial. 235 It has three faculti es, 
memory,, understanding, will or memory, understanding and 
236 love but these three are one in that they are one life, 
. one mind, one e ssence. The soul knows itself as a whole, 
and lives as a whole. 237 Often t here are t wo wills (i.e. 
one is both wi lling and unwilling) but always there is one 
238 
mind. The charac-ter of' the will is of great i mportance 
for will is in all the motions of the soul, 11 0mnes nihil 
aliud quam voluntates sunt. " 239 Sin is a perversion of 
will. 240 
Philospphically, Augustine held the active vi ew of 
man, but h is mystical experience lead him i nto the passive 
view so that his writings are very inconsist ent at this 
233 . 
234. 
235 . 
236. 
237. 
Ibid., II, 
De Trin., 
De Trin ., 
Ibid ., X, 
Ibid., IX, 
1· 
' 
X, 
X, 
18 ; 
4· 
' 
Beata Vita, ch. 7. 
13 , 14; De Civ. Dei, XI , 26 . 
10, 13, 15. 
J!Jl, 22 . 
X, 18 & 6. 
238. C onf ., VIII, ix, 2lf. Cf. F.omans, VII, 15-19 and 
Gal !. V • . 16 f f • 
239 . De Civ. Dei, XIV, 6 . 
240. Conf., VII, 2..-vi, 22 . 
point . He declared the human will t o be f re e but he meant 
that f or the natural man "the will is free in evil, but f or 
doing g ood it must be made free by God 1 s g race. Man does 
241 
no g ood thing which God d oes no ·t cause him to do .n (Thi s 
makes freedom an evil.) Because of God's foreknowledge, 
freedom is i mpossible and man can never take the i nit i ative . 
Augustine rightly as sumed God as the fundamental ground of 
the univ erse and that if he· withdrew his creative power f or 
t t , t• . . l d 11 242 b . a momen , ne en 1re un~verse wou co apse, ut tnought 
God could not be the necessary condition f or human acts and 
at the same time grant any real freedom. 
Against this passive view there is an anticipation of 
tl It 
Kant 's 11 Spontanei tat der Begriff e 11 ·or "das vermog en, 
vorst ellungen selbst hervorzubringen. 11 In perception there 
is another trinity, the object, vision or s ensati on, and 
"the a tt ention of ·the mind. 11 The sensation belongs to the 
nature of the living subject and t he capacity was there be-
fore the object was present. The will 11 powerfully comb ines" 
the object and t he sensation. Although they are ver y d i f -
ferent in nature, these t hree "are tempered together into a 
kind of unity 11 so that even reason can scarcely d istinguish 
241 • . Two Letters Against the Pelagian s, Bk . 3, Ch. 25 , & 
Bk . 2, Ch . 21. 
242 . De Civ . Dei , XII, 25 . 
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them. A h i gi1er trinity is produced from memory , i nternal 
vision , and vfill which is called thought . 243 
Also , Aug ustine recognized what is now c alled creative 
activity in the human sense , when he pay s high tribute to 
the g r eat achi evements of man in the practical arts , in 
numbers and astronomy , in wealth of s ong , eloquence of 
s peech , and vari e ty in writing . 
Has not the genius of man inv ented and 
applied countless astonishing arts, 
partly the result of necessity, partly 
the r esult of exuberant invention, . so 
that this vigor of mind, which is ~ 
active in the d isc·overy not mere l y of 
superfluous but even of dangerous and 
destructive things, betoken s an inex -
haustible wealth i n the nat ure which 
can invent, l earn or employ such arts? 
What wonderf ul-one might say stupefy-
i ng --advances has human industry mad e 
in t he arts of weaving and build ing, of 
agriculture and navigation! With what 
endless v ariety a r e designs in pottery , 
painting , and sculpture produced, a nd 
with what skill executed! ••• wonderful 
spectacl e s i n t he t heatre s ••• skilful 
c ontrivances fo r catching, killing or 
taming wild beasts! and f or t he injury 
of men , also , how many kinds of poisons, 
weapons , engines of destruction, have 
been invented, while f or the preserva-
tion or restoration of heal th the a~­
plianc es and remedies are infinite . 44 · 
creative activi ty is also vaguely sugge st ed by reason 
of kinship bet we en the human and divine. Usi ng self c er-
tainty as a starting point Augustine analyzed mi nd or 
243. 
241~. 
De Tri n ., XI , 2 , 5 , & 6; cf. De Lib. Arbit ., I I, 3 
and De Trin ., XI I, 24 . 
De Civ . De i, XXII, 24 (Underlining added) . 
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experience . Deeply impressed by the statements, "God 
c-reated man in his own image" and Paul 1 s "now· we see through 
245 
a g lass darkly 11 he discov ered various trinities in man 
I 
246 
which seemed to be reflections of the divine trini~y. 
"Quia fecisti nos ad t e et inquietum est c or nostrum, donee 
11247 
requiescat in t e . He concluded that human personality 
furnished a valid basis for metaphysics. "we recognize in 
ourselves the i mage of God , though it be v ery far r emoved 
from Him--is yet nearer to Him in nature than any other of 
his YWrks , and is dest i ned to be restored to bear a still 
closer resemblance---and these are not given by sense per-
248 
ception. 11 
summarizing the thought of Augustine: 
1) The self' is the one most certain fact . 
2) The mind has special faculties, but it is a unity 
and always functions as a whole. Tile will is in every act. 
3) Mind is active in perception i n that the will 
combines the object and the sensation. 
4) Man by the grace of God has a genius for art, in-
vention and discovery. 
5) The s e l f as the most certain fact, has a claim to 
245. Gen., I, 27; I Cor., XIII , 12. 
246. · De Trin ., IX, 4; XI, 1-5; XIV, 8; ]N, 5 & 10. 
247. conf . I, 1. 
248 . De Civ . Dei, XI , 26. 
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be real. Its t riniti es seem to be a reflection of that 
Trinity whic h is the fundamental g round of t he universe. 
Then as an image or pale copy of ultimate reality it must 
be a valid basis for metaphysics . 
3 . Descartes must be menti oned not so muc h for new 
ideas but because he gives new expression for old ide as and 
marks the beginning of modern philosophy . Z s pecially i m-
portant is his emphasis and revival of Augustine's doctrine 
of self-c ertainty which had never really taken root. He 
chose as the fir st rational truth of his system, "Je pense, 
done je 249 suis. 11 The most certain and the easiest thing 
to know 250 is mind. He made so r adical a distinction be-
tween res extensae and res cogitante s that ile is usually 
251 
called a metaphysi c-al duali st. His d istinction of mind 
and body completely supplanted Aristotle 's form and matter . 
" 25 ') 
Yet he admits that body and mind are closely united , ~ and 
that t hey are both dependent substances, which to exist, 
25 ~ 
need only the concurrence of God, ;; the first cause and 
249. Discours, Pt. IV, OC, 29; PW, 101. (Always volume I 
unless ot:ner wise indicated.) 
250 . Med ., II, OC, 87- 9 9 ; PY;r , 149-157. 
251 . Discours , Pt. IV, OC, 29, 150; PVi , 1 01, 190 & E.I:i.n· 
VIII, 221 . 
252. Med ., VI, OC, 153; PW, 192 & ~. II , 255. 
253. :eo..n. Lll, PW, 240. 
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254 the only true independent substance. No imperf ect na-
tures could subsist without Him for a single moment.255 
Further it is to be noted that these two dependent sub-
stances are not on the same level. Body is simply a 
256 
machine, whereas soul is akin to the divine. It is 
independent of body entirely, can exist without it, and 
is not liable to die with it. 257 "I know that in some 
I 
manner I bear the image and similitude of God. 11258 · Hence 
soul triumphs over body and is the ultimate substance so 
that his dualisn1 disappears. 
Mind employs itself in faculties such as willing, 
feeling, and understanding, but it is one and the same 
mind. 259 Th e senses are not reliable, they hamper the 
i d 260 m n • It is not true that there is nothing in the 
understanding which. has not first been in the senses, for 
254. Med., III, OC, 112; PW, 165, Prin. II, 255 & XXXVI, 
26'7. ---
255. Discours, Pt. IV, OC, 32; PW, 103. 
256. Med., VI, OC, 15'7; PW, 195. 
25'7. Regulae, IV, PW, 10; Discours, Pt. V, OC, 52 , 150; 
PW ,. 118, 190. 
258. ~., IV, OC, 126; PW, 1'75. 
259. Med., VI, OC, 158f; PW, 196. 
I 
260. Responses, IV, OC, 244; PW, II, 223; Med., II, 
OC, 98f; PW, 15'7. 
'72 
the ideas of God and t h e soul have never been. 261 Neither 
is the idea of God imageable, it must be t h ought. "In 
t hinking , the mind employs itself alone, but in i magining 
it contemplates a corporeal form. 11262 Descartes emphasizes 
the importance of wi11. 263 It is the use of free will that 
renders us like God in making us masters of ourselves.264 
Descartes rejects atomism and passivity of mind. 265 
In his study of a piece of wax he finds that mental action 
is neces sary to thought, 266 or that mi nd is active in ac-
quiring knowledge. He speaks of the powers of imagination 
and understanding. "Mind in i.ts intellectual activity in 
some manner turns on itself, and considers some of t he 
ideas which it possesses in itself; while in imagining it 
turns towards the body, and there beholds in it something 
conformable to the idea which it has eith er conceived of 
. 267 itself or perceived by the senses." 
4. Leibniz t h ought t hat Descartes was ''only the ante-
261. Discours, IV, OC, 33; PW, 104. 
I 262. Res ponses, VI, OC, 253; PW, II, 229f. 
263. Prins. XXIV, XXV, PW, 233. 
264. Les Passions, I II , OC, II, 84; PW, 401. 
I 265. Responses V, OC, 249 ; PW, II, 227 and Prins., CC II, 
298 . 
266. Med., II, OC, 95f.; PW, 154f. 
267. Med., VI, OC, 145; PW , 186. 
chamber of true philosophy. n Cogito is apperception, and 
preceding it is perception which can't be explained except 
t hat it is t h e internal activity and very essence of simple 
substances. The soul is never without some perception. 268 
Monads are simple substances or nbeings capable of action," 
the elements of things, unitary, individual, and spontan-
eously active. No two are alike and change is continuous 
in each. 269 Not only is everything which acts a particular 
substance, but also every particular substance acts ?!i thout 
cessation not even excepting body itself, in which no abso-
270 lute rest is ever found. Reality is a plenum. All that 
there is, consists of monads or entelechies or souls. 
Activity is everywh ere and there is no useless, dead, or 
271 inert substance. 
Monads may be classed: 
1} Lowest, having only perception, "metaphysical 
i t "27 2 po n s. 
2) Animal souls having perception with memory. 273 
268. PWL-D, IV; Monad., 30; EHU-L, 60, 16. 
269. Prins. in PWL- M, ·21; Monad., 3 , 18, 9f.; Carr, ML, 161. 
270. PWL-D, 1 25; EHU-L, 690. 
271. Monad., 8, 6 2 , 69; Prins., 3; PWL-M, 22, 111. 
272. PWL-M, 103. 
3) Rational souls, minds, spirits, having self-con-
sciousness and power of recognizing necessary truth.274 
4) God, the Supreme uncreated Substance, Actus purus, 
Author of the whole, Master and final Cause, "Architect of 
the machine of the universe and Monarch of the divine City 
of .Minds. 11275 
The created monads have no windows (except toward God) 
by which anything can come in or go out. "The only im-
mediate object of our perceptions which exists outside of 
us is God. 11276 A created substance has only ideal (not 
real) influence on another, and t h at solely through the 
277 intervention of God. By soul Leibniz means life, the 
vital indestructible element or the principle of internal 
action, whereas mind is rational soul capable of society 
with God and never laying down its character as a citizen 
in the Republic of God. 278 Souls mirror the universe, but 
rational minds are .:. images of the Deity Himself, each being 
279 
a microcosm. Mind is thinking being. It is a unity 
274. Ibid., 29; Prins., 5, 14. 
275. Monad., 40f., 87, 89f.; PWL-D, 165, 281; Carr, ML, 156. 
276. Monad., 7; PWL-M, 104; Met., 28; EHU-L, 109. 
277. .Monad., 51; P'\~'L-M, 104. 
278. PWL-D, 280, 282 ; EHU-L, 109; Monad., 77. 
279. Met., 35; EHU-L, 109; Carr, ML, 151; Monad., 56, 63, 
83. 
belonging to a larger One. "Minds are whole parts." 280 
Mind is both active and passive. Among created things 
action and passivity are reciprocal. The monads have active 
power and also passive capacity to be affected. 281 Mind is 
no tabula rasa. "Ideas, even those of sensible things come 
from within our own souL" 282 Mind is active in that it 
draws necessary truths from its own depths, although the 
senses are necessary to give it the occasion and attention 
for this. Necessary truth comes from understanding alone, 
and other truths from experience or observation of the 
senses. Our mind knows both but it is the source of the 
former. No amount of particular experiences of a universal 
truth can give assurance of it without the process of 
reason. 283 In opposition to the sensationalists and em-
piricists he made the famous answer to Locke: Nihil est in 
intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu, excipe: nisi ipse 
intellectus. 284 
Leibniz emphasizes the principle of " sufficient reason" 
280. EHU-L, 645; P\~-M, 40. 
281. Monad., 52; Met., 29. 
282. EHU-L, 15. 
283. Ibid., 80f., 70, 75f.; PWL-D, .163f. 
284. EHU-L, 111 (BK. 2, Ch. 1, par. 2) or P~~-D , 204, or 
PWL-M, 173. 
285 
or that nothing happens without a cause. Efficient 
causes alone, deriving everything from brute necessity, 
are inadequate. 286 "It is necessary to have recourse to 
final causes" not depending on the principle of necessity 
as do the truths of logic and mathematics but on the choice 
of wisdom. The two kingdoms of efficient and final causes 
287 
are in harmony. Only cantigent truths, or " truths of 
fact" depend on God's will, the eternal "necessary truths 
depend solely on His understanding, of which they are the 
internal object," i.e. they are unereated and eternally 
existing in the mind of . God, 11for ideas are in God from all 
288 
eternity.'' Then even God is not free to change necessary 
truths. 
Although the system of r.eibniz is strongly determin-
istic, his emphasis on individuality makes him recognize 
the facts indicating free will. He speaks of "each mind as 
it were a world apart, sufficient unto itself, independent 
of all other created things including the infinite, 11 and 
says, 11 We think directly by means of our own ideas and not 
G d t II 289 through o s. In response to Jacquelot he states, 
285. 
286. 
287. 
288. 
289. 
I 
Monad., 32; Theodicee, 44 in OC, II, 136. 
EHU-L, 69, 680; Met., 22. 
Prins., 11; P~~-M, 27; Monad., 79, 87. 
Monad., 46, 33ff.; EHU-L, 325. 
I I 
PWL-M, 107; Met., 29; also, Monad., 18 and Theodicee, 6~ 
"My hypothesis is not inconsistent with freedom. On the 
contrary, more than any other system, it affirms true free-
dom, that is to say, spontaneity with choice and the soul's 
independence of everything save God alone." Also, he adds, 
the statements, "I think, therefore I am," and "I do what I 
will, therefore I am free," are equally evident and "I 
mean a freedom which is not only exempt from constraint 
290 but even from necessity. " 
Nevertheless, with Augustinian insistence he says, 
God has foreseen all and provided a remedy f Qr everything 
in advance. In His works there is an alre ady pre-established 
harmony and beauty. "Nothing takes place in the soul which 
is not determine d , and nothing is found in creatures that 
291 God does not continually create." ("Determined" need 
not necessarily mean fixed without possibility of human 
choice, it may mean caused, conditioned, made possible by 
God. Free choice is not exempt from causation. Neither 
"yes" nor "no 11 is possible without the fundamental sus-
taining cause of the universe.; 
The deterministic sta t ements of Leibniz ar e f urther 
weakened b y statements expressing t he idea of creative 
activity of mind . 
1 ) Every s i mp l e substance i s r e a l and mu s t be t he 
290 . Carr, ML, 163 , 166 . 
291. Reply to Clarke, II in PWL-M, 197; EHU-L, 15f. 
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real immediate cause of all its actions and of its internal 
passions; indeed to speak with metaphysical precision, it 
has no other actions and passions than those it itself 
produces. 292 
2) Minds as images of the Divinity Himself are capable 
of knowing the system of the universe and of imitating some-
thing of it by architectonic patterns, each mind being as 
it were a little divinity in its own department. They are 
also able to enter into society and fellowship with the 
293 Creator in the City of God. (This means to live 
creatively.) 
3) "The mind not only has a perception of the works 
of God, but is even capable of producing something like 
them, though on a small scale.... Our soul is architectonic 
in its voluntary activities also, and, discovering the 
sciences it imitates in its own sphere, and in the little 
world in which it is allowed to act, what God performs in 
294 the great world." 
Summarizing, Leibniz holds: 
1) Substance, instead of inert matter, is alive, 
active agent. 
I I 
292. Theodicee, 400 in OL, II, 360. 
293. Monad., 83-87; Prins., 15; PWL-M, 40, 107. 
294. Prins., 14 in PWL-M, 29. 
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2) A qualitative ~etaphysical monism of mind. 
3) A quantitative metaphysical pluralism or society 
of real active individuals, each independent of all others 
except the Supreme Individual. 
4) Rational monads or minds can know something about 
the universe because it is rational, harmonious and con-
tinuous. They are creative in constructing their own know-
ledge, and as images of God are able to imitate his creative 
works. 
5. Berkeley, the founder of universal immaterialism, 
added two great ideas to the activism of Leibniz: 
1) Reality is mental. The universe consists solely 
295 
of spirits and their ideas. "There is not any other 
substance than spirit, or that which perceives. 11296 Spirit 
only can act, and there is no efficient cause distinct from 
spirit. 297 "There are only things perceiving and. things 
298 i perceived." The ~ of material things is percip , 
and the ~ of spirits is percipere (or velle i.e. 
agere). 299 There are degrees of reality, 300 but always 
295. PHK, 86, 89. 
296. PHK, 7, 14, 34. 
297. PHK, 57, 72, 107. 
298. DHP, 98. 
299. PHK, 3, 139; Com. Bk., F, I, 10, 37 (F. indicates 
Fraser, BCW). 
300. PHK , 33, 36. 
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there is continuity. "There runs a chain throughout the 
whole system of beings. In this chai n one link drags 
another. The meanest things are connected with the high-
est. n301 
2) God is not distinct from nature. 30 2 An infinite 
omnipresent Spirit "contains and supports" the sensible 
world. He lfproduces and sustains all things.n 303 God 
pervades all n ature and all elements, but this must be 
explained by force not extension. Everything we perceive 
in any way by sense is "a sign or effect of the power of 
God." 304 Things perceived are "produced by the will of 
an infinite Spirit." He exerts his energy throughout the 
305 
whole creation. These passages indicate clearly, belief 
in the physical world as the result of God's activity or 
will, and for us, it is "divine language, n306 the means 
of understanding and communication with him. We know of 
his existence empiricall y and by reflection on experience. 
I do not will my sense impressions nor my heart beat, hence 
301. Siris (meaning chain ) , 303 or F, III, 270. 
30 2 . PHK , 150. 
303. DHP , 67, 64; PHK , 94 or F, I, 427, 424, 310. 
304. Siris, 329, cf. 291; PHK , 148. 
305. DHP, 69; To Magis., F, IV, 494. 
306. PHK , 44, 66 , 108. 
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another must will them. 307 God is known as certainly and 
immediately as any other spirit for "the effects of natureu 
are more numerous.
308 11 It is a truth evident by the light 
of nature that there is a sovereign omnipotent Spirit. n 
He never ceaseth to influence by instinct, by the light of 
nature, and by his declared wil1. 309 
Berkeley sees no escape from a refined and rational 
anthropomorphism. "All the notion I have of God is ob-
tained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers 
and removing its imperfections ••• though I perceive Him not 
by sense, yet I have a notion of Him~ or know Him by re-
, 
flection and reasoning. " 310 He thinks that the failure to 
311 
study mind, results in atheism. He firmly believes that 
the sublime notion of God, and the comfortable expectation 
of immortality naturally arise from a close, impartial, 
312 
and methodical application of thought. He often quotes, 
"In Him we live and move and have our. being, n313 but not in 
307. PHK, 26, 29, 33, 149; DHP, 69; Siris, 257f. 
308. PHK, 14'7f. 
309. Pass. Ob., F, IV, 105; To Magis., F , IV, 495. 
310. DHP, 93, or F, I, 449. 
311. PHK , 154. 
31 2. DHP , 5 or F, I, 3'7'7. 
313. 1H.~69, 122; DHP, 68, 98. 
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any pantheistic sense. 
In a Calvinistic age Berkeley maintains human freedom 
and the view of religion as cooperation: 
1) "It is the indispensable duty of all good men 
throughout the whole course of their lives, to cooperate 
with the designs of Providence . In religion as in nature 
God doth somewhat, and somewhat is to be done on the part 
of man. 11314 
2) Berkeley seems to say that interaction of mind and 
body is an instance of our cooperation with God when he 
says, 11 This connection of sensations with corporeal motions 
means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature 
between two sets of ideas" (ours and God's). 315 
3) "Freedom of thought is the prerogative of human 
kind; it is a quality inherent in the very nature of a 
thinking being ." 316 
4) 11 Actions leading to heaven are in my power if I 
will them." 317 
5) God's activity makes possible all that we do, but 
when we do wrong, it is not God's sin but ours, for "sin 
314. To Magis ., F, IV, 495. 
315. DHP, 106 or F, I, 459~ 
316. To Masis., F, IV, 500. 
317. Com. Bk., F, I, 69. 
doth not consist in the physical action11 but ''in the in-
ternal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and 
religion. 11318 
Mind or Self. 
"I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a think-
ing, active principle that perceives, knows, wills and 
319 
operates about ideas." The term 11 Itt is the same as 
" soul" or ''spiritual substance." "By spirit we mean only 
320 that which thinks, wills, and perceives. " "Of interior 
beings the human mind, self, or person, is the most simple 
and undivided essence and the Supreme Father is the most 
321 perfect One." Spirit "as it perceives ideas is called 
the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates 
about them it is called the will," but "will and under-
standing--volitions and ideas--cannot be separated, either 
322 
cannot be possibly without the other." There is no 
323 
active power but the will. Berkeley omits the affective 
aspect of mind in his definitions. He acknowledges it only 
318. DHP, 100 or F, I, 454 . 
319. DHP, 95 or F, I, 450. 
320. PHK, 139, 138; Com. Bk., F, I, 53. 
321. Siris, 358, F, III, 295. 
322. PHK, 27; Com. Bk., F, I, 54. 
3 23. Com. Bk., F, I, 34, 40, 67, 69. 
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as a handicap, not as a necessary factor to be used. He 
speaks of passions rooted in our nature which must be res-
trained, and some are more dangerous than others. It may 
be galling to the sensual part or the beast to subject our 
passions to the immutable decrees of reason, but it adds 
much to the dignity of that which is peculiarly human. 324 
Berkeley tried "to observe the most rigid laws of 
325 
reasoning. n Reason is the criterion for submission to 
Government, and right reason is "the voice of the Author 
of Nature. 11326 "Intellect and reason alone are the sure 
327 guides to truth." He thinks there is a rational ten-
dency. "There is an instinct or tendency of the mind up-
wards, which sheweth a natural endeavor to recover and 
raise ourselves from our pre sent sensual and low condition 
into a state of light, order, and purity.n 328 
Mind Both Active and Creative. 
1) "The making and unmaking of ideas doth very 
properly denominate the mind active.n 329 The active and 
324. Pass. Ob., F, IV, 109, 125. 
325. DHP, 5 or F, I, 376. 
326. Pass. Ob., 12, 6, 11 ff., 39 or F, IV, 108-10, 105, 125. 
327. Siris, 264 or F, III, 249. 
328. Siris, 30 2, F, III, 269. 
329. PHK, 28. 
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passive are in every perception, for if there could be a 
perception without any act of the mind, then unthinking 
330 
substances could have perception. Ideas are passive, 
but spirit is active. 331 
2) 11 'Why may we not conceive it possible for God to 
create things out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create 
332 in some wise whenever we imagine." He calls the ideas 
of imagination ncreatures of the mind.n333 
3) The primary qualities as well as the secondary 
334 cannot exist without the mind. 
4) In his youth Berkeley accepted t h e tabula rasa 
concept, but later saw his error and said, besides ideas 
derived from sense, there are notions, the acts or opera-
tions of mind. 335 Also, he saw the necessity and -value 
of abstractions, and that the power of abstraction is a 
h . t 336 high mental ac 1evemen • 
5) "Number is no object of sense, it is an act of the 
330. DHP, 4 2 or F, I, 406. 
331. PHK, 25, 27, 39, 139, DHP, 92. 
332 . Com. Bk. F, I, 53. 
333. PHK, 33. 
334. PHK, 9f. 
335. Com. Bk., F, I, 48, 23; Siris, 308, F, III, 272. 
336. Siris, 337, F , III, 286. 
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mind," entirely the creature of' the mind. 337 
6) Mind is a creative synthesizer. "To collect many 
notions into one and to consider them as one is the work of' 
the intellect. 11338 
7) There is creativity through imitation, effort, 
religion, reason, and social service: 
a) It is our duty to copy God's methods in nature 
339 
"so far as the frailty of' our nature will permit." 
b) "The most refined human intellect, exerted to 
its utmost -reach, can only seize some imperfect glimpses 
of the Divine Ideas abstracted from all things corporeal, 
sensible, and imaginable •••• Nevertheless, as the mind 
gathers strength by repeated acts, we should not despond, 
but continue to exert the prime and flower of our faculties, 
still recovering, and reaching on, and struggling, into the 
upper region, whereby our natural weakness and blindness 
may be in some degree remedied, and a taste attained of 
truth and intellectual life." 340 
c) 11 The Christian Religion ennobleth and enlargeth 
the mind beyond any other profession or science whatsoever. 11 
337. Siri s, 288, F, III, 262; PHI'~ , 12. 
338. Siris, 355, (Approved from Themistius). 
339. Pass. Ob., 14, F, IV, 110. 
340. Siris, 337-341, F, III, 286f. Cf. 367. 
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In this it surpasses astronomy and even philosophy. "A 
mind whose views are enlightened and extended by religion 
is animated to nobler pursuits by more sublime and remote 
objects. 11341 
d) Reason is universal and from the Author or 
Nature himself. It is the source of moral laws. "He who 
squares his actions by this rule (the Eternal Law of Reason) 
342 
can never do amiss." 
e) We should propose to ourselves that we "recreate 
and exalt the mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, 
extent, and variety of natural things: hence by proper 
inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur, wisdom, 
and beneficence of the Creator; and lastly, to make the 
several parts or the creation, so far as in us lies, sub-
servient to the ends they were designed for, God's glory, 
and the sustentation and comfort of ourselves and fellow-
creatures."343 
The following summarize Berkeley's valuable contribu-
tions to the study of mind from the metaphysical and reli-
gious points or view: 
1) An enlarged concept of mind. The whole universe 
341. Essays, F, IV, 17lf. 
342 . Pass. Ob., 1 1-1·3, F, IV, 108f. 
343. PHK, 109. 
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consists of minds and their creations. 
2) 
3) 
and man. 
4) 
5) 
The concept of God is given greater content. 
A new view of the cooperative relation between God 
A rational anthropomorphism. 
Reality and importance of freedom. 
6) Mind is active and creative in building its notions, 
and knowledge. 
6. As Co.pernicus achieved a revolution in astronomy 
by showing that the earth is not a stationary spectator 
but is in constant motion, so Kant believed that he had 
achieved a revolution in the realm of knowledge by proving 
that mind is not stationary or pas sive but active and 
344 
creative. Knowledge, h e said, is due to two inseparable 
sources, intuition and understanding. Without sensibility 
no object would be given, and without mental activity nothing 
would be thought. 345 "Even our empirical knowledge is made 
up of what we receive through impressions and of what our 
own faculty of knowledge supplies from itsel.f.u346 Nothing 
can be known without a knower or relater. 347 11 We can know 
344. KrV, B XVI-XVIII. 
345. KrV, B 74.f. 
346. KrV, B 1. 
347. KrV, B 130-132. 
· a priori of things only what we ourselves put into them. u348 
"Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representa-
tion of that which is the condition of all unity, and itself 
is unconditioned •••• The soul does not know itself through 
the categories, but knows the categories, and through them 
all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and so 
th i lf "349 rough tse • 
How and in what ways did Kant consider mind to be 
creative (in the modern sense): 
a) In thinking. The 11 I 11 is a 11denkende Na tur 
(Seele),n ndas Vehikel aller Begriffe iiberhaupt. 11350 The 
synthetic unity .of apperception or transcendental unity of 
self-consciousness is the highest principle in the whole 
351 
sphere of knowledge. . Kant often speaks of creatures of 
thought, Gedankendinge, Verstandeswesen, Geseh8pfe der 
352 Einbildungskraft, Gedankenwesen, and of the understanding 
as die Spontaneitlit des Erkenntnisses. "Concepts are based 
on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the 
f i • II 353 receptivity o mpress~ons. 
348. KrV, B XVIII. 
349. K"~·V  , A 401f. 
350. KrV, B 710, 399 . 
351. KrV, B 132-139, esp. 135. 
352. KrV, B 57; Prole~., 1 6 , 32f., 59 (Carus, 5 2 , 75f., 
118, 1 25, 134). 
353. KrV, B 75, 93. 
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b) By imagination. "The reproductive synthesis of 
the imagination is to be counted among the transcendental 
acts of the mind." 354 Imagination is the active faculty 
for synthesizing sensations a priori. It is 11 a necessary 
ingredient of p erception11 and is subject to empirical laws, 
but productive imagination is spontaneity . 355 "Imagination 
as a productive faculty of cognition is very powerful in 
the creation , (Schaffung), as it were, of a second , nature 
out of the material which the actual gives to it. 11356 
c) Through reason. "Human reason is by nature 
architectonic" i.e. it regards all knowledge as belonging 
to a possible system-a whole . 357 11 Human reason contains 
not only ideas, but ideals also which although they do not 
have sch8pferische Kraft, yet have practical power as 
regulative principle s, and form the basis of the possible 
perfection of certain actions. 11358 "It is in the light 
of the idea of a sch8pferische Vernunft that we so guide 
the empirical employment of our reason as to secur-e: its 
354. KrV, A 102. 
355. KrV, A 120-125; B 152. 
356. KU, 193. 
357. KrV , B 502, B 860-879; Cf. KpV, 18. 
358. KrV , B 597. 
greatest possible extension." 359 (These reveal the fact 
that Kant r•eserves sch8pferisch for deity.) "Pure reason 
can be practical, i.e. can of itself determine the will 
independently of anything empirical.n360 
d) By free will. Freedom of will means autonomy. 
Practical freedom is "independence of the will on anything 
but the moral law." 361 Psychological freedom, a mere in-
tarnal chain of ideas in the mind, involves physical nee-
essity, and at bottom is nothing better than the freedom 
of a Bratenwenders. True or transcendental freedom means 
independence of everything empirical and therefore of 
362 
nature generally. Man alone is free. Animals are 
bound by the sense world and their actions involve bruta 
necessitas. "The inherent value of the world, the summum 
bonum, is freedom in accordance with a will which is not 
363 
necessitated to action." 
e) Religion is not a passive matter of feeling, 
but is the acceptance of all duties as divine commands. 
Everything is religious which makes a differenc e to our 
359. KrV, B 700f. 
360. KpV, 72. 
361. KpV, 168; Met. Morals, 65f. (Abbott). 
362. :KpV:, 173f. (190f.). 
363. KrV, B 574; LE, 12lf. 
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364' 
actions or conduct. In this sense only is relig ion 
creative for Kant. His God is deistic or humanistic, com-
munion is impossible, and mysticism is fanaticism.365 
f) The sense of duty is creative. With all of his 
denial of feeling s, Kant reveals emotional fervor in his 
apotheosis of Duty. It e levates man above himself. It is 
the power that connects him with the transcendent world yet 
one that commands the whole sensitive world and the summa-
tion of all ends. This power is nothing other than per-
sonality, freedom, and independence of the mechanism of 
nature. 366 
g) Similarly, the pure moral law is creative by 
causing individuals to act on the highe st ideals. It 
makes us conscious of the sublimity of our own super-
sensible existence and causes us to regard all personality 
as sacred , a1W!3."US to be respected and treated as an end, 
367 
never as means. 
h) There is creativity in faith, when one acts on 
the best known hypoth esis which g ives new knowledge, posi-
tive and negative. To wait for certainty is to be inert 
364. LE, 94. 
365. LE , 98f., 88, 103; KpV, 148; RWLR, 40. 
366. KpV, 154f. 
367. KpV, 158, 155f. 
and wilfully weak, and to v1aste life, for "activity is life 
itself." 368 The speculative interest of reason makes it 
necessary to regard all order in the world ·as if it had 
originated in the purpose of a Supreme Reason. This bene-
fits reason and can never injure it. When one assumes 
absolute certainty, reason ceases to be architectonic. 
Completeness can be a ssumed only when there is empirical 
verification-and this is not attainable. 369 Then it wa·s 
for the sake of preserving inquiry and a continual increase 
of knowledge that Kant found it necesE;ary to deny knowl~dge 
(pretended and dogmatic) in order to make room for faith. 370 
Kant's greatest contribution lies in the fact that he 
showed analytically and systematically the i mpossibility 
of sensationalism, that thought is autonomous, and knowledge 
is acquired through the constitutive activity of the mind 
according to its ovm rational nature. 
7. Because Kant ignored history, rejected mysticlsm 
and held firmly to his unknowable Dinge an sich, his system 
seems narrow, fixed, and anthropocentric indeed, when com-
pared with that of Hegel 11 the empiricist of consciousness." 
The contrast may be seen in the following brief statements, 
368. KrV, B 697-732; LE, 160. 
369. KrV, B 718-721, 720. 
370. KrV, B xxx, 498f., 496-499. 
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selected ~rom his comprehensive system, which add something 
di~~erent to the d evelopm:ent o~ the concept o~ mind and its 
creativity: 
1) Spirit alone is reality. 371 The Ph~E2m~~ologie 
is "a voyage o~ discovery" or "th e pathway of n a tural con-
sciousness" which passes through var1ous stages as it 
372 
presses forward to true knowledge. Consciousness is the 
relation o~ the ego to its object. "Consciousness is alone 
the element which ~urnishes spiritual beings or powers with 
their substance. 11373 ''Everything depends on grasping and 
expressing the ultimate truth not as substance but as sub-
ject as well.n Substance is mind, spirit, agent. 374 Logic 
is immanent in the world, ndieser Inhalt die Darstellung 
Gottes 1st, wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erscha~~ung 
der Natur und eines endlichen Geistes ist." 375 
Intellect, will, and feeling cannot be separated. 
Mind is not a "verknocherte mechanischen Sammlung,n but a 
371. PG, 24 ( 86); 414 ( 600). Tr. of Baillie in (~). 
372 . PG, 67 ( 135). 
373. PG , 415 ( 601). 
374. PG, 19 ( 80); 45 (113); 24 (85f. ); 558 ( 801 ) ; Enc • , 
573 (W311). 
375. WdL, III, 31 ( PhB ). 
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living developing organic whole. 376 Hegel's use of Idee 
has be en grossly misinterpreted as involving only the cog-
nitive a spect of mind, but he has not neglected will or 
feeling . It seems to be overlooked that to think is to act, 
and ''reason is purposive activity. 11377 He held that a man 
is what he does. Outer acts reveal the inner. 378 "Noth ing 
great in the world is accomplished without passion. 11379 
Yet he rightly says, to stay in the sphere of feeling and 
be able to communicate only by feeling states is the con-
dition of animals. 380 Hegel improves on the reply of 
Leibniz to Locke by saying, " Nihil est in sensu qu o.d non 
fuerit in intellectu," in general meaning that Spirit is 
the cause of the world. 381 Even bare historical truths are 
382 
impossible without the activity of self-consciousness. 
Because man thinks he possesses (creates) law, religion, 
383 
morality. 
376. Enc., 445. 
377. PG, 22 (83). 
378. ~., 140. 
379. Phil. der Geschichte (1837), 28, 51. 
380. PG, 56 ( 127). 
381. ~., 8. 
382. PG, 35 ( 100). 
38 3 . Enc., 2. 
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2 ) "Was vernftnftig ist, das ist wirklich, und was 
wirklich ist, das is vernllnftig." 384 
a) 
b) 
c) 
The rational is the real (actual). 
385 Reason seeks the whole--concrete actuality. 
Das Wehre ist das Ganze.386 
d) "For it is on],y the whole which properly has 
387 
reality." 
e) Then anything abstract or isolated is meaning-
less and unreal. Abstraction is the Naivitat der Leere an 
Erkenntnis. 388 
Truth is not an immovable lifeless positive element. 
It moves itself by its very nature, and is realized only 
in the form of system. 389 "The range of knowledge has no 
limits, and the flight from star to star is limitless. n390 
Achievement of meaning is only through strenuous toil of 
Begriffs, by a long laborious journey and by suffering. 391 
384. Phil. des Rechts, S XIX; Enc., 6. 
385. PG, 185 ( 283). 
386. PG, 21 (81). 
38'7. PG, 476 (689). 
388. PG, 19 (79). 
389. PG, 39 ( 105); 40 ( 106); 24 (85). 
390. PdR, I, 195 ( 184). 
391. PG, 48 ( 116); 26 ( 88); 57 ( 128); 28 (90f.). 
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The spirit calls to every consciousness, nachieve ration-
ality," "seid fiir euch selbst, was ihr alle an euch selbst 
392 
seid-verntinftig. 11 Holiness itself is the very height 
of the struggle with evil. "So ist z. B. auch die Tugend 
nicht ohne Kampf; sie ist vielmehr der hBchste, vollendete 
393 Kampf." Abstract views lack the seriousness, the suf-
fering, the patience, and the labor of the negative. 394 
The insight that thought in its very nature is dialec-
tical and as understanding must fall into contradiction is 
one of the main lessons of logic. 395 Experience is a 
dialectic process, and opposites are complements. In what 
seem to be conflicting and inherently antagonistic, there 
is the presence of mutually necessary moments. 396 Nature 
is organic to intelligence and exists only in the life of 
the spirit. Nature exists for spirit the very means through 
which the highe st spiritual life is realized. Hegel saw 
11 the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive 
evolution of truth,n and that philosophy must be dialectical 
392. PG, 383 (558). 
393. Logic, IV, 65 or Glockner, IV, 543. 
394. PG, 20 (81). 
395 . Enc., 11. 
396. PG, 73 (142); 10 (68). 
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in form. 397 It is the rational me thod of s triving toward 
the wh ole by confronting thesis and antithesis, extracting 
some truth, cancelling and transcending error, ascending 
as a spiral where each synthe sis become s a n ew thesis 
with broader opposition, appro aching nearer and nearer to 
Truth or God. As knowledge mu s t be achieved through dif-
398 ficulty, so also freedom must be won. 
3) God is die allgemeinste Pers8nlichkeit, the orig-
inal synth etic unity. "As man has p ersonality, the ch ar-
acteri stics of subjectivity, personality, spirit, absolute 
spirit, enters int o God. n399 
H i He is truth. 400 __ e s power, 
God is essentially rational, 
God is not spirit beyond the 
stars, above the world, but he is present, omnipresent, 
and exists as Spirit in a ll spirits--a living God who is 
. 401 
acting and working . Man is no p assive being eith er. He 
may cooperate with God. Divine grace h a s its work but hu-
man consciousne s s and exercise of will is also n e cessary. 
God moves toward man, and it is his part to make himself 
397. PG, 10 ( 68); 54 ( 1 24 ). 
398. Phil. Hist., 40f. 
399. PdR, I, 1 33 ( 1 21 ) ; 408 (II, 56). 
400. PdR, I, 70 (53); 407 (II, 55); En c ., 1. 
401. PdR, I, 50 ( 33 ). 
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such that the Spirit may dwell in him. 402 "We can know 
that man can know God. n403 
"Knowledge of God is inner movement or more accurately 
it is a rising up or elevation of the soul .to God. 11 This is 
t h e basis of religion. In fact "Religion itself is know-
ledge of God." It is a relation of the spirit to absolute 
Spirit. It is "the ultimate and highest sphere of human con-
sciousness." To think of God means to ris e above what is 
sensuous, external, and individua1. 404 Religious con-
sciousness in its very essence is the parting from and 
forsaking of what is immediate, and finite. "Life consists 
in the abolition of limitation. 405 
When we recognize that we ar e finite, we are already 
above it. If the finite is limited by the infinite, then 
the infinite itself becomes limited. There is no gulf be-
tween finite and infinite, to make a rigid separation is 
Manicheism. 406 
That God is love, or that God is in feeling is true, 
40 2. PdR, I, 202 (19 2 ); 262 ( 25 2 ); 239 ( 228f.). 
403. PdR, I, 186 (175). 
404. PdR, I, 177 (166); II, 428 (III, 229); I, 178 (167); 
216 (205); 55 (54); 108 (94); Cf. Enc., 12. 
405. Pd.R, I, 118f. (105f.); 185 (174). 
40 6 . PdR, II, 536 (III, 348); II, 490 (III, 297). 
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but trivial. If fe eling were all of religion, there would 
be no need for theology. 11 Reason is the region in which 
alone r e ligion can be at home.u407 
Hegel does not hold the pantheistic view of God. He 
repeate dly criticizes it because it does not hold substance 
to be subject or active agent. 408 He says no one means 
409 that God is all, in all r espects. God is the God of 
free men, and man is free. 410 11 I and God are different 
from one another; if both were One , there vwuld then be 
innnediate relation free from any mediation, 11 but knowledge 
is mediated. 411 I and God are different stages of one 
dialectic. Also, there could be no cooperation, a s men-
tioned above, if the two were identical or could be identi-
cal in all respects. He seems to mean, an identity of will 
may to some extent be achieved. 
8. Lotze, often attacking what he believed to be 
Hegel's views, yet deriving many of his best ideas from 
him, was neither a systematic nor an original thinker but 
was a stimulating critic and transmitter of philosophical 
407. PdR, I, 20 {81); 131 ( 119); 214f. ( 204). 
408. PdR, I, 338 ( 3 33) ; Enc • , 573. 
409 . Pd.R , I, 110f. ( 96f.). 
410. Pd.R , II, 93f. ( 222f.). 
411. Pd.R , I, 177 ( 166). Also se e 226f. ( 216). 
101 
views. Some of his most relevant and penetrating thoughts 
concerning mind and creativity are as follows: 
1) ••• konnen wir ••• das We sen aller Realitllt in 
diesem lebendigen Fiirsichsein zu finden glauben. " n:Nur 
der lebendige Geist 1st, und Nichts 1st vor ihm oder ausser 
ihm. fl412 
2) Apparently expanding Hegel's 11 die allgemeinste 
Pers8nlicbkeit 11 we find: 
Vollkommene PersBnlichkeit 1st nur 
in Gott, allen endlichen Geistern 
nur eine schwache Nachahmung derselben 
beschieden; die Endlic:h.Jceit des End-
lichen 1st nicht eine erzeugende 
Bedingung fftr sie, sondern eine 
hindernde Schranke ihrer Ausbildung. 413 
3) It seems the strangest of errors that mind which 
has direct experience only of itself, could come to deny 
its own existence. 414 
4) The capacity to become conscious of (or of per-
ceiving, inne zu werden) the infinite is the distinguish-
ing endowment of the human mind. This capacity has not 
been produced in us by the influence of experience but 
has its origin in the very nature of our being and only 
412. MIK, III, 533, 545 (II, 647, 658). 
41 3 . MIK, III, 576 (II, 688); Hegel, PdR, I, 133 (121). 
414. MIK, I, 288 (263). 
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needed the favoring conditions of experience for .its dev-
415 
elopment. However, when it comes to the manifold of 
sense Lotze takes the passive view (and Bowne fails to 
correct it). Concerning the Leib-Seele relation, he says 
that representations are passive products, the necessary 
results of the universal and binding l aws of nature, and 
without any freedom or consciousness on the part of the 
416 
soul. 
5) Of all the functions of mind Lotze seems to 
magnify feeling or emotion. He believes that no other 
mental activity functions without it. Feeling is the 
basis of imagination, whence spring works of art. Pro-
ductive and reproductive power consists in nothing else 
als in der Feinsinnigkeit des Geistes. 417 Surprisingly 
enough he says, feeling further contains the principle of 
reason. In its feeling for the value of things and their 
relations, our reason possesses as genuine a revelation as, 
in the principles of logical investigation, it has an indis-
pensable instrument of experience. Moral principles are 
dictates of an appreciative feeling. 418 
415. MIK, II, 328 (I, 714). 
416. MIK, I, 310f. (28 4f.). 
417. MI K, I, 265. 
418. MI K, I, 267f. (245ff.). 
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Volition, he says, is dependent on feeling and idea-
tion. The terms volition and effort are used too lavishly. 
We often erroneously take for energies of our decided will 
what are really only movements of ideas and feelings arising 
on occasions supplied by the general psychic mechanism. 
Thus it would seem that for Lotze, feeling is responsible 
for the creative, and also it is the prime function. 419 
6) Concerning creativity Lotze uses occasionally such 
expressions as the following: 
a) "Die Vorstellung eines sch8pferischen Selbst 
bewusstseins. 11420 
b) "Der Menge sch5pferisch gestaltender Geister," 
and "dieses weniger sch8pferischen Dranges." 421 
c) Speaking of Rococo style, he says the subjec-
tive mind with unrestrained will moulds all given material 
into a Gesch5pf that is according to its own fancy. 422 
d) Most interesting of all perhaps is "die sch8p-
ferische Thatigkeit des Alterthums." 423 
419. MIK, I, 277 ( 254f.). 
420. MIK, II, 13 (I, 415). 
421. MIK, III, 283f. (II, 399) . 
422. MIK, III, 327 (II, 441). 
423. MIK, III, 312 (II, 426). 
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9. Bowne was greatly stimulated and influenced by 
Lotze ~s a teacher, but in later years called his idealism 
424 
a Kantianized Berkeleianism.- In the scattering remarks 
of Lotze about personality the systematic independent mind 
of Bowne saw the clue to reality and made it the center of 
his system, the first of its kind. Whereas Hegel used 
"self-conscious spirit" to solve the antinomies of thought, 
Bowne showed how they are leveled on every hand by person-
ality.425 He declined to accept either the realism or 
idealism then current but sought the truth in both, con-
eluding that the ·ideal (mental) is the real. Personality, 
the ultimate principle, cannot be explained by anything 
else, but everything else is explained by it. 426 Concern-
ing the still much misunderstood term he said, "The essen-
tial meaning of personality is selfhood, self-consciousness, 
self-control, and the power to know.tt 427 
"For the expls_nation of the world we need an agent, 
not substance,n and causal explanation "must always be in 
424. Bowne, MET, 423. He did dedicate his first Meta-
physics to Lotze. 
425. N~T, 428; PER, 194-197, 254f.; Hegel, PG, 24 (86 ) . 
426. MET, 340f., 425, 86f.; PER, 215. 
427. PER, 266; earlier forms, MET, 118, PT, 128; MET (1), 
97, IPT, 36_; I H~ , I "'l. · 
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terms of personality or it must vanish altogether. 11428 
Bowne defines substance as "that which can act and be acted 
upon." 429 The living thinking self is the only substance 
that we know anything about, and nothing has a better title 
to be called rea1. 430 The verbal deniers of the self 
always retain the fact. 431 He emphasized the unstable 
equilibrium of thought and the "futility of all attempts 
at philosophizing on the plane of impersonal existence.n 432 
Hocking says, "There is no more powerful and convincing 
chapter in metaphysical writing than that of Bowne on 'The 
433 Failure of Impersonalism. 1 " 
Bowne chose for his first fundamental postulate the 
434 
coexistence of persons, and his conclusion was that 
"Theism is the fundamental postulate of our total life." 
It is demonstrated by nothing, but implicit in everything, 
and can't be denied without ending in absurdity. 435 
428. PER, 96, vii, 196. Also, PHS, 112, 125 • . 
429. KS, 170; M~T, 335. 
430. KS, 170; TTK, 27. 
431. PER, 263. 
432. MET, 427; THE , 147; PER, 217-267. 
433. Hocking, Meth. Rev., 104 (1922 ), 374. 
434. PER, 20, THE, 127. 
435. THE, iv, 43; PT , . 265. Of. ST, 4· 
' 
T'rK, 316; ME'r ( 1) , 
487, 533. 
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"For the complete satisfaction of reason the road between 
the creator and the created must admit of being travelled 
in both directions;" or as in his last dictated sentence 
"In short, the problem of knowledge implies that nature is 
a world of meanings, and this implies thought at both ends--
thought at the further end to make nature the bearer of 
meanings and thought at the nearer end to receive and re-
think the meanings." 436 
Bowne found the first condition of all theorizing is 
" trust in reason itself." The rational is the rea1. 437 
But reason depends on another condition which is vital to 
personality and ~o the possibility of creativity which had 
been grossly neglected, or at most left very vague--the 
question of freedom. He defines it as " the power of self.,. 
direction, the power to form plans, purposes, ideals, and 
to work for their realization. 11438 He says: 
a) "Every system of necessity overturns reason 
itself;" 11 where there is no freedom, there is no reason;" 
Freedom is a necessary implication of rationality, the 
436. MET, 4 28; Meth. Rev., 104 (1922), 369. 
437. ST, 1 20, 118, 135; TTK, 278. 
438. PER, 199f.; MET, 405. 
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denial of it leading to the collapse of reason. 439 
b) "In a scheme of necessity error becomes cosmic 
and neces s ary;" "The distinction between truth and error 
440 
are possible only in the fact of freedom." 
c) Freedom is the only solution of the problem of 
reconciling the trustworthiness of our faculties and the 
fact of error, without wrecking reason itself. 441 
d) Freedom is an assumption of moral action; It has 
the deepest speculative significance for science as well as 
f 1 d 1 . . 442 or mora s an re 1g1on. 
e) Freedom does not mean lawlessness. Law and nee-
essity are conditions of freedom; It is impossible to dis-
pense with either freedom or necessity; "It is only in the 
union of the .two that the rational life is possible;" 
Either unmixed necessity or pure arbitrariness would cancel 
443 
reason. 
Activity and passivity. 
Bowne continually opposed the idea of a completely 
439. P'r, 185; THE, 21 2; MET, 405, 329; TTK, 102. 
440. ~ffiT, 407, 329; THE, 1 25; TTK, 241. 
441. TTK, 239. Cf. PER , 200; ~ffiT (1), 123f., 398. 
44 2. PE, 164ff.; PER, 199; also, NiliT (1), 17lf.; ~ffiT, 409. 
443. MET, 410f.; PT, 168; THE, 197; TTK, 241. 
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passive mind. "The d emonstrable impossibility that any-
thing should exist for the mind except through the activity 
of the mind rules out once for all the notion of a purely 
passive intellect." 44~ He places great emphasis on will and 
activity but sees the necessity for a passive element. "In 
the finite consciousness, there will always be a foreign 
element, an external compulsion, a passivity as vvell as 
activity, a dependence on something not ourselves, and a 
corresponding subjection. Hence in us personality will 
445 
always be incomplete." Far from overlooking the fact of 
passivity he sees that there is too much of it and calls 
attention to its dangers: 
a) Because of the active nature of the human spirit 
it cannot be satisfied with mechanical passive pleasure, 
but requires an active pleasure which arises from self-
446 
assertion, self-realization and from what we produce. 
b) "A passive mind can have no rational experience 
of any sort, particular or universal." Belief in a passive 
mind destroys reason. 447 
c) Passivity hinders progress. " With the passive 
444. TTK, 350. 
445. THE, 168; also TTK, 36. 
446. ER, 250, 243; PE, 64f. 
447. TTK, 362, 274f. 
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mind any departure from the customary is wrong and dis-
astrous." "The pas s ive conscience acquiesces in traditional 
and institutional morality, n and ideal living can never be 
reach ed by passively resting in conventional conscience, 
but mora l progress can be made where t h e g ood will is al-
ways active and intellect ever alert and critical, proving 
all thing s and holding fast all t h at is good. 448 
d) Passivity is injurious to persona lity and moral 
character. To live in the passive voice pauperizes the 
soul. To p ermit the living energies of the will to slumber 
reduces the moral life to the level of cattle. 449 
e) There is too much passivity in reli g ion. Salva~ 
tion is not a passive matter but something to be worked 
out. We are saved by grace but it is " a mistaken concep-
tion of salvation which does not involve our most strenuous 
450 
and most devoted effort in s p iritual things." The 
authorized version erred in the passive translatlon of 
451 
flrepent and be converted," but the revised corrects. 
The passive conception of s p iritual blessedness is a reflex 
448. 
449. 
450. 
451. 
SC, 79; PE, 1 21, 152; PER, 10. 
ER, 243. 
ER, 245f. , 249. 
SC, 228. Cf. Acts 3: 19, Matt. 18 : 3 , Luke 22: 32 
and .P..s. 51: 1 3---rrl"Moffat, and Goodspe ed also. 
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of human laziness. It is not God's purpose to make us 
"passively h appy but actively good." Bles s ing s depend on 
452 
efforts, and work is a necessary part of prayer. 
Bowne would doubtless have agreed with Peirce's idea 
of the dual nature of will as agent and patient. nThere 
is active volition and passive volition, or inertia, the 
. 453 
volition of reform a..'1.d the volition of conservat1.sm." 
How is mind creative~ 
a) In acquiring knowledge. "The mind creates some 
of its objects by definition and invention, and some of 
-454 
its objects it discovers through perception. 
nAt every step of mental movement the mind appears as 
organic. It does not passively receive and simply retains 
what is put into it, but it reacts against the external 
contribution as an organism against its food, modifying, 
assimilating , and working it ov e r into the forms required 
by its own nature." 455 
Perception is not possible as a passive i mportation of 
ready made knowledge into the mind, but only by an immanent 
452. ER, 242f., 150f. 
453. Peirce, CP, I, 167; written c. 1905. 
454. TTK, 121. 
455. MET (1), 511. Also see PER , 55, 64. 
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activity in the mind. 456 
"Thought is an organic activity which unfolds from 
within and can never be put together mechanically from 
without. 11 The mind works over the raw material of the 
sensibility into the forms of intelligence. 457 
One can never perceive any world except the one he 
makes; the understanding makes nature in a real and impor-
tant sens e but it must be recognize d that nthe mind is con-
ditioned by the nature of the object as well as by its own 
nature. " 458 
nThe great quantitative sciences, pure and applie d , 
are not picked up ready-made on the field of s ense exper-
i ence, n e ither are t h ey the precipitate of any random 
association. On the contrary, t h ey are the magnificent 
product of thought i n its effort to master experience and 
rise into self-possession.n459 
b) In building body. Agreeing with Plato he says, 
"We may also speak of' the soul as the builder and main-
tainer of t h e organism. There is no reason to t h ink there 
456. MET (1), 408; THE , 1 29f.; ~lliT, 1 25, 4 21, 4 26. 
457. TTK, iii, 11, 38 , 116. 
458 . PER, 71; TTK, 114; KS, 150. 
459. TTK, 80. 
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would be any organism if there were no inner life. n460 
c) In the production of mat erial goods Bowne recog-
nized degrees of creativity. 11 In many cases the manual 
labor, which assumes to be the creative agent, is the least 
important factor. The most important is the organizing 
mind. The inventive brain t h at produced the machinery is 
the next." 461 
d) The christian life is an active creative co-
operative process. As God's children we are called to be 
righteous, 11 to be workers together with him in the divine 
462 labor of realizing his will and building up his kingdom." 
We are to transform ourselves in the making new of our 
minds by the help of God. "This inward process, like a 
living organic principle is to metamorphose us, not by ex-
ternal and mechanical mending , but by a vital growth from 
within. 11463 Men are neith er saved nor lost, but are dev-
eloping toward these conditions. 11 The great end of reli-
gious effort is a developed soul. 11464 
460. MET, 369. Cf. Phaedo, 87, 80. 
461. PE , 262f'. 
462. ER, 79, 243f.; sc, 258. 
463. ER, 206i'. 
464. ER, 153; sc, 311. 
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e. To acquire rationality is a creative attainment. 
"The human soul does not become a rational soul by virtue 
of t h e law of reason alone; there is ne eded in addition, 
an act of corresponding self-determination by the free 
spirit. Hence, while there is a necessity in the soul, 
it becomes controlling only through freedom; and we may 
say that every· one must constitute himself a rational 
1 n465 sou . • 
Bowne's great contribution lies in his power of sel-
ection and systematization, and also in his ability to ex-
press his thought in clear penetrating language. His work 
synthesizes so much that has appeared in this historical 
sketch that it is indeed fitting to close with him. The 
Empirical Approach will next be considered. 
465. THE, 198. 
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Man's innate materialism leads him 
to doubt his own conscious being 
and to substitute for it something 
which can be seen. 
(Brightman, IGP, 9.) 
'I'he mind is t h e bighest finite em-
pirical reality we know. Strange 
that its touch should be thought 
to derealize its creations. 
(Alexander, STD, 245.) 
I NTRODUCT ION 
AN EMP IRICAL AP PROACH TO CREATIVE 
ACTIVITY OF MI ND 
Having traced the h istory of rational though t on 
creative activity of mind, this section will examine ex-
perience, past and present, for evidence of creativi ty . 
Here as already defined, experience is meant in its 
broader sense as anything one can feel, know, think, or 
will. 'I'his indicates that there are e.t least four marked 
type s, sense experience, religious experience, moral, and 
aesthetic. Much experience is necessary as content before 
a great deal of reasoning is pos sible, hence in human 
development, individual and racial, the empirical really 
comes first. ''Religion is much older than philosophy, and 
1 
strikes its roots much deeper in the human soul.n 
"One c a.nnot write a truly r ealistic history of mind 
without recognizing the religious enterprise as a funda-
mental factor therein." 2 The first consideration, then 
will be creativity in the history of experience as it con-
cerns religious development. "Re ligion in its essential 
1. Herbart, E~P , 155. 
2. Coe, PR, 233. 
nature is an experience; the rational element in it is 
subordinate •••• Religious exp erience is rooted in history 
and h e nce instinctively takes a reverent attitude toward 
it. " 3 By re ligious experience is meant "awareness o:f the 
presence o:f the divine. 114 All o:f the great ancient civ-
ilizations have le:ft sacred writings and ample evidence o:f 
complex development in religion. However, only the Judea-
Christian religion can be considered here. 
Like other peoples the ancient Hebrews derived t h eir 
ideas o:f deity at first from the forces of nature. They 
lived on the sein level of sense experience. Great pro-
phets and teachers arose who were able to discover and use 
other powers of mind and to show the way to higher con-
ceptions o:f the world and deity. The Bible is a historical 
account of the experiences o:f many great characters strug-
gling to find God. It is not a philosophical or intellec-
tual group o:f writings. There are :few arguments of any 
kind to be found. Some form of the word reason do e s occur 
at least eighty-five times in the Bible, but in the major-
5 
ity of cases it merely means cause. The nearest word in 
Hebrew seems to be one meaning to judge or argue. The 
3. Knudson, PTRT, 199. 
4. Brightman, FG, 94. 
5. Job, 13:3; Ps_., 90:10; Josh., 9:13; Is., 1:18; Ex., 2 :23 
I Kings, 9:15. 
117 
Bible is the greatest of all books on heart e xperience. 
I CREAT I VE RESUL'rs OF HEBREW EXPERI ENCE I N BRI EF 
1) "It was Moses who was the creative source of Old 
6 Testament relig ion. " As a mediator h e established the 
i mageless worship of Yahweh, t h e sole God of Israel. It 
was an e thical relig ion. A just God r equires ju s t deeds 
of his people. Yahweh made a covenant with Israel and t h ey 
became his chosen people. The deliverance from Egypt pro-
moted faith and loyalty, and a deep national consciousness 
was developed which made the future growth possible. Later 
the prophets, alternating with doom and hope called on the 
people to r epent and live accord ing to t h e first princip les 
taught by Moses, and were not cons cious of being creators 
of new ideas. 
2 ) Amos was t h e prophet of the moral law. He attack ed 
complacency, luxury, g reed, and empty ceremonialism. God 
is ri ghteous and relig ion is bound up with conscience and 
social justice. "Though ye offer me burnt offering s a nd 
meat offering s I will not accept them ••• but let judgment 
run down as waters, s.nd righ t eousnes s as a mighty stream. 117 
3) Hosea the prophe t of divine love and hope, taught 
6. Knudson, PMI, 29. 
7. Amos, 5: 21- 24. Cf. Hose~, 6: 6 ; Mic., 6:6-8; ~., 1:11-17. 
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that God as a father loves his erring children and forgives 
8 to the utmost. 
4) Isaiah was the prophet of faith. He was a true 
mystic. In one of the greatest creative passages in all 
literature, he describes his religious experience--his 
vision of God, realization of his own unworthiness, conse-
9 
cration, and ready response for service. This and other 
similar biblical experiences suggest that the criterion for 
true religious experience lies in the response for worthy 
deeds. 
5) Jeremiah, the introspectionalist and prophet of 
personal piety "first made the soul of the individual the 
10 true seat of religion." Out of his own trying experiences 
he comes to know that although much suffering and disaster 
cannot be removed, it is still possible to find the chief 
good which is fellowship with God. 11 Jeremiah began to see 
the individual as well as the nation. Sin may become as 
deeply ingrained e.s the leopard 1 s spots, but the responsi-
bility is ind ividual. No more shall it be said that the 
fathers have eaten sour grapes and the children's teeth are 
8. Hosea, 11:1-4, 14:4. 
9. Is., 1:8. Cf. I Kings, 19; Matt., 17:1-5, 14f. 
10. Knudson, BLP, 167; PMI, 64. 
11. Jer., 15:19. Cf. Job, 42:5. 
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on edge, neveryone shall die f'or his own iniquity. 1112 God 
of'fers a new covenant, "I will put my law in their inward 
p~rts and write it in their hearts; and will be their God 
and they shall be my people." 
6) Ezekiel becomes more emphatically the prophet of 
individualism. nThe soul that sinneth, it shall die. 1113 
God has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, turn ye. 
"Make you a new heart, a new spirit; f'or why will ye die? 1114 
7) Deutero-Isaiah, perhaps the greatest, is the pro-
phet of universalism. He specially emphasizes the idea of' 
God as the creator. 15 Jehovah is God of all nations and 
there is no other. 16 . The highest ideal in the Old Testament 
is that of' the Suffering Servant, who shall come to redeem 
both Israel and the world. "The Gentiles shall come to thy 
light 11 and "mine house shall be called a house of' prayer 
17 f'or all people. " Isaiah f'inds creativity through worship 
in the f'orm of' increased physical powers f'or service. "They 
that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they 
12. Jer., 13: 23; 31:29f'. 
13. Ez., 18:20. 
14. E.z.., 33:11, 18:3lf'. 
15. Is., 51:4, 5; 44: 24 ; 45:7, 12, 18; 42:5. 
16. Is., 45:5, 22; 43: 10f'f'. ; 46:9; 44:6. 
17. Is., 60: 3; 56:7. 
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shall mount up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not 
be weary; and they shall walk and not faint.nl8 
The prophets all go beyond the realm of sense exper-
ience. They dealt with the real practical problems of reli-
gion "in the only way in which such problems can be studied, 
19 
namely, in the school of experience. " They taught re-
liance on the imageless and unseen out of the abundance of 
their own personal experience. All of them saw that reli-
gion is not external form merely, but the essential thing 
is the inner attitude of mind toward Gqd, and right con-
duct. The people, as ever, were sense-bound, wayward, and 
slow to grasp the truth, for it is not enough to be taught, 
but each has to learn anew through his own experience. 
However, the power and creativity of the prophetic ideas 
and ideals could not be lost. The results took two distinct 
direct.ions: 
1) The Jews were scattered throughout the world, but 
unlike any other people so uprooted, they have retained 
their identity to this day, although they have often lost 
their racial characteristics and given up their language. 
There are Mongolian Jews in China, Negroid Jews in Africa, 
and blonde Jews in Northern Europe who are quite different 
from the ancient type. They are still separate and distinct, 
18. ~.' 40: 31. 
19. Whitehead, RIM, 146. 
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and have preserved their traditions, sentiments, customs, 
20 
and religion. In spite of ceaseless persecution they have 
kept their faith, conformed to law as no other group, and 
have made great contributions to society. Disregarding 
their proverbial success and creativity in business, many 
have achieved eminence as creative thinkers in scientific 
and scholarly professions, and in music, thus often excit-
ing jealousy. The persecutions of the twentieth centur~ 
make the period under the Phan.aohs dwindle into insignifi-
cance. '1.1hey continue to be ''Suffering servants" and "a 
light to the Gentiles." 
2) The teachings of the prophets, especially of 
Deutero-Isaiah, were organized and expressed in human form 
by Jesus who demonstrated their validity and taught addi-
tional truths arising out of his own experience. His ideas 
were creative and have ever since "turned the world upside 
down" wherever they were really applied. Some of the more 
i mportant are: 
a. God as Father. The idea mentioned only seven 
times in the Old Testament, was fundamental in the mind of 
Jesus and consequently it is found in the New Testament two 
hundred and sixty five times. It is the deepest thought 
20. Fishberg, TJ, Chaps. 5 and 23; Kroeber, ANT, 57; 
Science, 21, 860. 
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about God. In religion and the idea of God as spirit are 
found the empirical foundations of' idealism. The experience 
of God as father where thought through, leads inevitabl~ to 
personalistic philosophy. 
b. The Value of Personality. The idea of man's 
creation in the image of God was deepened and spiritualized 
by the idea of sonship. He who notes the fall of the 
sparrow cares far more for persons. The parables of the 
lost coin, sheep, and son vividly illustrate the value of 
human souls to God. If earthly parents care for their 
children, how much more does God care for his! 
c. 'rhe Creative Power of Love. He saw that the 
law of hate or Tl an eye for an eye" is destructive and re-
placed it by "Love your enemies, 11 which is creative. Never 
retaliate evil. 
d. The Creative Power of Worship. It was through 
private worship that Jesus gained strength, courage, and 
wisdom for life 1 s problems e.nd decisions. He discovered 
that the kingdom of God is within. He achieved conscious-
ness of unity of will with the Father, and taught others 
how to find it. 
e. The Law of Sacrifice. He that saveth his life 
shall lose it :- ·- not my will but thine. 
f. Aesthetic Appreciation. The Bible contains more 
of the rational. Expressions of the beautiful are espec-
123 
ially numerous in the realm of worship, and in the Priestly 
Code, but Jesus appreciated the beauties of nature as well 
as "the beauty of holiness. 11 
Consider the lilies of the rield, how 
they grow; they toil not, neither do 
they spin: and yet I say unto you, that 
even Solomon in all his glory was not ar-
rayed like one of these.21 
g . Religion Requires Activity. He went about ac-
tively preaching, healing, teaching, and doing good. IIis 
message was Good News, and so dynamic that nGo ye into all 
the world 11 inevitably became the mission of his followers 
even to the present day. 11 His sinlessness was a spiritual 
achievement not a metaphysical inheritance. His perfect 
religious experience was a product of creative energy, not 
a passive reflection or an objective order. Vfllen we, then, 
speak of his revelation or God, we must do so in terms of 
creativity, not of mere receptivity." 22 
II CO MPAR ISON OF' THE EM:piRICAL HEBREW- AND THE RATIONAL GREEK 
Justin Martyr held that the same logos in Jesus was 
also in Socrates and Heraclitus. 23 The Christian church 
f'rom its very beginning "was formed by a confluence of 
21. Matt., 6: 28f. 
22. Knudson, VRE, 224. 
23. Brigh tman, FG, 42. 
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24 Jewish and Hellenic religious ideas." What one found em-
pirically, the other reached chiefly through reason. The 
two need not conflict, in fact cannot, if there is contin-
uity in the universe. They are supplementary. Conflict 
in results merely indicates the need of correcting one 
or both. Each may serve as a valid check on the other. 
~Vhat similarities can be found, and what do they signify? 
a) Xenophane s (\c. 530B.C.). "There is one god supreme 
among gods and meil. 11 About the same time Deutero.;..Isaiah 
wrote, nr am the Lord and there is none else, there is no 
God besides me. 1125 Xenophanes heaps ridicule upon the 
crudely anthropomorphic one s who think the gods have physi-
26 
cal forms and appearance like their own, while Isaiah 
makes fun of those who try to carve or mold idols to repre-
sent their gods. 27 Xenophanes said, "the gods did not re-
veal all things to men at the start; but, as time goes on, 
by searching, they discover more and more." About a hundred 
years sooner, the author of Deuteronomy said, ''But if from 
thence thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find 
24. Inge, PP, 14. Cf. Arnold {M), CA, 128-149. 
25. Fr. 1 (Karsten); ~., 45:5. 
26. Frs. 5, 6, Dl6. Cf. Empedocles, Fr. 133f. 
27. Is., 45: 20; 44:9-20; 46:lf., 5-9; 40:18ff. Cf. Ps., 
90:8. 
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him, if thou seek him with all thy heart and sou1.n 28 
b) Heraclitus (c. 505B.C.) comp lains of the ignorance 
and stupidity of the people. "Although the logos is common 
to all, most · men live as if each had a private wisdom of 
his own.n Isaiah bemoans the moral stupidity, perverseness, 
and sinfulness of the people and tells them, "Hear ye in-
deed, but understand not; and see ye indeed but perceive 
29 
not. 11 Heraclitus . says, 11 Man is called a child by God, 
as a boy is by man. 11 God through Nathan says of Solomon, 
"I will be his fathe r , and he shall be my son," and earlier 
it was written, "I am a father to Israel. 1130 However, the 
similarity is only in words, not in spirit or meaning , for 
Heraclitus is expressing God's contempt for man, while the 
Hebrew writer is expressing God's care and tender regard 
for his people . 
Heraclitus said, This universe always was, and is and 
ever shall be an ever-living fire. The Hebrew gives, "For 
the Lord thy God is a consuming fire,n and nis not my word 
as a fire? 1131 Heraclitus says negatively, "For the most part 
the knowledge of things divine escapes us because of our un-
28 . Deut. 4:29. 
29 . Frs., 2, 7· 
' 
Is. ·, 6:9. 
30. F r., 79; II Sam., 7:14; Jer., 31:9 (c. 600B. C.) 
31. Fr., 30; Deut., 4: 24; Jer., 23: 29. 
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belief," the Hebrew states positively, "Believe in the Lord 
your God, so shall ye be establish ed," and Jesus often said, 
according to your faith, so be it. 32 The eleventh chapter 
of Hebrews records the fruits of faith for the Old Testament 
characters, and explains how they became creative. All had 
faith but each in addition made a choice and confidently 
acted upon it. 
c) Anaxagoras (c. 450). All things were together and 
confused. In the beginning , when infinite, eternal, self-
ruled Mind "began to set things in motion, there was a 
differentiation of a ll that was in motion." Mind caused 
the universe to revolve and regulated sun, moon, and stars. 
Mind knows all and rules all. The author of the priestly 
code writes a little later: "In the beginning God created 
the heaven and the earth. And t h e earth was without form, 
and void; and darkness was u pon the face of the deep . And 
the Spirit of God moved upon the face of t h e waters. And 
God said, Let there be light ••• n 33 
d) Plato (427-347B.C.). For the just man, even under 
misfortune, "all thing s will in the end work tog ether for 
good to him in life and death." Th e Psalmi st wrote, "The 
steps of a good man are ordered by the Lord: and he de-
32. Fr., 87; II Ch., 20: 20; Matt., 8 :13; 9: 29; ~~ ., 9:13. 
3 3 . Frs., 1, 4f., 9, 1 2f., 15f.; Gen., 1:1-3. 
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1ighteth in his way." Paul may have read both.34 Socrates 
rises far above the general Old Testament level when he says 
" Neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by 
evil is ever right," the injuring of another can be in no 
. t 35 case JUS • He says, "There is no release or salvation 
from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and 
wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world 
below take s nothing with h e r but nurture and education,rr 
whereas Job, a little earli e r perhaps, said, naked I came, 
and naked I shall return. 36 
Socrates appeals to intellect. The unexamined life 
is not worth living. "Now this way to the other world is 
not a sing le and straigh t path--if that were so no guide 
would be needed, for no one would miss it: but there are 
many partings of the road, and windings." Much earlier 
Isaiah has a similar thought but appeals to will or moral 
life. " Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the 
desert a highway for our.God," and later the Master said, 
"Strait is the gate and narrow is the way, Virhich leadeth 
u n to life, and few there be that find it. 1137 The contrast 
34. Rep., 613; Ps., 37: 23. cr. Rom., 8:28. 
35. Crito, 49; Rep., 334. (See Aristotle par. e.) 
36. Phaedo, 107; Job, 1:21. 
37. Apol., 38; Phaedo, 108; Is., 40:3. 
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of intellectual and practical is ag ain shown in the view 
first expressed by Habakkuk (c. 600B.C.) that, " The just 
shall live by faith," while Socrates taught 11 Knowledg e is 
virtue." A proverb concedes, "Teach a just man, and he 
will increase in learning . n38 
The d e lay of the Hebrew in a ccepting immortality was 
due to the Messianic hope which offered something more im-
mediate. 'l'his hope which probably grew out of the belief 
that God is in human history, was responsible for another 
striking difference. 'l'he Greek held tenacious ly to the 
39 
anci ent the ory of cycles, while the Hebrew, with only one 
exception, r e jected this and believed in a personal God of 
free creative purpose. 
He tha t planted the ear, sh all he not hear? 
He tha t formed the eye, shall he not see?40 
From t h e time of Abrah am God had p r omised and p lanned a 
great nation. The Messianic hope advanced in three forms: 
the idol king , 11 the suffering servant, 11 and the "Son of 
Man. 11 The cycle theory oppose d the idea of progress and 
development while the belief in an org anic world pointed 
to a cataclysm ushering in continued progress. This is 
38. 
39. 
40. 
Hab., 2 :4: Prov., 9:9. 
- --
States., 269-274; Phaedo, 247ff.; Phys., 223b 24; 
Xenophanes in Bakewell, SBAP, 11. 
Ps., 94:9; ~., 1:9. 
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important, for if the universe is n o t progressively creative, 
how can t h ere be progress and creativity in the human world? 
e) Aristotle ( 384-322B.C.). 11 If one man has knocked 
out another's eye, Justice demands not merely that his e y e 
be knocked out in return, but tha t he suff er a worse penalty 
in accord ance with t h e l aw of proportion. " The Hebrew was 
f ar more humane demanding only life for life, stripe for 
stripe, and permitted strangers to share t h e same law. How-
ever, Aristotle g ives a nother account. He says tha t the 
Pythagorean s taught nvvhat a man has d one to anoth er sh ould be 
done to him," but that it depends on the circumstances, some-
41 
times he should suffer more, sometimes less. Aristotle 
say s "Nature is no wanton or r a n dom creator, " "For natu re 
never makes anyth ing superfluous or in vain, " while Isaiah 
says earlier, "Thus saith the Lord that c r eated the heavens; 
God himself that formed the earth and made it; he hath es-
tablished it, he created it not in vain, he formed it to be 
42 
inhabited: I am the Lord, and there is none else." Both 
indicate belief in purpose, but that of Aristotle grows out 
of his sense experience, whereas that of Isaiah is a devel-
opment out of his r e lig ious experience. God is personal and 
41. Mag. Mor., ll94a; Ex., 21: 23-27; Lev., 24: 20ff.; 
Deut., 19:21; Nic. Eth., V, 5. lff. 
4 2 . De Caelo, 29lb ( 27la); De Part. An., 66lb; Is., 45:18. 
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his purpose is directed. 
Knudson says, "These two mov <::ments--Hebrew prophecy 
and Greek philosophy--have been the great creative forces 
in the spiritual and inte llectual history of mankind." The 
prophe t is in search for God, comes from him to the world 
and man, while the philosopher moves toward God through 
the world and man--he is found of God. In prophecy it is 
preeminently the heart and conscience that speak to us, in 
philosophy the intellect. nGreek philosophy in its final 
outcome arrived at a view of the world essentially similar 
to that of the Hebrew prophets. This is a r emarkable and 
significant fact, that the only philosophical movement in 
the world which h a s run its full course ended in a spiritual 
view of the universe. " It testifies alike to the unity and 
. 43 
the essential religious nature of man. 
Perhaps the greatest difference in the conclusions of 
the two is that the Greek speaks intellectually of Logos, 
Nous, nature, and the universe as purposive and creative. 
The Hebrew with depth of feeling growing out of active reli-
gious experience says, Yahweh, Jehovah, God the Father, our 
personal God cares, guides, purposes, and creates. The 
Hebrew is more sure of monotheism. He writes psalms, and 
uses the language of worship and devotion. 
43. Knudson, BLP, 45-48. Also, Arnold, CA, 1 28-149. 
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nNevert heless I am continually with thee: 
thou hast holden me by my right hand. 
'I1hou shalt guide me with thy;· counsel, 
and afterward receive me to glory. VVhom 
have I in heaven but thee? and t here is 
none upon earth that I desire besides thee. n44 
There is nothing parallel to this in the Greek. He spoke 
objectively and unhesitatingly of god and the gods. The 
Hebrew, with subjective awe and reverence dared not to 
pronounce his name. 
This comparison makes it easier to under stand why the 
two cultures had to unite. Each needed the corrective 
elements in the other. This creative synthesis illustrates 
that reality as it exists for reason does not contradict 
45 
reality as experienced. The complex synthesis which we 
call Christianity is the great social inherltance of wes-
tern civilization and has at least touched other cultures. 
Great errors and evil periods, are not to be denied, but 
in the main it must be admitted that Christianity has been 
and is creative wherever sincerely tried. All realms of 
life have been touched, inspired, and uplifted by the 
Christian religion. As Whitehead emphasizes, "Religion 
46 
can be and has been, the main instrument for progress.n 
44. Ps., 73: 23- 25. 
45. Bowne, MET, 143. 
46. Whitehead, RIM, 37. 
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In brief, what are some of the ways in which Christianity 
has promoted progress and creativity? 
a) A greater than Christ can hardly be expected, yet 
John has him to say, nHe that believeth on me, the works 
that I do shall he do also; and greater works than these 
shall he do; because I go unto my Father. Whatsoever ye 
47 
shall ask in my name, that will I do.*' Here is both 
prophecy and promise which has set the highest ideal for 
all who will follow its gleam. Although none may attain the 
ideal, it is highly creative, for the quest leads to greater 
attainments than could have been without it. Individuals 
have designed great cathedrals; great artists have filled 
them with wonderful paintings, carvings, and windows; great 
poetry and literature has been inspired; musical instru-
ments have been invented on which to play great religious 
compositions; teachers have striven to know and present the 
truth; priests .and preachers have given their best ser-
vices; and physicians have toiled to understand and con-
trol disease--each in his own way but all in the name of 
Jesus. 
b) Metaphysics must take account of religious exper-
ience, and rational religion must have recourse to meta-
physics for a scrutiny of its terms. They are mutually 
47. ~' 14:12f. 
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dependent. "You cannot shelter theology from science or 
science from theology; nor can you shelter either of them 
from metaphysics, or metaphysics from either of them. There 
is no short cut to truth. 1148 Christianity has promoted meta-
physics. 
c) 11Religious thought is carried on in terms of per-
sonality, this being, in the world of religion, the one 
fundamental fact.n 49 This is especially true of christian-
ity. Modern philosophy, according to Whitehead shifted to 
a subjective point of view emphasizing experience and re-
volving around the Cartesian formulation of the primary 
datum, because of the work of Christianity in its insis-
tence century after century on the infinite worth of the 
individual human sou1. 50 It is a notable fact that 
Christian countries are the builders of hospitals, and in-
stitutions for the protection of the aged and helpless. 
d) Science could not have progressed without faith in 
the order of nature. The idea of "the detailed providence 
of a rational personal God is the root of sucb faith. "The 
faith in the possibility of science generated antecedently 
to the development of modern scientific theory is an uncon-
48. Whitehead, RIM, 79. 
49. James, VRE, 491. 
50. Whitehead, SMW, 195f. 
134 
scious derivative from medieval theology. '151 There has 
always been conflict between science and religion, and 
sometimes it has seemed very severe but "The clash is a 
sign that there are wider truths and finer perspectives 
within which a reconciliation of a deeper religion and a 
more subtle science will be found.." 52 It is merely part of 
the dialectic, and not a disaster but an opportunity. Sci-
ence needs religion for inspiration and direction, while 
religion needs the results of science for the modification 
of religious thought. "The love of truth, which is the 
mainspring of science is only one phase of religious feel-
53 ing and worship." 
III CREATIVITY THROUGH SCIENCE 
In popular thought the development of science with its 
many wonderful inventions is probably the greatest evidence 
of the power and creativeness of man's mind. Mathematics, 
the mother of all the sciences took the lead. When culture 
was ready for it, two men simultaneously, independently, 
and by different methods discovered the calculus, wonderful 
in itself and the indispensable tool of other sciences. 
51. Ibid., 86, 18. 
52. Ibid., 253, 257. 
53. Bowne, ST, 66. 
135 
The astronomer was the first to achieve results that shook 
the mental and religious world out of its complacency and 
obsolete ideas. With his telescope, camera, and mathe-
matics he has destroyed the primitive views of heaven and 
earth. Nevertheless, when it is said, "Astronomy shows 
that the material universe is so vast that man is less 
than a speck and can have no significance or future," the 
philosopher promptly replies, "but man is the Astronomer." 
There were many false leads and much untruth mixed 
with truth. August Comte was convinced that the theologi-
cal and metaphysical stages belonged to the past and a new 
54 
era of science was dawning. For awhile it seemed that 
his prophecy might come true. Two years after, Darwin gave 
his epoch making work. Geology and the theory of evolution 
showed that the earth reveals its own story. It was not 
created 6000B.C. nor in a week, and man was not made of 
dust in a day. Genesis is not true and if not, the whole 
Bible g oes. (Yet strangely enough Aristotle's " absurd 
physics" had been rejected and his "immortal logic,n flow-
ing from the same source, retained.) But the theologian 
came out of the shock in due time with an enlarged view of 
the universe and the greatness of God who took millions of 
years to prepare the earth for man, and at least half a 
5~. Comte, (1798-1857) Positive Philosophy. 
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million to bring him to his present state of development. 
This brought a revaluation of man and h 1·s me · an1ng . He has 
mind and Genesis is still corr ect that he is made in t h e 
image of God, his rational intelligence being the latest 
emergent. The whole Bible, rather than being destroyed, 
takes on new significance as progressive revelation. 
However, while theology was recovering and adjusting 
to astronomy, geology, and anthropology, science was grow-
ing by l eaps and bounds in e. dozen fields and had the ad-
vantage of being easily propagated for it produced observ-
able material results. Its creations appeal universally 
to all levels of intelligence although it requires high 
creative intelligence and much effort to become a scientist 
or to understand the discoveries and inventions. The har-
nessing of steam, electricity, and gas brought bodily com-
forts, labor saving devices, ease of travel, rapid communi-
cation, and increased production of goods to meet the grow-
ing desires of an increasingly complex culture. 
Soon after the turn of the twentieth century it became 
increasingly evident that civilization was out of gear, and 
science, instead of being creative was in many respects 
becoming increasingly destructive. Even Bertrand Russell 
admits that the evils of war 11 are all due in part to sci-
entific technique and therefore ultimately to science," 
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nevertheless he clings tenaciously to science alone, con-
cluding his "Science and Ethics 11 with the statement, nV\Ihat 
science cannot discover, mankind cannot know," and admits 
of no method of arriving at truth except that of science. 55 
Such partiality and ignoring of other methods and sources af 
knowledge are bound to hurt science itself. The trouble is 
that religion and ethics are lagging when they should be 
abreast, giving guidance and suggesting control. Unless 
they are developed more evenly the creations of science 
will continue to fall into hands greedy for commercial gain 
and power, and so will be diverted from good and become 
destructive of the highest values. This bring s science 
under condemnation. 
The automobile may be an instrument of mercy or death; 
the moving picture may enlighten and entertain or it may 
blunt and degrade the finer sensibiliti es; the radio may 
scatter propaganda and war lies around the globe, or con-
tribute to international u nderstanding and justice; the 
press may advertise whiskey and represent to weak minds 
that other poisons are attractive and socially necessary, or 
it may be a source of information and education; the air 
plane may rush serum and other aid to str~ken areas and 
relieve disaster, or it may produce disaster by dropping 
55. Russell, RS, 258f., 255, 197 (1935). 
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bombs and disease germs on innocent and helpless people; 
machines by saving labor . and increasing production at lower 
costs may be highly profitable to the owners, but they have 
also thrown thousands out of useful employment and set them 
adrift. Such facts make it increasingly evident that ab-
stract science, isolated from human interest and social 
welfare is a menace. 
An encouraging tendency in recent years is that some 
scientists are themselves realizing that science cannot 
progress indefinitely alone. They are becoming more social 
minded and are turning in the metaphysical direction. 
Physicists now recognize that science as well as religion 
rests on faith, that matter does not exist and they are 
dealing with the unseen. Jeans says that science is now 
favorable to idealism which has always maintained that the 
beginning of the road by which we explore nature is mental. 
"To this, present day science adds that at the farthest 
point she has so far reached, much, and possibly all, that 
was not mental has disappeared, and nothing new has come in 
that is not mental.n 56 
Wolfgang KBhler worked in physics and other sciences, 
especially in psychology. From this empirical position he 
tried to survey the significance of the whole for truth. 
56. Jeans, NBS, 307 (1934). 
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The evidence caused him to form the hypotheses: 
1) "Matter 11 does not exist; 
2) It is impossible to exclude the anthropomorphic 
(in the higher sense); 
3) There is structural correspondence between the 
physical (external and cortical) and the mental; 
4) The universe is organic in nature; and 
5) Value permeates the physica1. 57 
Here again it seems that science cannot be divorced from 
metaphysics if it is to go forward, but it should use a 
minimum of it and keep out of metaphysical interpretation. 
If the scientist is entirely positivistic--studying only 
sensations which are in his own mind--he is logically com-
mitted to solipsism. 
Although the scientist has revealed the facts of evo-
lution, and endeavored to explain the survival of the fit-
test, he has never accounted for the arrival of the fit, 
the new emergents. He explains much about science but little 
about himself. How can genius be explained?--Roentgen, 
Edison, Curie, Pasteur, Walter Reed, Crawford Long , 
Graham Bell. Can science explain the Age of Pericles, 
Socrates, Plato, the prophets, Origen, the Renaissance, or 
Hegel? Is it any easier to account for destructive genius--
57. KBhler, P~VS (1938). 
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Alexander, Caesar, Napoleon, or Hitler, working for selfish 
ambition and g lory or for empire? Are they all mere ly the 
product of their time and culture? "The world will not 
rep eat Dante , Shakespeare or the Greek tragedians •••• Stan-
dardized size can do almost anything , except foster t h e 
growth of genius. The.t is the privilege of a tiny oasis •••• 
58 They deal with what all men know, and they me.ke it new. 11 
Some explain the differences in men a.s due to environ-
ment or geography, others as due solely to race or hered-
ity. 59 William James s a id, 11 The causes of production of 
great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessible to the social 
philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses as data. 11 He 
is He gelian enough to hint that the explanation is no less 
than the wh ole. "Not a sparrow falls to the ground but 
some of the remote conditions of h is fall are to be found in 
the milky way." 60 Bowne says, "In studying a man's life, 
we certainly need to consider hi s antecedents and surround-
ings; but t he man himself is a f actor apart, conditioned by 
t he se thing s but not to be confounded with them or deduced 
from them. " 61 James off ers one suggestion from J evon as to 
58. ~nitehead, RI M, 1 35. 
59. Galton, IHF; De Gobineau, IHR; Huntington, GBS; 
Rosenberg, Der Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhundert s . 
60. James, WB, 225f., 216 . 
61. Bowne, I G, 91. Also, SC, 63. 
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the essentials of the genius of discovery. "To be fertile 
in hypotheses is the first requisite and to be willing to 
throw them away the moment experience contradicts them is 
the next." The creative mind keeps moving, forms no fond 
attachments for new found ideas, loses no time regretting 
their demise, nor does he cease further activity because of 
the joy of success. 
What does science have to s ay of the distribution of 
creativity or intelligence~ Are men of genius a d ifferent 
species from "the Kallikaks?" Many scientific scales have 
been painstakingly devised for the purpose of measuring what 
is said to be intelligence62 or ability to learn. The best 
ones applied under impartial conditions produce continuous 
curves of normal probability, though there may be more hope-
63 
less idiots at one extreme than geniuses at the other. 
Hence it may be said scientifically, that creative intelli-
gence is a human characteristic found in all in various 
degrees. 
In conclusion, science demonstrates the power and 
creative genius of man to discover the secrets of a universe 
which had to be recognized as rational before science could 
begin. It has more conspicuously refuted the ancient cynic 
62. Suggested by Binet-Simon scales for feeblemindedness. 
63. Terman, MI; Goddard, l1' CC, and KF. 
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who said "There is no new thing under the sun," than any 
64 
other realm of' knowledge. Then it must be concluded that 
modern science, as well as Greek philosophers and Hebrew 
prophets, testifies to the empirical fact of progress and 
creativity. "Whether we start with atoms or the unknowable 
or a personal God, we confront the fact that reality is a 
65 
creative process." 
IV CREATIVI'l1Y IN THE ARTS 
The works of art (fine and liberal) differ from the 
products of science in several respects: 
1) There is hardly an invention of science, however 
simple and useful that does not lend itself readily to evil 
uses. A madman may use an axe, a child may try to use a 
sharp knife, a baby may swallow a pin. Poems, music, sculp-
ture, pictures, and great books are not so easily misused. 
In some cases one may be too deeply absorbed in such things, 
so that emotions may check energies which should be socially 
applied. It is not to be denied that degrading books are 
written or that there are low forms of art and music which 
may have deleterious effects, but these are not in a strict 
sense creative works, or at least are only negatively so. 
The things which lower, degrade, and destroy are opposed 
to the forces which elevate, inspire, and benefit. The des-
64. ~~., 1: 9. 
65. Brightman, PAR, 55. • 
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tructive factors are necessary nevertheless to arouse desire 
and effort for something better, for without pain, no 
pleasure; without ugliness, no beauty; without falsehood, 
no truth. There can be no struggle, growth, and human crea-
tion unless there is a given to resist, and something to 
achieve. (Perhaps there has to be struggle and opposition 
for divine creation too. If they permeate our e xperience, 
and the universe, they must be in God.) Even the negative 
and destructive factors then, contribute indirectly to 
creativity. 
2) Because the works of science are usually practical 
they are more universally grasped, appreciated, and used 
by the majority than the works of art which suffer for lack 
of use because they are more aesthetic and intellectual and 
thus tend to be exclusive. They appeal to the higher 
trained senses. The majority find doing easier than think-
ing, ma.nipulating things more agreeable than contemplation 
and understanding . 
Besides this natural tendency there are occasions when 
works of art are artificially suppressed. At certain times 
Les Marseillaise may not be played in F'rance. Hitler does 
not want Kant's Zum ewi$en FriedeE: to be read. Chamberlain 
thinks the high art of prayer should be exercised nat the 
proper time. n For centuries the people were not permitted 
to read the Bible lest they misunderstand it. When they 
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did have a chance it is not to be wondered that it beca.me 
absolut e and inerrant for them. Repression sooner or later 
brings reaction. The forbidden enhances in value. If one 
can see far enough ahead, such t h ings in the end result in 
creativity. 
3) The products of science are less stable than the 
works of art. No sooner does one buy a car, or an industry 
set up machinery, or the g overnment build a new battleship 
than n ew inventions appear and make them obsolete. The 
worl{s of art often enhance with age. The Pyramids, Sphinx, 
reme_ins of the Mayan temples and the design of the Parthenon 
are among the world's priceless treasures, not to be sup-
planted. 11 The Sistine Madonna," "Moses ,n "David" and nThe 
Last Supper 11 with musical compositions such as "The 
Mes siah , 11 11 The Creation," " Elijah" and 11 Ave Maria" (Gounod) 
will live at least as long as Christ is worshipped. 
Little satisfactory work has come to attention by way 
of analyzing and. describing the experience of creativity in 
any of the main fields of art. One of the best efforts in 
this line is the work of Prescott who has treated at length 
of 'l1he Poetic Mind which he believes to be intuitive, im-
aginative, dreamy, fanciful, pas s ive, and full of mystery, 
feeling being the most obvious pre.requisite of poetical 
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production. 66 He approves Carlyle's statement, "Unconscious-
ness is the sign of creation; consciousness at best that of 
67 
manufe.cture.n He depreciates reason as well as will and 
says the subjects of poetry are those too difficult for any 
mind and cannot be approached by reason. Here one can only 
68 feel and imag ine. It is an observable fact that many do 
live with very little reasoning. Also, it is a common oc-
currence for ordinary people as well as poets to have periods 
when intention, imag ination, and feeling seem to have full 
sway, but these are only the high spots and always have a 
background of will and activity, and unless followed by 
reason often lead to absurd results. As Hocking says, al-
ternation is the fundamental principle of growth, and it 
applies to all art. Technique must alternate with spirit 
t th Whole. 69 Wh t p tt b bl which represen s e a resco says pro a y 
does apply to much of the lighter poetry, but certainly not 
to the deepest, most creative, and best. He did not con-
sider Job, Browning , and other deep poets. 
With all the general differences between the works of 
science and art, both require h i gh intelligence and ap-
66. Prescott, PM, 44, 92, 138. 
67. Ibid., 94. 
68. Ibid., 73. 
69. Hocking , MGHE , 396, 407f. 
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plication genuinely to comprehend them. One must himself 
be something of an artist, poet, musician, and scientist to 
appreci a te truly the best ~rt, poetry, music, and science. 
To appreciate any one of t h ese is -an achievement. Hence 
the works of art and science not only give objective evidence 
of the creativity of man, but they constantly stimulate fur-
ther c r eativ:tty. 
V I ND IVIDUAL EXPERIENCE OF' CREATIVITY 
Introduction. Concerning the Self. 
1) Historically the external world reveals a continual 
purposive stream of increasingly complex ideas and inven-
tions, as seen in the sketch of the Hebrews and the works 
of science and art. Man creates ideas and these ideas pro-
duce visible results. All of this has been mainly in the 
realm of external observation or inferred experience, and 
little has been said regarding the internal evidence of 
consciousness itself which is the real source of human 
creativity. 11 The only experience immediately accessible 
to us is our own. 1170 As Buckham says, We know ourselves, 
that is to be creative. The witness lies not only in con-
sciousness but in the works we do. There they stand in 
wood, stone, color, printed page, or what not, ours testi-
70. Ward, PP, 25. 
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fying to our creative deed. Yet greater than creativeness 
in the external environment is the inner creativeness by 
which we make ourselves other than we were. 71 The considera-
tion of consciousness is very important for, "The most cer-
tain fact and the only absolutely certain empirical fact is 
72 
my own self-experience.n 
A survey of experience has provoked various individual 
definitions of the self such as: 
Plotinus, The well-spring--eternal source of activity; 
Boethius, Substantia individua rationalis naturae; 
Descartes, The thinking and doubting I; 
Leibniz, A veritable unite; 
Kant, Die tranzendentale Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins. 
Goethe, Supreme value; 
Hegel, Being and manifestation in One; 
Schopenhauer, Will which knows and is; 
Renouvier, Freewill; 
James, A fighter for ends; 
Bowne, Efficient Cause and the only one we know; 
stern, A dynamic unitas multiplex, or that at which men 
aim but never fully attain. 
Brightman, Not abstract unity but a synthesizer of unity 
and multiplicity--th e whole unity of experience. 
71. Buckham, PP, 100. 
72. Brightman, PI, 18. 
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3) The majority of these statements express decidedly 
the view that the self is active agent. If mind were purely 
passive it could not think or have experience beyond sense 
impressions. But it has rational experience which is in-
separable from a sense of effort, search, and striving. Has 
consciousness any passive element? Ladd says that every 
state of consciousness has both an active, discriminating 
f t d . t t 73 ac or, an pass~ve con en • There is always " a foreign 
element, an external compulsion, a passivity as well as 
74 
activity, a dependence on something not ourselves." The 
unwilled is a constant fact of experience as much as the 
willed. Things are always present which I did not will and 
cannot eliminate. No matter what I strive to achieve, or 
how hard, I always get something I do not will and do not 
wan~. No matter how much I concentrate on a line of thought, 
there are constant external stimuli breaking in and forcing 
attention. 
The self is, the self acts and receives impressions. 
It has permanence, yet is ever changing and being changed. 
It acts because it is, and it is because it acts. Sometimes 
the emphasis on 11being is activity," gives the impression 
that mind is thought to have no passivity, but "Being did 
73. Ladd, PM, 89. 
74. Bowne, THE, 168. 
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not first exist, and then act; neither did it act before 
it existed; but both being and action are given in indis-
soluble unity. Being has its existence only in its action, 
and the action is possible only through the being." 75 
Passivity is necessary for activity. The.yalternate in prom-
inence, and attention may be directed to either so that in 
thinking , a gent and patient may be separated, yet in fact 
there is no separation. Memory is a relating activity which 
reveals the identity and unity of the self. It is so funda-
mental that, as already mentioned, the word for mind in many 
languages means memory. 
4) According to Schleiermacher, there are in self-
consciousness two elements, one expressing the existence 
of the subject for itself (ein Sichselbstsetzen), and the 
other its coexistence with an Other (ein Sichselbstnichtso-
76 gesetzthaben). The self or consciousness is the esse. 
It is so closely related to the causa that they are often 
not distinguished even by some psychologists. To overlook 
the esse leads to very inadequate results. To deny~ 
destroys t h e independence and very essence of mind making 
it only a flux produced externally by nature. The only 
possible way of know i ng mind is to be one. Personality is 
75. Bowne, ~~T (1), 53. 
76. Schleiermacher, DOG, I, 15f. (13). 
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like blue, pain, causality, space, and time in that it can-
not be constructed but can only be experienced as a fact, 
but when once the stage of self-consciousness is attained 
. , 
it is an undeniable fact. Some have sought to deny it 
nevertheless. To deny the causa and say that mind is res-
ponsible for everything and itself creates all that it 
knows leads to solipsism which the facts render impossible 
for: 
a. Examination reveals that every moment of my ex-
perience contains more than myself. There is always some 
objective reference beyond. The self is constantly forced 
to recognize the not-self. "Life, then, is to be conceived 
as an alternation between an abiding-in-self (Insichbleiben) 
and a passing-beyond-self (Aussichheraustreten) on the part 
of the subject. 1177 The senses seem to reveal an external 
world. If it does not exist, how can I possibly account 
for my experiences? Furthermore, the constancy and identity 
I experience in myself, is matched in the universe by law 
and order. The purpose I find and execute in myself is 
matched by purpose in the world. If all of this is illusion 
then the actual rational experience of explanation would be 
impossible. 
b. Similarly, the fact of social interaction is un-
77. Ibid., 9 (8). 
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deniable. '11his is a two way process requiring impression 
and reception as well as action and expression. If' this is 
illusion then there could be no experience of coherent 
thinking. 
c. The relation of mind and body reveals that each 
greatly inf'luences the other but so much goes on in mind 
which seems to transcend body, and so much goes on in body 
that mind cannot change or control, that it becomes evi-
dent that my mind only partially controls my body. As 
Berkeley said, I do not cause my heart to beat, therefore 
another must do it. Hence the causa are not to be denied. 
Other Important Types of' Experience. 
1) Religious experience is a f'act. Hegel says man 
78 knows of' God only in relation to consciousness. "The only 
source of evidence for God is immediate experience which I 
have called the 'datum self' and which includes both con-
tent and form. All of the reasons for belief in God or in 
man are but interpretations more or less trustworthy of this 
datum.n 7 9 VIJhitehead gives an active and empirical view of 
religion when he says, 
Religion is the vision of something which 
stands beyond, behind, and within, the 
passing flux of immediate things; some-
78. Hegel, PdR, I, 63 (46). 
79. Brightman, J. Rel., 12 (1932), 545. 
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thing which is real, and yet waiting 
to be realized; some t h ing which is a 
remote possibility, and yet the great-
est of present facts; something that 
gives meaning to all that passes, and 
yet eludes apprehension; someth ing 
whose possession is the final good, and 
yet is t h e ultimate ideal, and the hope-
less quest.80 · 
The mystics are convinced of the certainty of God, of the 
immediacy of his presence, and of a unity of purpose. " In 
this respect they are, as Royce said, the only true or 
thoroughgoing empiricists. tl81 The pages of history record 
many of their experiences, and the power and continued in-
spiration of their messag es testify to an other-th an-human 
source. Much has been revealed about God and t h e relig ious 
life. Revelation is a fact. Thousands who would deny any 
claim as mystics nevertheless seek God and strive to know 
his will. They testify that they have real communion, and 
that earnest prayer a l ways bring s results. .Jame s writes 
empirically, ~~ Prayer or inner communion with the spirit 
thereof--be that spirit 1God 1 or 1 l aw 1--is a process whe r e in 
work is really done, and spiritual energy flows in and pro-
duces effects, psycholog ical or material, within the phenom-
enal world. u82 These empirical facts are the support of 
80. Wnitehead, SMW , 267. 
81. Knudson , VRE , 68. 
8 2 . .James, VRE , 485. 
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religion which could not exist without them. 
But, it will be objected, not all men are religious, 
and what is more, not all great men are reli gious. It may 
be replied that greatness fl always re quires a clear and in-
tense vision of some end and a concentration of purpose to 
83 
that end ." It simply means that relig ion is one but not 
t h e only inspiration for life's purp oses and creativity. 
2 ) Mora l experience is a fact. A very small child 
soon develops what is called conscience, or a voice of 
criticism within. vYhat he feels is right depends on his 
sur r ounding s, but it is a powerful fact that universally 
all intellig ent being s come to consider something as right 
and something as wrong . Th ere is a universal moral sense. 
Duty, the moral law within, the demand to do right, and to 
respect personality made a more l a sting impression on Kant 
than the fact of religious experience. 
3) Aesthetic experience is a fact. Not so universal 
perh a p s, certainly not so pronounced as the above, a nd far 
from its desired state of development, but the result s of 
the aesthetic are found among all peoples. Savag es g ive 
clear eviden ce of a sense of the beautiful in their desire 
for ornamentation, tattoo decorations, and handiwork. Few 
can be found , if a ny, who have not seen or d o not call 
83. Brightman, Rel. in Life (Winter 1939 ), 17. 
154 
something beautiful, and who are not moved by objects so 
called. 
Some Questions. 
1) ·what does mind create? Directly it creates ideas, 
knowledge, beliefs, a.tti tudes, and ideals. Nothing exists 
for anyone until he thinks it for himself. Some ideas are 
very specific and personal, while others are discoveries of 
universal laws and essences which each individual, in order 
to possess, must achieve anew for himself. Indirectly, by 
means of ideas and ideals mind may direct the activities 
leading to great literary productions or to the new com-
binations and inventions in the material world, as already 
discussed, or to great deeds. William James in "Energies 
of Men" stresses the power of ideas to transform life and 
unlock innumerable powers such as 11 The Flag, 11 "Fatherland," 
84 
nThe Holy Sepulcher, 1' nLi berty, Equality, Fraternity, n and 
to these may be added, "Make the world safe for democracy." 
After all of the usual railing against tradition as 
deadly to progress, Whitehead comes to the rescue and says 
this is a mistake, that traditional ideas are never static: 
They are either fading into meaningless 
formulae, or are gaining power by the 
new lights thrown by a more delicate 
84. James, MS, 256. 
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apprehension. They are transformed by 
the urge of critical reason, by the 
vivid evidence of emotional experience, 
and by the cold certainties of scientific 
perception. One fact is certain, you can-
not keep them still. No generation can 
merely reproduce its ancestors. You may 
preserve the life in a flux of form, or 
preserve the form amid an ebb of life. 
But you cannot permanently egclose the 
same life in the same mould. 5 
2 ) vVhat essential contributing factors does exper-
ienc e find involved prior to creation? As Brightman says, 
there is such a factor: 
It seems that the activity of mind is 
never pure , wholly self-determining, 
or self-creating action. Rather it is 
the selecting or forming of a conscious 
content that is given (meaning a con-
stituent, not a product of mental _ac-
tivity). This content is conscious ex-
perience and is an inseparable part of · 
the very structure of mental action, 86 yet it is not produced by that action. 
Mind belongs to a larger organic vrhole. The causa and the 
alternation of self with not-self have been mentioned. 
What do they include? 
a) A physical body and nervous system is the most 
intimate part of the necessary environment of mind. 
b) A physical world is necessary to explain sensa-
tions. It furnishes the fundamental raw materials of know-
85. Whitehead, S~V , 26 2 . Cf. Dewey, LO G, 239. 
86. Brightman, in Barrett, CIA, 194. 
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ledge for the body to transmit to the developing mind. 
c) Other minds (the social environment) are essen-
tial both for body and mind. Communication serves as a 
short circuit to knowledge by transmitting rapidly the 
accumulated experience of the race. By the methods of edu-
cation a child may learn in a few hours what required many 
centuries of slow experience to work out for the first time. 
Communication has three types, and each of them leads to 
knowledge and creativity: 
1. Suggestion, or thinking as others think, grasp-
ing for oneself the ideas conveyed by language. Exact repro-
duction is of course not possible. 
2. Sympathy, or feeling as others feel approxi-
mately, i .s often communicated by signs and facial expression 
when there is a comraon background of association. It has 
such a pow·erful emotional quality that it greatly influ-
ences action. 
3. Imitation is doing as others do. It calls 
for comp arison of my acts with those of another and effort 
to eliminate the difference. Ye t as ~oyce says, " I never 
merely repeat his act. Imitation is a kind of experimental 
orig ination, a trial of a hew plan, the initiation of a 
· n87 trial series of acts. 
87. Royce, WI, II, 3llf. 
He adds that the imitative ac-
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tivity tends to the establishment of n ew forms of recurrent 
self-expres s ion. I n oth er words imitation is a n intermediary 
step to creative activity and is vital to the development of 
the self. Th is is illustrated by pupils in art who imitate 
technique, copy masterp ieces, and practise a long time with 
the expectation that originality will emerge. 
4. Greater than these forms of learning through 
likeness is the communication provoking antagonism and 
stimulating mental activity by producing counter ideas to 
supplant, by opposing feeling, or by contrary acts. These 
may result in a period of argument, justification, and 
demonstration in an effort to reach a settlement which is 
often beneficial to both sides. Some are of such disposi-
tion t h at they often feel the need of a goad, g lory in o p-
position, and learn best that way., Others find it irri-
tating b e cause it lead s to ma ny blind alleys and distracts 
from the main point of interest for which solution is 
sought. They learn f aster in peaceful cooperative pursuit, 
or in solitude. 
d) Experien ce as a whole, including rational ex-
perience , reveals that there must be a guiding , directing, 
unifying , controlling power permeating t h e universe. 
Otherwise it is impossible to account coherently for ex-
perience. As Creator and sustaining power, God must be t h e 
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main source and condition of the whole environment, and of 
all minor human creation. 
3) Some of the methods and means contributing to 
creativity have been mentioned already in other connections. 
The next question is, more specifically, how does mind 
create? The following topics are treated separately for 
clarity, but this does not indicate that the functions pre-
sented are separate. There is always great overlapping , 
and interdependence. 
1. Perception, contrary to the older forms of psy-
chology, i s 11 no passive mirroring of objective reality. 
It is a complex creative and transforming process, H for 
will enters as attention, memory is present, thought con-
tributes its categories, and sensibility furnishes the 
t . 1 88 raw ma erJ.a s. Mind discovers many of its objects 
through perception. 
2. Creativity is promoted by apperception or by a 
rich background of accumulated past experiences. "The 
effect of a new thought or desire depends very largely on 
the character of the thoughts and desires already in the 
mind. The same thing affects us diversely according to 
our mood or preoccupation. 1189 An inscription on the Union 
88. Knudson, VRE, 75; Bowne, IPT, 253. 
89. Bowne, MET, 239. 
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Station at Washington, D. c. informs the traveller, l! If you 
would bring back the wealth of the Indies, you must take 
the wealth of the Indies with you." What a student gets 
from a lecture and what he does about it depends on the 
knowledge and experience he takes to the lecture. 
3. Impulses and desires are elementary drives often 
leading to creativity. Probably no impulse in itself is 
definitely destructive. Every normal person experiences 
from some source within, which he does not understand, 
wonder, or the desire to know, an impulse to construct, a 
craving for beauty, impulses for t h e good, vague longing s 
for perfection, and a restless seeking for the source of all 
being . 'rhe results are found in handiwork of all kinds, 
weaving, needlework, utensils, tools, musical instruments, 
ornaments and decorations, shrine s and ritual, a s well as 
in the more advanced and conspicuous forms of sculpture, 
painting, architecture, music, literature, and worship. 
Man wants to leave an impression in the world. He wants to 
achieve distinction, to do something worth remembering . 
The Taj lVIahal, Bok Tower, Duke University, Carnegie 
Libraries and the Rockefeller Foundation reveal this in 
comb ination with the impulse for beauty and a desire to 
benefit mankind. 
4. Imagination or the power of making images which 
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Laird calls " the mimic of sense, 1190 is essential to all 
material constructions. The engineer sees the bridge, 
tunnel, and dam before he puts it on blue prints, the artist 
sees the statue or painting before he beg ins work. Exper-
ience r ev e als that very simple acts are first pictured in the 
mi nd. F lewelling has written at leng th on 11 Creative Irnag-
ination, 11 and says that without this uni que posses s ion 
orig inal and creative work is impossible. He accepts 11 no 
imagination, no emotion, 1' adding "no i ma gination, no emo-
tion, and no creative achievement.n 91 Schleiermacher ex-
presses a similar extreme and exalted view: 
You will know that imagination is the 
hi ghest and most orig inal activity in 
man, and that all besides is only re-
flection upon it. Your imag ination 
cre ates the world, and you could have 
no God with out t h e world.92 
Leigh ton se ems nearer correct when h e calls imag ination the 
primary source of man's power to progress, but admits that 
as an intellectual being man g oes far beyond imagination. 93 
Ferrier says that it is impossible to picture ideas or 
universals in the imagination, and that ideas are opposed 
90. Laird, PS, 344. 
91. F lewelling , CP, 280; Personalist, 6 (1925), 81, 88. 
92. Schleiermacher, SR, 283. 
93. Le i ghton, SPC, 233. 
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to imagination. 94 Experience certainly verifies t h is view. 
It is certain that some of the mo s t important ideas such 
as God, freedom, and immortality cannot be correctly pic-
tured, but must be thought, and this means to rise above 
t h e sensuous p lane. Bowne said little of imag ination but 
often. rid iculed " pictur e thinking" as a lower stag e of 
thought. He s peak s of the "unpicturable notions of in-
tellig ence, u " t h e unpicturable categ ori e s of causation and 
95 
activity" and "the unpicturable construct ions of thought. " 
He says, "We cannot be even empiricists without assuming 
the unpicturable reality of causation. 1196 
5. If thinking is not a more creative proces s than 
i mag ination, it is certa inly creative on a much h igher 
plane. Thinking leads to expression and language which not 
only records thought but prompts clearer, more exact, and 
more systematic expression. The mi nd creates s ome of its 
objects b y definition. Some think that the proces s of 
finding truth is wh olly a matter of defining what is meant. 
97 Exact definition often reveals error. Since all inherit 
94. Ferrier, PW , I I , 338f. 
95. Bowne , TTK, 81, 289; MET, 9. Of. TTK, 291, 274, 343; 
MET, 27f. 
96. Bowne, TTK, 354. Of. Einbildungskraft in Kant. 
97. Brightman, I TP, 70. 
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a lang,'Uage , n the word" often 
mental activity is necessary 
ings. 
~ -----
. 1 98 
precedes 11 the thought," and 
I 
to capture the accepted mean-
1 
Reading, as well as writing, is 1 a creative proces s of 
I 
constructing thought along suggested l lines. Sometimes, it 
I 
is true, there is too much suggestio? and not enough inde-
pendent r eaction and criticism. Thik vvas in the mind of 
I 
Hobbes when he said tha t if he read as much as other men he 
I 
would know no more t han they! Bowne
1 
says that log ic c annot 
teach invention which is a matter of l insight, but that it 
- I 
is negatively valuable, whereas Dewew chooses a broader, 
more dynamic definition of log ic, as 1 inquiry into inquiry, 
I 
and says it is 11 the life blood of ev1ery science and is 
I 
constantly eng aged in every art' crart' s.nd profession." 99 
Perh ap s it would be more exact to say that it requires a 
I 
great deal of creative activity of mind to lay h old of logic, 
a nd that the possession of a little :of it aids further 
creativity greatly by setting limits and guiding thought 
I 
into proper channels. 
Theolog y is the thought sspect 1of religion. Knudson 
I 
says that its function is regulative not creative. As proof 
I 
I 
98. Bowne, TTK, 121, 147. 
99. Bowne, TTK, 207; Dewey, LOG, 4 1• 
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he cites the scholastics. 100 The qu stion arises, can 
theology serve relig ion without bei creative? Was not 
I 
sch olasticism creative until it crystallized into narrow, 
formal, abstract, argumentative formi for its own sake and 
lost its deep religious renewing spibit? Thinking is active 
. I 
and creative, hence relig ious thinking (or theology) should 
I be creative. Perh aps it is one reason for an all too static 
I 
condition of t h e church today that theology has clung too 
persistently to tradition, based on ~nferior philosophy. 
It does too much regulating and hampl ring when it should 
take the lead and inspire. When thef logians in true reli-
gious spirit think long and deeply ar out God and the uni-
verse, they are sure to find some ne dynamic truth. ~~y 
should theology be restricted to the dead and static of 
past thought? Why is it not present, living , growing 
thought about God? Regardless of what Knudson has s aid 
about theology being only regulative, he is himself making 
it dynamic and creative . 
Ethics may similarly be reg ard ed as the thought aspect 
. b t - I · t· 1 t· of morals, It lS n ot static u dynaml c, s 1mu a 1ng, 
c reative. When ethical t h ought was permeated with skepti-
cism and the r e lativity of human de ire, Brightman showed 
100. Knudson, DG, 63, 186. 
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the eternal and inviolable nature of moral laws. 101 The 
reader who has.been told all of his l ife.that laws are 
possible only 1n logic, and the mathFmat1cal and physical 
sciences, gets a real revelation if he is openminded enough 
to read to the end. Moral laws lik e logical laws set limits 
and guide one seeking the creative l·fe. 
6. Intuition is a~in to percep ion but not so closely 
associated with sense experience. It is higher, more 
s piritual. Intuitions seem very ijdiate, often coming 
like a flash. Sometimes thev are t en to be bits of 
revelation or direct suggest:on fro God. · This must be 
possible if there is any interactioj between God and men, 
Probably some intuitions are from d, vine source and as 
such are highly creative, but all ane certainly not, so 
that when they come they need to be tested. "Believe not 
every spirit, but try the spirits w ether they are of 
God, n102 is good advice. Intuition may be called na 
revelation claim to be investigated ' It is a good idea 
to think of them simply as suggesti0ns, hunches, guesses, 
or hypotheses. As such they are crfj ative, for they set the 
mind experimenting and searching fo proof. 
7. "As the creative activity of thought is essential 
101. Brightman, ML (1933). 
10 2 . I John, 4:1. 
1 6 5 
to articulate experience in general, so the creative ac-
tivity of faith is essential to religious experience."l03 
In fact faith is a sine qua non of a 1.1 creative activity. 
Fear and doubt unhinge the powers of/ creativity. Without 
faith all realms of life would be pa~alyzed . Busines s , the 
state, the school, and the h ome just as much as the church, 
all rest upon it. There must be fai h in others for any 
kind of cooperative d e aling s or ente prises. There must 
be faith in oneself to g ive assuran e and courage for the 
tasks of life. As Whitehead says, ~aith (conviction) deter-
mines character: I 
Your character is developed according 
to your f ai tb.. 'l'hi s is t~1 e primary 
religious truth from whic · no one can 
escape. Religion is fore of belief 
cleansing the inward part~. For this 
reason the primary religi,us virtue is 
sincerity, a p enetrating ~incerity •••• 
In the long run your character s.nd your 
conduct of life dep~nd upbn your in-
timate convictions.~04 / 
Faith in oneself without belief in hod may reach colossal 
proportions of conceit and arroganc l , but one cannot reach 
his own highe st pos sible efficiency without faith in God , 
or as Whitehead says, without the f fa. ith in reason, which 
spring s from direct inspection of t~e nature of things as 
103. Knudson , VRE , 30. 
104. 1fl/hi te,head, RIM, 15. 
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disclosed in our own immediate preser.l t experience. 
To experience this faith is to know 
that in being ourselves we are more 
than ourselves: to know tpat our 
experience, dim and fragme~tary as 
it is, yet sounds the utmost depths 
of reality: to know that 1~etached details merely in order to
1 
be them-
selves demand that they should find 
themselves in a system of lthings: 
to k now that this sys tem i~cludes 
the harmony of logical rationality, 
and the harmony of aesthetic achieve-
ment: to know that, whilei the harmony 
of logic lies upon the uni~erse as an 
iron necessity, the aesthe
1
1tic harmony 
stands before it as a living ideal 
moulding the general flux [in its 
broken ~0ggress toward fi l er, subtler issues. 
In other words the aesthetic harmonJli creates beyond nee-
essity. 
8. The worship of God is the J reatest source of 
creativity. Man re a lly is closer t l God than he generally 
knows or thinks. "The instinctive ~ature of' prayernl06 is 
one suggestion of this. God reveall himself continually 
through the senses in evolution, in the law, order, and 
beauty of nature as well as in the Fational, moral, and 
religious consciousness. Men may br ignorant of God and 
utterly reject him while at the same time they draw inspira-
tion for a worthy life from some so , rce which they do not 
105. Whitehead, SMW, 26. 
106. Hocking, MGHE, 358. 
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recognize as divine. But the religious person is certain 
that God is in everyth ing, and no soi ree of inspiration 
exists without his sustaining activi j y whethe r it is com-
prehended or not. Henc e , it may trul y be said t hat all 
great. men and many not so great draw l their inspiration 
either directly, or indirectly and. u r consciously from the 
divine. "God is the one systematic, comp lete fact, which is 
the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act."107 
Direct inspiration is the stronkest and best unless it 
is carried to excess as in extreme m~sticism where emotional 
effects are prolonged and actually ihhibit activity and 
creativity. It is an empirical fact that the experience 
of prayer brings relief, and harmonizes thought, feeling , 
and action. It unifies and gives direction to personality 
as nothing else. The question may ~e asked sp~cifically, 
how does it do this? or what does wf rship create? Only 
four of the more important results vill be mentioned: 108 
a) It creates perspective o enables one to rise 
above h is body and sense experience and to see himself as 
a member of the spirit world of whi j h God is the supreme 
power. It brings a fusion of persofal worth and personal 
subordination wh ich gives peace, jo . , confidence, and hope. 
107. \Vhitehead, RIM, 154. 
108. For full account se e Brightman, RV, 212- 234 . 
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It reveals something of what one ought to be. 
b) Worship creates a spiritual ideal for wh ich to 
strive. Individual life as a tiny part of an eternal world 
becomes deepe r and more meaningful for it becomes "the high 
adventure of cooperation with God. n109 
c) Worship creat e s power. A real vision of God is 
creative for it is a confronting of reality and always ends 
with a call to action, and g ives the power to 1NOrk. Worship 
may not give control over disease or physical things, but, 
what is vastly more important, control of inner a ttitude. 
It gives power to transform the meaning of the past as a 
part of a whole, and it controls within limits, the present 
and future. This po1Ner is not mechanical or coercive but 
personal and cooperative. Worship brings relief from the 
110 burden of sin, and is t•the soul's charter of liberty. n 
d) Worship creates a community of love. In giving 
a vision of the whole, it reveals relations and duties to 
others. Communion with God is supplemented and augmented 
by the fellowship and communion of (the saints) other 
religious minds. 
9. Emotion may be creative as well as destructive . 
A great deal more h as been written against emotion than 
109. Brightman, RV, 219. 
110. Ibid., 221. 
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for it. Bowne, a frequent critic of emotion, in one of 
his earliest books said that the saying, "Feeling proves 
nothing" is true only for individual, isolated, and trans-
itory feeling s; the great, fundamental, and abiding feel-
ing s of the race may prove much, and few are aware to what 
extent feeling and sentiment enter into intellectual life, 
and even into their own theories. 
Both in ethics and esthetics t h e ulti-
mate fact upon which all theory is built, 
is a movement of the sensibility, which 
thus founds the distinction of good and 
bad, beautiful and u g ly. The most rigor-
ous rationalist in morals cannot escape 
the ultimate appeal to feeling to sanction 
his t heories. 'l'he whole mental life, also, 
spring s out of feeling. It is extremely 
doubtful if a purely perceptive being , 
without any subjective interests, could 
attain to rationality, even if its phys-
ical existence were secured. Indeed it is 
demonstrable that our sentiments outline 
and control all mental development.lll 
To some this may seem extreme. The emphasis on the cogni-
tive has certainly been more extreme. Feeling, emotion, 
and sentiment are empirical fact s , and as such neason must 
take account of them. Bowne later writes, "In order to be 
wholesome and rational, emotions must spring from ideas; 
112 
and religious emotions must spring from religious ideas.n 
Emotion is always in relation to othe r functions, but to 
111. Bowne, ST, 65f. Cf. James in J. Spec. Phil., Jan. 
July, 1878. 
112. Bowne, SO, 254. 
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be creative it must be in proper relation to them. It 
needs to be grounded in ideas, as Bowne suggests, and also 
it must be directed and controlled by reason. 'rhere is no 
denylng the fact that it furnishes the incentive and power 
for action. Ribot said, "The emotion is the ferment without 
. 113 
which no creation is possible." 
Love is doubtless the greatest of them all. Science 
depends on love of knowledge. vVhi tehead says that if devoid 
of emotion and interest, we do not even observe at a11. 114 
Bowne says, l'The love of truth, which is the mainspring of 
science, is on1y one phase of religious feeling and wor-
ship."115 Religion would be primitive indeed without the 
belief that God is love, and without love of God and fellow 
man. Art d e pends on love of beauty, ethics on loyalty to 
the right, and philosophy could not exist without love of 
truth. Emotion then, however destructive in some of its 
phases, is nevertheless an indispensable factor in all 
creativeness. 
10. Activity, unwi11ed as well as willed, is creative. 
It is the essence of being. Much activity which is random, 
accidental, automatic, or forced reaches consciousness and 
113. Ribot, CI, 3lf. 
114. Whitehead, RIM, 124. 
115. Bowne, ST, 66. 
171 
teaches something . Habits which move along smoothly with-
out conscious will are often interrupted by a change which 
leads to improvement. 11 We cannot think first and act 
afterwards. .From the moment of birth we are immersed in 
action, and can only fitfully guide it by taking thought. 11116 
Will is creative. \Vhen one chooses, he makes something. 
It is said that wrong action is better than no action, for 
if one is not willing to take a chance, and can act only 
on what he knows certainly, he would be paralyzed. Will 
requires the support of feeling and ideas, and is closely 
related to reason. The conclusion of a syllog ism depends 
on the choice of the premises, but reason in its larger 
sense, should guide the choice. It is certain t hat we can 
become rational only by great effort and persistent use of 
will. Most creative are the obedi·ent and good wills which 
seek to follow the divine will. 
11. Reason is creative. nThe chief function of 
reasoning is to make ·discoveries, to carry Us beyond the 
limit set to observation, memory, and the simple r forms of 
thought. Reasoning is thus an important form of self-
development, or learning , a means of acquiring new outlooks, 
117 
new points of view, new bases for action. n Brightman 
116. Whitehead, SMW , 261. 
117. Calkins, FBP, 163. 
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emphasiz e s the c r eativity of reason by calling attention 
to the neg ative. "Reason is t h e state of peaceful activity, 
the p rocess of' h a rmoniou s p rogress toward h a rmonious ends. 
Irr ation ality is the state of war, of conflict, of tearing 
d own with the left h and what t h e right hand has built 
U ull8 P• Reason is subject to misuse. V\/hen driven b y emo-
tional desires it becomes ration a l iza tion which is very de-
c e p tive because it is believed to be re a son. Effective 
re a son is closely linked with faith. 11 A man who alway s 
re a sons and never trusts will not reason creatively or 
119 fruitfully." 
Re ason is a p rocess of unceasing s e arch for truth 
and , Das Wahre ist da s Ganze. Reason is closely linked 
with activity. Die Vernunft das zweckm~ssige Tun ist, but 
it cannot be r educed to action. nReason must either lead 
to acti on or be self-defeating . The li f e of reason is not 
the life of pur e contemplation; it is the total experi e nce 
of man, h is whole life activity, tested and guided by com-
prehens ive insight, 11 120 or "it is a coherent exp lanation · 
"1 21 R . t h based on a synoptic view of experience. eason 1s e 
118. Brightman, Alert, II (1938), 11. 
119. Brightman, ITP , 325. 
1 20. Brightman, PR, 101. 
1 21. Ibid ., 27. Also, FG , 66, 16lf • . 
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ultimate test of truth, highest faculty, most concr ete and 
comprehensive, latest emergent of mind, and, since it seems 
to permeate the universe, must also be in God. This makes 
it ''a mark of kinship with the divine.n 122 
VI CONCLUSION 
It seems justified to say that experience reveals growth, 
development, and creativity in history in the realms of 
religion, science, art, and morals. The study of individual 
consciousness likewi se reveals creativity. By introspection 
and analysis it is possible to distinguish different func-
tions which come to prominence from time to time and to 
decide what is the contribution of each, although intros-
pection never catches any function absolutely alone. The 
cognitive, affective, and conative are alwa y s working in 
conjun ction. Thinking and feeling are themselves activities. 
The great fundamental experience is that of unity and iden-
tity. Without this, or without memory, the other functions 
would be impossible. This binding principle indicates that 
the mind always functions as a whole. The p rocess of 
reason is experience, and the results of reason become part 
of experience. Reason is the whole mind -functioning crea-
tively. 
1 22. Brightman, FG, 72. Also, ML, 84. 
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The human mind, with all of its observed powers and 
products, and with its consciousness of creativity, is 
amazingly wonderful to contemplate until one considers the 
source of it all and the creations of the first, and an 
entirely different order, i.e. the bringing into being and 
sustaining of new spirits, separate consciousnes s es, c a pable 
of achieving freedom in limits, and ree.son. Then the crea-
tions of man fade into insignificance to be restored only 
by the experienced ideas that nspirit is spirit, 11 man has 
kinship with God, and the secondary creativity of man is 
evidence of the kinship. The next chapter will attempt to 
use and synthesize the historical and empirical data, draw-
ing from the whole a formulation of the best possible 
hypothesis to explain creativity. 
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There are two kinds of creation, 
one is human and the other divine. 
Soph., 265. 
Everybody is n creator in a sense. 
There are three beds; the idea made 
by God, that which is t h e work of 
the carpenter, and the imitation 
made by the painter or poet. 
Rep., 596. 
CHAPTER THREE 
RESULTANT IfYPOTHESIS 
INTRODUCr.J.1ION 
Bringing together that great complex of ideas given by 
history, rational thought, and experience, what conclusions 
may be reached concerning creative activity of mind? Out 
of the mass of opposing data and contradictory theories do 
some principles seem to emerge, and can they be fitted to-
gether in a harmonious system? Empirical facts are far less 
subject to difference of opinion than the interpretations 
of those facts; yet to hold only to the empirical would not 
only make philosophy impossible but would reduce men to 
solipsists and eventually to a very low animal existence. 
Reason and experience are not tvw separate powers. They are 
essential, inseparable, interdependent aspects of conscious-
ness and only in their concrete unity is their full truth 
evident. 1 Their artificial separation brings much confusion. 2 
11 The rational is the development of an aspect of the em-
3 
pirical, n and all experience includes some reason. 'l'he 
1. Brightman, P71C, 74. 
2. Brightman, Phil. Rev., 46 (1937), 155. 
3. Brightman, Sem. Quart., 6 (1937, No. 3), 10; PR, 87. 
"pure ego" and the "empirical ego" need to be studied together 
4 
as "experiences of the same i'inite seli'." 
Descartes was doubtless correct in his "Rules for the 
Direction of the Mind 11 when he said, 11 it were far better 
never to think of investigating truth at all, than to do so 
without a method." 5 The true philosophical attitude and aim 
is not to try to annihilate various theories, but rather to 
consider them as necessar~ parts of the dialectic whole of 
philosophy, and hence to try to understand them in order to 
preserve their elements of truth in a higher synthesis. This 
study so far has revealed the advantage both of purpose and 
method. It also shows tendencies in the human mind both to 
tear down (analyze, abstract), and to construct (synthesize), 
and that only the highly trained mind recognizes that truth 
is the whole, and sees the above processes as essential and 
complementary parts of the synoptic method. 'rhe general 
tendency to stop with analysis was npted and criticized by 
Goethe, 
Wer will was Lebendig 1 s erkenne.n und beschrei ben, 
Sucht erst den Geist herauszutreiben; 
Dam hat er die Theile in seiner Hanq, 
Fehlt leider nur das geistige Band.6 
4. Brightman in Barrett {Ed.), CIA, 182. 
5. De scartes, PW, I, 9. 
6. Quoted by Sor1ey, MVIG, 248. 
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'rhe whole is more than a perfect understanding of relations 
and sum of all its parts. It is a living functioning or-
g anism. The utter insufficiency of analys is may be illus-
trated by a fine automobile in perfect condition which is a 
mere summation, and useless until a driver (mind, agent, 
reason) steps in and makes it a functioning whole. nA 
philosophy based on less than the coherent whole of p erson-
ality is abstract, impersonal, and f al s e because of its in-
coherence with actual facts. 11 7 
The previous chapter s have sketched various philosophi-
cal and practical conclusions of some of the greatest synthe-
tic thinkers and "radical empiricists" conce r n ing the nature 
of mind and its creativity. They arrived at these conclu-
sions by various method s and have expressed themselves in 
diverse manner and in six different languages. The present 
p roblem reduces to the questions: 
a) Ju s t what similarities can be found? 
b) ~~at are t h e main principles expressed? 
c) 1fuich of these shall be selected as b e ing t h e most 
reasonable? 
d) Can t h ey be systematized to form a coherent whole ? 
e) To what extent and in what sense is belief in 
7. Brightman, "First Principle s of Persona lism," in 
Luminar, par. 9. 
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creative activity of mind justified by the evidence? 
I SPECIFIC HYPO'l'HESES 
1. The study of mind necessarily involves metaphysics 
and religion. God, mind, and reality are indissoluble. 
In Greek philosophy metaphysics and theology were in-
separable. For the Hebrews life and religion were bound 
together. Experience cannot be explained without metaphy sics. 
If one speaks of brain, interprets, or believes anything he 
passes beyond the realm of experience, in its usual narrow 
sense. Indeed, as Hocking says, "Experience is essentially 
metaphysical--the place in which we meet Reality •••• One 
thing I cannot by any means escape: nronely, that reality 
itself is present to me in experience."8 
a. Thales. Soul pervades the whole universe and is 
the cause of movement. 9 
b. Pythagoras believed reality to be immaterial and 
of the nature of thought forms. 
c. Moses relied upon an imageless, invisible God as 
creator and source of all good. 
d. Empedocles. God is Mind sacred and ineffable, 
flashing through the whole universe with swift thoughts. 
8. Hocking, MGHE, 303, 310. 
9. Citations previously g iven will not be repeated. 
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e. Heraclitus. Log os the guid e of all things per-
v a des the universe lik e an infinite subtle flame. 
f. Anaxag oras. Nous is t h e first principle which 
set the universe in motion and is the cause of g oodness and 
order. 
g . P lato. Mind is the self-moving mover, God t h e 
mo t ion that moves itself. The Stranger in Sophist rejects 
the vulg a r op inion that unint e lligent nature bring s all 
things to being spontaneou sly, favoring t h e explanation that 
they are created by God or by a divine reason and k nowledg e 
coming from God. It is more reasonable that mind should 
come from a Supreme mind than from something lower than mind 
and void of consciousnes s . If human mind must be highly 
trained and must work strenuously to be creative in a sec-
ondary wa y , how could it be thought possible that anything 
less than a mind could ever produce creation s of the highest 
order? As Lock e says, 11 It is as impossible to conceive that 
ever bare incogita tive matter should produce a thinking in-
tellig ent being , a s that nothing should of itself produce 
10 
matter." 
h. Plotlnus. Soul is immaterial, t h e reason- prin -
ciple of the universe, existing nowhere and ever~nhere. All 
things are from one source. 
i. Hegel. Substance is mind, spirit, agent. Spirit 
10. Locke , PVI , I I , 236 , or EHU, IV. 
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alone is reality. The rational is the real, the trust-
worthy. 
j. Bowne. A personal, creator God is the fundamental 
postulate. All attempts at philosophizing on the impersonal 
plane is futile. 
k. Brightman. The rationality of the universe and 
11 the fact of God stand or fall together. 
It also appears that one's metaphysics or philosophy 
is determined by the view he takes of mind. As Royce em-
phasized, "All philosophy turns, as Kant had shown, upon 
understanding who and what I am, and who my deeper self 
is. 1112 Mind then, far from being negligible or accidental, 
or merely a temporary human affair, seems to be the one and 
only reality. 
2. Mind is organic. The universe is qua litatively 
One, mental, and continuous and ~uantitatively many. 
a. Empedocles. All thing s draw breath and all 
things have wisdom and a sl',lare of thought. 
b. Heraclitus. It is wise to harken to the logos 
and to confess that all things are one. 
c. Anaxagoras. Eternal Nous is certainly there where 
everything else is, in the containing envelope, in both the 
11. Bri ghtman, Rel. in Life, 1 (1932), 145. 
12. Royce, SMP, 204. 
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animate and inanimate. 'rhings are not cut off as with a 
hatchet. 
d. Plato. Our bodies have the same elements as the 
universe and hwnan soul must be from universal soul. 
e. Plotinus. Soul is one and many. All thing s are 
from one source and have souls. 
f. Augustine. 'l1he soul knows itself as a whole and 
lives as a whole. 
g . Leibniz. All that there is consists of monads 
or souls which mirror the universe; and mind or rational 
souls are citizens of the Republic of God. 
h. Berkeley. There is not any other substance than 
Spirit. Nature is divine language. The physical world is 
part of God. A chain runs through the whole system of 
being s, one link drags another, and t he meanest thing s are 
connected with the highest. (According to Wordsworth, the 
meanest flower that blows can give thoughts too deep for 
tears.) 
i. Hegel. Nature is organic to intelligence and 
exists only in t he life of the spirit. Each thing in the 
universe is relatef to every other thing, and no single 
object can be completely understood without knowledge of 
the whole universe. 
j. Bowne. "At every step of mental movement, the 
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mind appears as organic." 
Empirically, my mind interacts with the physical world 
and interprets it, if the t wo were utterly different, this 
could not be. I see the same principles of growth , change , 
purpose, law, and struggle in the physical world that I ex-
perience in myself. As Pringle-Pattison says, "Man the 
knower is within the real system which he knows, and as re-
gards his knowledge of nature 'his body is within the nature 
system and continuous with it.' •14 The development and 
structure of t h e mind reflects the nature of the unive~se. 
My consciousness interacts with other consciousness. With 
some persons I share many ideas, feeling s, and activities 
in common, yet my consciousness is my own and n ever identical 
with that of any other. The world as I know it is a society 
of distinct individual selves, which it seems reasonable to 
supp ose could be bound together only by a Supreme conscious-
ness. 
When the mystic testifies to identity with the Spirit 
of spirits, he is speaking of the feeling of identity of 
will only, and never in an actusl sense. He would not for 
a moment say that his own puny existence is equal to that of 
the Supreme Being, nor that his own short comings, ignorance, 
13. BoVIme, ME'l' (1), 511. 
14. Pringle- Pattison, IGRP, 122. 
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and imperfections are to be identified with any part of 
God's mind. Supporters if idealistic metaphysical monism 
have wrought much confusion and have sometimes brought on 
themselves unjust charges of pantheism because they failed 
to distinguish clearly between the qualitative and the quan-
titative. They have said all is Spirit, but fail to add 
there are many individual Spirits, great and small or with 
varying degrees of completeness and reality. 
3. The rational is the real (actual), and knowledge is 
possible. 
This follows from the hypothesis that the universe is 
organic Hnd mental. From the Sophists to Spencer and Barth 
this has been frequently contradicted in some form. Kant 
thought he could never know the Dinge an sich, or as Wallace 
expresses it, ''Reason, to his way of talking , is always some-
thing of an intruder, a stranger from a far off world, to be 
feared even when obeyed, sublime rathe r than beautiful. From 
the land of sense which we habitually occupy, the land of 
reason is a country we can only behold from afar: or if we 
can be said to have a standpoint ln it, that is only a fig-
urative way of saying that though it is really over the bor-
der, we can act--it would sometimes seem by a sort of make-
believe--as if we were already there."15 
15. Wallace, RPM, 88. 
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For Plato reason or "the sacred and golden -cord" pre-
serves the soul from the illusions of sense, and he as well 
as Hegel held that reason is the divine part of the soul. 
Leibniz said man's knowledge of eternal and necessary truths 
is his distinguishing characteristic. Descartes believed 
that we could have real knowledge because God would not de-
ceive. Christianity has emphasized belief in the law and 
trustworthiness of the universe. Such faith is the founda-
tion of science as well as religion. Human beings generally 
experi ence rationality or a desire for knowledge and an 
impulse toward order and the whole truth. The universe re-
veals rationality, purpose, and orde r as well as irrational 
aspects. It is reasonable to believe that the knowledge 
which is won through hard labor and tested rigorously by 
all available means must be real and trustworthy even though 
it must be partial. To believe otherwise would make it 
impossible to continue this study on creativity. Indeed, 
it would plunge one into a world. of illusions and chaos. 
4. Abstraction (just as analysis alone) is one of the 
greatest errors of thought. If t he universe is an organic 
living whole, it is obvious that a study of abstract parts 
mu s t be inadequate and fall far short of the whole truth. 
'I'hi s was recognized at a - surprisingly early period: 
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a. Plato. For any single class to be isolated is · 
not good nor altogether possible; 1l.'o speak of an abstract 
something naked and isolated from all being is impossible; 
Can we imagine that being is devoid of life and mind and 
exists in awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture; If all 
were flux there wou ld be n o one to know and nothing could be 
known; The attempt to separate all existences from one 
another is a barbarism, utterly unworthy of a philosophica.l 
mind; the attempt at tlniversal separation is the final an-
nihilation of all rea.soning. Plato and Aristotle both speak 
of the impossibility of abstracting motion from a mover or 
activity from an actor. 
b. Aristotle adds, time is not independent of con-
sciousness for there could be no time without a soul to 
count; The concrete whole is composed of both form and 
matter and form does not exist independent of substance; 16 
Universals must not be separated from particulars. 
c. Plotinus emphasizes, no perception without a 
percipient. 
d. Kant says, nothing can be known without a knower 
or relater. 
e. Hegel condemns monotonous and abstract universal-
ity as the very na!vete of emptiness of knowledge, and bases 
16. Aristotle, Met., 1033b, l036a. 
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his whole system on the concrete living consciousness or 
subject. He thought form is as necessary to the es sence as 
the essence to itself, and reality must be conceived not as 
essence alone but as form also. 17 
Bowne and Knudson have stressed the fallacy of the uni-
versal and the misuses of abstraction in philosophy and 
theology. " Abstractions are indispensable to us in master-
ing the manifold of experience, but when mistaken for reality, 
they become absurd." Thought does not exist without a 
thinker. 18 No amount of superficial derision of " the e go-
centric predicament" can destroy the empirical fact that 
nothing cs.n exist for me except as I think it or that there 
can be no knowledge apart from a pprehending intelligence. 
All of this seems so reasonable and so obvious t h at it 
is difficult to see how today mind can still be ignored, and 
consciousness even be denied; how nnature " and nexperience n 
can be treated as something vague, general, and unowned; how 
it can be claimed that abstract thought may exist neutrally 
without a thinker; or how it can be declared that analysis 
is all sufficient, or that the easiest simplest explanation 
(Occam's razor) is the truest. It would seem that infinitely 
complex situations in a universe of infinitely complex rela-
17. Hegel, PG, 20f. (81). 
18. Bowne, TTK, 24f.; Knuds'on, PP, 246, 188f. 
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tions could hardly be explained in a paragraph. Empirical 
facts te s tify that the universe is not constructed on any 
simple or e asy plan and much labor and difficulty is ex-
perienced in trying to understand even a little about it. 
5. Anthropomorphism is inevitable in valid thinking. 
"What I find in me as the most coherent and reasonable 
thought that my mind can form is true of reality,--or as 
near truth as I can reach. n 19 
This must follow in an organic universe where the 
rational is t h e real. 
a. Anaximenes probably g ave the first recorded ar-
glunent from the microcosm to the macrocosm. 
b. At least as early as Empedocles and Isaiah crude 
anth rop omorphism, so common in primitive religious thought, 
was ridiculed. 
c. Au gustine thought that because the self has ex-
perience of various trinities reflecting tb~ Trinity, it 
must be a pale copy of ultimate re a lity and t h e valid basis 
for metaphysics. 
d. For Leibniz a rational mind is a microcosm 
imaging the macrocosm a nd henc e is capable of knowing some-
t bing of r e ality through itself. 
e. Berkeley saw no escap e from anthropomorphism. 
19. Brightman, IT P , 209. 
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"All the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on 
my own soul, heightening its powers and removing its im-
perfections." God and reality can be known by reflection 
and reason~ng . 
f. James Ward believed that we cannot have the idea 
of God without the idea of self. 20 
g . Ladd said that every intellect is neces s arily 
21 
anthropomorphic. 
h. Bowne warns ag ainst easy anthropomorphism in our 
thought of the infinite mind, but adds, 11 0f course we can 
think at all only as we assimilate that mind to our own. 1122 
i. Schiller says, 
The prohibition of anthrop omorphic reason-
ing is the prohibition of all reasoning in 
the supposed interests of a fiction of un-
anthropomorphic thought which can never be 
known to exist, and which if it existed, 
would be utterly inconceivable to us. 
Surely it is too plain for words that all 
our thought and all our feeling must be 
anthropomorphic. The p roposal to avoid 
anthropomorphism is as absurd as the sug-
gestion that we should take an unbiased 
out s ide view of ourselves by jumping out 
of our skin •••• However much he wills to 
disbelieve it the philosopher must finally 
confess that to escape anthropomorphism he 
would have to escape from self.23 
20 • Ward, RE, 460 • 
21. Ladd, PM, 225. 
22 . Bowne, THE, 170. 
23 . Schiller, RS, 145 ; HPE, 13. 
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j. Koehler . shows . that the revolt against a crude 
anthropomorphism wh i ch once greatly h21t1p ered physics, has 
caused some to reject the valid and necessary anthropomor-
phism required for the study of a physical world which 
actually resembles the phenomenal world. nit is of no use 
to demand that man be removed from the process which leads 
24 to physical knowledge. He cannot be removed." 
It is obvious tha t each person has to do his own 
thinking (as socrates taught Theaetetus), and if he has 
thoughts t h ey must be human. The finite mind may transcend 
the crudely anthropomorphic ·and may at times reach high 
enough to t h iclc some of God's thoughts after him, but even 
t h en human thoughts are still inevitably human. If rational 
anthropomorphism is ruled out, the only alternatives are 
a gnosticism or some hopeles s impersonal theory. 
6. Reality is dialectical in nature. 
Consciousness reveals contrast opposition, strugg le, 
and reconciliation at every turn. It is the law of growth, 
learning , and progress. Yet rational thought reveals that 
strife is not always creative but may be destructive. Ob-
servation of the physical world reveals coni'lict, struggle 
for existence, destruction, waste, and adjustment. 'rhere 
can be little doubt that opposition is a law of the human 
24. Koehler, PVvVF, 178, 375, 37 2-390. 
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mind and of the universe. Herac litus wa s the firs t to g ive 
emphasis to the principle : All things arise throu~h strife 
and necessity; Opposition bring s men together; It is dis-
ease that makes health pleasant; evil, good; hunger, plenty; 
weariness , rest. It is of particular interest that he also 
placed opposition in God for he said, "God is day and night, 
winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger, but 
he assumes different forms." 
Plato did not seem to g o deeply into Heraclitus, al-
though he admits universal opposition, that all things 
have opposites, and that opposites cannot be understood 
at all without opposites if one really is to have under-
standing of either. 25 It ',"!as not until Hegel that the 
dialectic principle really took root. He saw that exper-
i ence was a dialectic process, self must meet not-self to 
know itself, and opposites are really complements, the 
seeming ly conflicting a nd inherentl~ antagonistic are 
mutually necessary moments which g ive rise to creative 
syntheses which in turn meet new opposition anc lead to 
new knowledge. Life means strife, and he who does not 
labor and s truggle doesn't really live. This is true for 
us because it is true for the universe. " Gott ist ein 
25 . Plato , Phaedo, 70f., Laws, 816. 
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lebendiger Gott, der wirksam ist und thatig. 11 26 The dia-
lectic principle is one of the most important laws of mind 
and of creativity as well. Without it mind would be too 
inactive to grow or to discover anything new. 
7. Reality is not merely activity, but both activity 
and passivity. 
The dialectic princip le makes this evident. Activity 
re quires passivity. Interaction which is so evident both 
in con s cious experience and in the external world would be 
i mpossible without both activity and passivity. Heraclitus 
was perhaps the first to recognize the passive element in 
the universe. :1This universe, the sarne for all, no one 
either v od or man, has made; but it always was, and is, 
and ever shall be an ever-living fire. 11 Plato adds that 
the receptacle (space) and the patte r n are timeless and 
uncreated. Creation is mixed, being made up of necessity 
and mind. Vrhen reason got the better of necessity (control) 
the univer s e was created. 27 In this he seems to recognize 
universal will (or active reason) and a competing, passive, 
unchanging , cosmic factor. 
Essences or the Ideas whi ch Plato could explain only 
by recollection are eternally existing in the consciousness 
26 . Hegel, PdR, I, 50 (33). 
27. Plato, ~., 48. 
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of God, waiting to be achieved by those who exert them-
selves. Law and reason are also existing in God and with 
the essences are part of the passive factor within him which 
his will cannot change or revoke. This view is not usually 
accepted, but if one chooses to be dualistic and place 
essences and nbrute facts" outside of God they would have 
to be in an opposing God or devil, which could find no 
satisfactory explanation; or else the essences would be 
utter abstractions dangling in the universe without an owner 
and principles 4 and 2 above would have to be cancelled. 
God must be more than activity, purpose, will, process, 
and energy. He is patient as well as agent. There would 
be chaos, the universe would " leak lik e a pot" if he were 
activity alone. There must be a balancing, unchanging, 
identical factor within him. From the empirical viewpoint, 
many testify to divine interaction which implies that God 
is not all will. We have at least some freedom of will. 
This would be impossible if the Supreme Being were Absolute 
Will. We experience the active and passive, we will, and 
we have what we do not will forced upon us. We discover 
unchanging law and the principle of reason as well as the 
factor of change. If these are not· truly in the universe 
then we are deceived and the rational is not the real. 
Also, if not in the universe, by what miracle could we 
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have come into their possession? If not deceived, then the 
essences, brute facts, and the physical world must be within 
God or a part of Him. 
8. God is a person--the only complete and supreme 
personality, e ternally active, passive, and creative. 
Xenophanes agreed with Isaiah that there is one God 
and only one, who is supreme. Xenophanes seemed also to 
attribute to him unitary personal consciousness. "The whole 
of him sees, the whole of him thinks, and the whole of him 
hears. " Even more striking is the empirical statement of 
the Psalmist, "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? 
He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" This is really 
not so much an argument for the existence of God (which 
was not then often questioned among the Hebrews) as an 
argument for a personal God. It seems to mean: 
1) The animate does not come by chance or from the 
lower inanimate, but from a higher consciousness. 
2) Because I have conscious existence, there must 
be a higher conscious being as its source, i.e. the very 
existence of the self points toward God. 
3) God must be a person. (This does not mean that 
he has human physical organs for God was believed to be in-
visible spirit. The eyes with which he sees are purely 
spiritual for the Psalmist.) 
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God is Logos (Heraclitus), Nous (Anaxagoras), and 
World Soul (Plato). Plato, the Hebrews, Jesus and all his 
followers everywhere have called God, Fe.ther. For Hegel 
he is the most universal (concrete) personality. For Lotze 
he is Perfect Personality of which we are pale copies, but 
Brightman would add, this does not mean a finished perfec-
tion. "If the mind is an active and creative process, if 
ideals are principles of its activity, the very conception 
of a completed perfection is a self-contradiction. The 
more active and creative a mind, the more will its perfec-
tion expand." 28 "The divine perfection is God 1 s inexhau:;t- ble 
perfectibility." 29 
Rational arguments for the existence of God have lost 
standing because of their increasing abstraction. This is 
especially true of the Ontological argument which is said 
to be void of the empirica l. Bowne says t hat it hasn't 
"a shadow of cogency, 1130 but owes its force to the aesthetic 
and ethical conviction that the true, beautiful, and g ood 
cannot be foreign to the universe, or to faith in the ideal. 
Here is a touch of the empirical, and also a h int that the 
rational is the real. Regel says of it, Er allein der 
28. Brightman, PI, 88. 
29. Brightman, J. Rel., 1 2 (19 33 ), 554. 
30. Bowne, THE, 47. 
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wahrhafte 1st, but he plainly shows at the beginning of 
the two hundred pag e series of lecture~ on proofs for the 
existence of God that h e doesn't value any of them very 
high ly. The y are too abstract. It i s on ly becau s e they 
have b een discarded as a "barren d e sert" and a s "rotten 
prop s " of our belief and forg otten, that he thinks they 
should be reh ear sed for hi s torical interest. 32 His treat-
ment lack s his usua l spirit and vigor, and is unsatisfactory. 
Knudson thinks that the conceptual argume nt was the 
p resupposition b a ck of Anselm's thought which g ave it sup -
33 port. Hock i ng would pull t h e argument out of its abstrac -
tion. He says, "Th e ontological argument in its true form, 
is a report of experie n ce. 11 34 Other arguments r e ason tha t 
because the world exists t h ere mu s t be a Creator, but these 
h e reg ards a s superficial. Thinking more deeply, we cann ot 
sta rt wi t h t he ph y sical world as a first premise , it is 
altoge t h er unstable . ·Even the primally certain s elf is not 
of its e lf alon e su f ficiently subs tantial. There mu s t be 
someth ing more fund amental. Then "because the world is 
n ot, God is. 11 Bec au se a ll othe r i de a s fail to g ive a se cur e 
31. Hegel, PdR, II, 547 (III, 361). 
32 . Hegel, PdR, I I , 360 (III, 156). 
33 . Knuds on, PP , 264f. 
34. Hock ing , :rvlGHE , 31.2f. 
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basis for a coherent account of experience and the physical 
wor l d, one turns to the idea of God. It is the presup-
position of' our who le life. The idea of the perfe ct person, 
and that he exists is es s ential to coherent thought about 
experience. 
9. God is immanent but not absolutely immanent. 
He is "not Spirit beyond the stars 11 as Kant and the 
deists thought, but present and omnipresent. This means 
that the physical world is hi s continuous activity and a 
part of h i m. It might be better to say nature is immanent 
in God for it is part of h is experience. For finite spirits 
immanence is not complete but 9artial. He created them 
and they are immediately dependent upon him, or the rela-
tion is consto.nt interaction. "In him we live and move and 
have our being" (as Bowne and Berke ley continually quo te), 
not in the sense of fusion or identity of consciousness, 
although unity of thought, feeling, and will may to some 
extent be achieved. As Brightman illustrates, the fish 
may be in water and water in the fish, but the fish and the 
water are never identified. 
The idea of immanence is very old and is deeply rooted 
in many of the ancient eastern cultures. One of the first 
expressions among the Greeks is that of Hippocrates who 
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said, uNo one thing is any more divine than another; 1135 but 
in this no value difference is suggested. Theists of the 
West have all too often rejected t h e idea completely, as 
pantheistic. The point to be stressed is the modern concept 
of God's complete ~ ·- _, ._,_m 11 anerrce in physical nature while at 
the same time in rega:rd to man he is both transcendent and 
immanent. 
Knudson vigorousLy opposes Barth 1 s absolutely tra__nscen-
d ent God: 
There is no valid ground for such a sharp 
distinction between the human and the di-
vine as is drawn by the Barth1an t h eology •••• 
Our modern : ~hilosophy of the divine im-
manence for.) i d s such a sharp anti t h esis 
between the christian and t .he non-christian 
world as wa:J current in the early and med-
ieval churc:-1 , and as has in recent years 36 been reaffirmed in the Barthian theology. 
In this he a grees with Hegel who also opposes the idea of 
God's complete transcendence: 
Es ist keine Klu.ft zwischen dem 
Unendlichen und Endlichen, das 
Endliche ist das sich aufhebende, 
dass seine Wahrheit ist das Unend-
liche, an und f~r sich Seyende.37 
10. The human mind has kinship with the divine. 
This follows natura lly if the universe is organic and 
35. Quoted by Dewey, PC, 301. 
36. Knudson, VRE, 5lf., 191. 
37. Hegel, FdR, II, 536 (III, 348); Of. I, 210 (199). 
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mental, and God is a person. The idea emerges over and 
over in h istory both through e xperience and reason. 
a. The priestly writer says God created man in his 
own image. 
b. Plato, the Hebrews, and Christians expressed the 
r e lation of God as tha t of Father. 
c. Plato s ays: Soul is like world-soul; God in 
creating wanted us to be as like him as possible; The soul 
of man partakes of the divine; Human soul is of the same 
elements as u niversal spirit, but diluted (denoting degrees 
of spirit as the Psalmist indicated, "Thou hast made him 
little lower than the angels " ); The soul resembles the 
divine; Our intelligence is akin to those in heaven; God 
cares for t h ose who strive to b e just and to be like God 
as far as they can be. 
d. Augustine. Soul is restless until it finds its 
kindred source. 11We recognize in ourselves the imag e of 
God, t hou gh it be far removed from Eim--is yet nearer to 
Him in nature than any other of his works , and is destined 
to be r e s tored to bear a still closer re semblance . tl (Did 
h e i gnore t he ange ls, or did he mean by "works , " the 
material c r e a tions1) 
e. Descarte s. .Lt i s the use of free- will that 
r enders us like God in maki ng us mast e rs of ourselves. 
200 
f. Leibniz. Rat iona l minds are images of the Deity 
himself, citizens in his Republic, and each a little divinity 
in its own department. 
g. Hegel. 11Die menschliche Vernunft, das 
Bewusstsein seines Wesens ist Vernunft Uberhaupt, fus 
38 GBttliche im Menschen und der Geist ." 
h. Brightman. "Reason is a mark of kinship with 
the divine. Carr i ed far enough and honestly enough, rea-
son i s one of the ways that leads man into the very presence 
of God. ll 39 
i. Kinship is e xpressed by Knudson when lle says, nNo 
one can determine with certainty where the human ends and 
the divine begins." "There is no way of drawing a hard-
and-fast line between t h e human and t he d ivine, 1140 the t wo 
interpenetrate. In t h is he opposes Bowne (who nevertheless 
holds to the immanence of God). Plato had said t hat ev e ry-
thing is a mixture of finite and infinite, and God reveals 
a finite element of existence , and also an infinite . 41 
Similarly, Hegel believes that, if t he finite is absolut e ly 
distinct, the infinite is limited and thus ceases to be 
38 . Hegel, PdR, I, 50 ( 33 ). 
39. Br:J.ghtman, FG, 72. 
40. Knudson, VRE, 52; BLH, 46; DG, 97. Cf. Bowne, MET , 96. 
41. Plato, ~., 23ff. 
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absolute. 1/lhen we recognize that we are finite, we are 
alread y above it. 43 If God were not finite as well as in-
finite even Barth's one way process of revelation would be 
impos s ible. God surely must understand and care for h is o~n 
creations, and if so, he can communicate with them as em-
pirical evidence indicates. 
j. As Maciver says, the fact that we seek communion 
with God and worship him indicates kinship for, "It is 
mo s t certainly tru e that we can seek nothing which we do 
n ot already in part pos s ess, that we c an worship noth i n g 
wh ose nature we do not adumbrate in ourselves: n 
war nicht das Auge sonnenhaft 
Die Sonne k8nnt 1 es nie erblicken; 
Lag'nicht in uns des Gottes eigne kraft 
·/Vie konnt' u n s Gottliches entztick en?44 
This might be called the metaphysical law of apperception. 
If man d i d not have kinship and connection with the Su preme 
Creator, he would not b e able to create in his own secondary 
way. 
11. God cooperates with man in every act, and man 
may, if he chooses, cooperate with God. 
The Old Testament is full of a cr~de kind of belief 
in cooperation. The Hebrews worshipped Ye.hweh, and fought 
42. Hegel, Pd.R, I, 195f. (185). 
43 . Ibid., 185, 196 (174, 185 ). 
44. Wa c iver, Phil. Rev., 24 (1915), 514. 
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for him. He in return guided, shielded, provided .for their 
needs, and turned battles in their favor. Deborah says, 
11 They .fought .from heaven; the stars in their courses fought 
. 45 
against Slsera. 11 Noah and Enoch walked with God. Moses 
talked with him on Sinai and received the law. ~~en Joshua 
met the .five king s "the Lord .fought for Israel." Perhaps 
the earliest direct recognition of cooperation is the 
statement o.f Paul, "For we are laborers together (co-laborers 
or fellow workers) with God. n 46 rrhe relation may be inferred 
from J"ohn 1 s unusual statement 11 As many as received him, to 
47 . 
them g ave he power to become the sons o.f God," whlch of 
course means .freedom, power to cooperate, and creative 
powers, as the Acts of the Apostles and the progress of 
the early church illustrate so vividly. 
Pelagius probably held the cooperative view of the 
human-divine relation, but his followers as well as his 
enemies interpreted him humanistically. rrhe first con-
spicuous stress on coope rative living is probably that o.f 
Berkeley. He rejected the view of Calvin that man is ut-
ter1y passive and h elp l e ss, and has no p art in his own 
salvation (which Knudson says confus e s emotion and d8votion 
45. Judges, 5: 20, c. llOOB.C. 
46. I Cor:_., 3:9. 
47. John, 1:12 . 
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with theology , or translates emotion into metaphysics.) 
Berkeley suggests that interaction of mind and body is 
cooperation with God--an idea so bi g t hat few have yet 
grasped its significance or applie d it to their daily lives. 
We ourselves will, and God makes it pos s ible for us to c a rry 
out t~e act even though it be wrong, but the sin is ours 
not God's. This view is the true synthesis between the 
passive or Calvini s tic and the humanistic positions. It 
preserves the empirical facts of both thesis and antith esis. 
We sley made a simil8.r s:ynthesis. Then, because man is a 
child of God, he naturally wants to know, to grow, and to 
create, e.nd God 1 s cooperation makes it possible whether man 
becomes con scious of it or not. When one does consciously 
seek to cooperate, his worth and creative powers are in-
cr·eased. 
1 2 . The human mind and the universe both reveal pur-
pose. Along with it i s the dysteleological. 
socrates was one of the first to discover· the important 
aspect of personality which is now called the power of s elf-
direction, will, or purpose. He talked of his daemons or of 
the voice within, getting away from the idea of ex ternal for-
ces (the Fates), and oracles. Yet the fact of unwilled ex-
ternal forces and conditions of environment is not to be 
48. Knudson, VRE, 228. 
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denied. Socrates simply helped the world to see the exist-
ence of both. Isaiah and Aristotle agree thet purpose is 
in the universe and nothing is created in vain. What has 
often been called entelechy or a sort of unconscious . pur-
pose is really the divine purpose in nature and in human 
bodies. 
Real purpose is neither b a re and abstract nor uncon-
scious, but owned. "Purpose is the con s cious selection 
of a foreseen end, together with acts appropriate to the 
49 
realiza tion of that end, " otherwise it might be 11 thobbing n 
or 11 wishful thinking . " Purpose could be called the inner 
power for creativeness by which (with help) we make our 
g iven s elves into higher personalities. There is evidence 
for a n unpurposed f a ctor in the universe. God can hardly 
be absolute will in t h e sense of being nothing but will, 
or of b e ing all the will there is. Those who believe that 
nGod is love, 11 that h e is omniscient, and reasonable, 
would have to ag ree that he is much more than will, and is 
not in all respects changing. If human being s have any 
freedom at all, God must to that extent be limited even 
though he may will it so. 
I f the universe is organic, if we h ave kinship with 
49. Brightman, in a recent article, "Fre edom Purpose 
Value, 11 hereafter cited, Art. 1940. 
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God, and if the rational is the real, then everything in 
our experience has to root in the universe or in God. Per-
haps God too has an unwilled, eternal, uncreated, passive 
factor to struggl e against and to control. We must infer 
that besides the conscious will whi ch 1Ne experience almost 
every moment, and divine will which we must constantly in-
fer, there is a factor in the universe which resists and 
thwarts will and results in the dialectic, and in dystel-
eological facts. 
Purpo s e essentially leads to creativity. The drifter 
does not create. nHe that wavereth is like a wave of the 
sea driven with the wind and tossed •••• A doubleminded 
. "50 . 
man is unstable in all h ls ways. If confllcting pur-
poses persist one becomes abnormal and disorganized. Pur-
pose contributes to organization, unity, and harmony of 
life . To be creative mem s to select discriminatingly a 
purpose worth fighting for, and to hold rationally and un-
s werving ly to it regardle ss of opposing factors, which must 
be brought under control. "The great spirit chooses a life 
purpose that no circumstances can overth row, yet 1dll pur-
sue it with a flexibility that adjusts every circumstance 
to the purpose. 11 51 
50. James, 1:6-8. 
51. Brightman, Art. 1940. 
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13. The universe reveals both freedom and necessity . 
Descartes t h ought free-will was a self-evident fact,52 
and indeed man always . acts as if he believed he was free . 
Yet freedom is always within the limits of past experien ce 
and present environment. Hegel h a s pointed out the terror 
of absolute (abstract) freedom. 53 Although be is often 
i n terpreted as a determinist he admi ts human free-will. He 
says planets, plants, and animals cannot deviate from the 
necessity of' t heir nature but in human freedom which bring s 
p ower of' free choice, it is possible to g o against necessity 
and work in op position to destiny, or to drift in inertness 
54 
to a standpoint of' untruth. · As Bowne pointed out man may 
shirk his h igh calling and sink into passivity or emotion-
ality when he should exert his will. 
55 Freedom and intelligence stand or fall together. 
Freedom is the presupposition of all science and of all 
valid thinking . 56 Freedom is not an abstraction. It im-
plies a chooser, something to choo s e from, and some standard 
of value or criterion by which to guide the choice. It 
52. Descartes, PW, I, :2 34 or Prins. 39. 
53. Hegel, PG , 418 ( 605) • 
54. Hegel, PdR, 22f ( 5) • 
55. Bowne, !VIET ( 1) ' 170. 
56. Br i g.._h tman, P61C, 164. 
207 
involves interaction with the chooser's environment. 57 As 
Brightma n says, freedom and reason are allies. Freedom re-
quires reason for its self-protection and guidance, and 
reason requires freedom for its very exi s tence. "Without 
inne r freedom to t h ink and outer fr e edom to express thought, 
reason remains a barr en and unreal idea1. n58 To be creative 
not only must there be freedom but choice must be deter-
mined r a tionally . Freedom of thought creates new mood s, 
insight s, and expe r iences. 
14. 'r he normal human mind is a unitary , org anic, 
func t ioning whole. 
'l'he onl y real unity of which we are directly aware is 
t h e unity of' the fr e e and conscious self. 59 Soc r ates said 
that the senses are not perched as in a Trojan horse, but 
man is the power that u n ifies sense data. Mind is not "an 
o s sified, me chani cal cong lomer a tionn but a nu nita s multi-
plex,n a fusion of activity and passivity (or of brute fact 
and l aw ). It has many function s to which at tention may be 
directed, a n d which may be analyzed. Schopenhauer and oth er 
voluntar ists were i mpres s ed with t h e imp ortance of will, 
Berg son s t r e s s ed intuition, Lotze, f eeling . Many have em-
57. Bowne, MET , 405f. 
58. Brightman, Art. 1940. 
59. Bown e , WlliT , 91. 
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phasized reasoning, in fact the greatest attention has been 
g iven to cognitive aspects. However, none of the functions 
exist in abstraction but they all operate in close conjunc-
tion with each other. 
Whitehead says, emotion is not bare emotion. nrt is 
emo t ion interpreted, integrated, and transformed into 
60 higher categories of feeling." More generally, Brightman 
s tates that unity of consciousness does not allow of a sep-
aration of the self into parts, such as intellect, wil l , 
anci s ensibili ty; neithe:r do es it require that future ex-
periences shall continue to be of precisely the same em-
pirical type as those of' t h e p B.st. 61 Night is not day 
(Heraclitus to the contrary), yet no one can say with cer-
tainty when one ends and the other begins. So it is when 
it come s to drawing lines between the functions. Feeling 
turns into knowing . Both are activities. Reason requires 
a great deal of will and must take emotion into account. 
'I.1here is no vvay of knovving when or how one blends into 
another any more than one can find the exact boundary be-
tween mental and physical or between finite and infinite. 
It ca.n only be said in general that it follows from the 
continuity of the universe and the unity-in-variety of mind. 
60. Vfllitehead, PR, 248. 
61. Brightman, P7IC, 76. Cf. Laird, PS, 34f. 
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All functions as necessary parts of' the whole contri-
bute to creativity when there is a rational purpose to 
guide and unify. In creative work mind employs all of its 
f unctions and crea t e s as a whole. 
15. Human mind is both active and passive. 
Anaxagoras probably believed Nous to be both active 
and passive. It is certain that Socrates and Plato did. 
Soul is patterned activity, movement with a shape. Soul 
is passive in s ensation and active in reason. If not in 
motion it ceases to be, but t h e passive too is essential. 
Aristotle certainly needs to be cleared of the often reiter-
ated charge of' holding mind to be a tabula rasa. He said 
there must be rest as well as motion. Plotinus and 
Augu s tine both taught that even sensation is not entirely 
passive. nwnen a mind receives a stimulus, it receives it 
62 
actively i.e. it responds. A mind in a universe which is 
both active and passive must, if there is continuity, be 
also both active and passive. 
Empirically, in every moment I am both active and 
passive, the two are inseparable, complementary aspects. 
The mystic may say that he goes into a purely passive state, 
but he only means t h at he excludes the secular and the dis-
tracting, for the facts are that he wills to be receptive . 
6 2 . Brightman, PI, 28 . 
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This means active attention. Contemplation requires much 
63 discip line, as Ignatius Loyola taught. When the mind is 
cleared of all ideas, is made a blank, or attains perfect 
passivity, consc iousness VHnishes. A minimum of will or 
activity is essential to existence. If mind were always 
p assive, a puppet played upon by environment, it would be 
impossible to account for the development of person ality, 
progress in science , religion, morals, or for inventions, 
literary and aesthetic creations. Without active will there 
could be no freedom, purpose, thought, communication, know-
ledge, or reason, all of which are facts of experience. 
A completely active mind would be just as disastrous 
as the world of Parmenides. r:L'here could be no identity, 
no reference, standards, or unity. There could be no con-
sciousness of l aw , essences, logic, or mathematics--nothing 
permanent. There could not even be that much talked of 
"relative truth, n for there would be no abiding 11 I'~ to make 
the comparison, and if ther e were, t h e objects to be compared 
would chang e too fast to be caught, or there would be no 
net (universal ideas) to catch them in. Without the per-
manent in the universe, or with out "the Given" to offer 
resistance and stimulation there would be no cause for 
activity, no call for struggle. 
63. See his Spiritual Exercise s . Also, Diary of Geerg e Fox. 
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Our passivity is really the result of God's continuous 
activity and passivity upon us. He may consciously in-
fluence human minds, or his constant, unch anging laws may 
be forced upon us or s ome non-rational variable part of 
"the Givenn may affect us. These are not sepax·ate influ-
ences but aspects of the way a supreme unitary personality 
affects his society of created selves. All of our body 
activity at first, and much of it in adult life, is the 
a ctivity of God. ~~en we learn in waking hours to will or 
direct the body somewhat, this is cooperation with God 
whether we are conscious of it (or of him) or not. The 
Mind-body interaction of which we are so conscious, and of 
which scientists feel certain, can be described in no 
better or more reasonable ' way than as the physical aspect 
of our cooperation with God. 
16. Creative activity seems to be an undeniable 
aspect of the human mind. 
11 Current thought is returning to the ancient insight 
of philosophy and art and religion, t hat reality is 
64 " creative.n Human mind as part of reality must be creative 
in its own lesser way. Personality by its very nature is 
t . 65 crea 1ve. As Hegel taught, every synthesis whether in 
64. Brightman, RV , 211. 
65. Buckham, HG, 60ff. 
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the objective or subjective order is genuinely creative. 
11 0ut of the dialectical tensions of spirit with spirit 
and of spirit with n a ture, there h ave g rown art and reli-
gion, science a nd philosophy, and noble character." 66 
Some have held that the very essence of mind is to create , 
but if so it must be understood that creativity necessarily 
involves passivity as well as activity. 11 The creative as-
pects of reality-- i ts free, valuable, purposing--exist 
within an uncreated framework that is g iven, a framework of 
rational law and of brute fact.n 67 The uncreated or given 
factors as already pointed out are d ialectically necessary 
for the existence of crea tivity. 
Knudson says "'Nothing can exist for the mind except 
as t h e mind thinks it," 603 but it must be understood that 
creating one's own ideas is mainly a cooperative affair . 
Human mind perhaps never creates anything alone or out of 
noth ing . Kant made it clear that there are other factors . 
Mind is cond itioned by the nature of the objects as well as 
by its own nature. Pringle-Pattison says, nAll sane ideal-
ism teaches that the subject is not creating new worlds of 
knowledge and appreciation for hims e lf, but learning to s e e 
66. Brightman, Art. 1940. 
67. Brightman, Art. 1940. 
68 . Knudson, VRE , 61. 
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mor·e of t h e one world, which 1s the world of all of us. n69 
( 'I'his of course need not mean that any t wo interpretations 
of this world are identical.) Blanshard says, "Creation is 
. 70 discovery, and discovery creat1on.n It may readily be 
admitted that all discovery is creation, but whether crea-
tion is limited to discovery depends on the definition and 
metaphysics of "discovery. n 
17) The foregoing sixteen points lead to the conclu-
sion that there is no c reativity apart from the mind of God. 
All creations are either wholly or in part divine . 
Creation stories are among the records of the oldest 
cultures. Plato concluded that eve ryone is a creator of 
some kind though human and cU vine crea tions are of dif-
ferent nature, illustrating with three beds, the t wo human 
beds d epending on t h e universal bed (the idea). Moses and 
t he prophets sought the will of God for the people and 
taught them to cooperate with him . God as 'creator is very 
prominent in t he Old Testament. Jesus demonstrated that 
reg ardle s s of immedi a te conseque nces a life is high and 
creative to t h e extent that it strives to know and to do the 
Father's will. The majority of relig ious minds for nine-
teen centuri e s have tended to recognize that only God can 
69. Pring le-Pattison, I GRP , 1 29. 
70. Blanshard, NT , II, 9, 98f . 
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create. Some like Augustine and Calvin have felt this so 
strongly that t hey failed, at l east in theory, to grant any 
cooperative creative powers to man. It is only since the 
humanistic trend of the twentieth century that it has be-
come popular to use the word in a human sense (as indicate d 
in the appendix by the number of books on the subject cur-
rent in the past t wenty years ) . Joyce Kilmer writes on 
"Trees 11 , a little protest against the humanistic mood: 
Poems are made by fools like me 
But only God can make a tree. 
In t h is investig ation the expres s ion "huma.n creativity" 
has been used. Is it justified if man creates nothing alone? 
Is the part of man in creativity worthy of such r ecognition? 
This can best be answered by defining the nature and dif-
ferent kinds of creativity which may be grouped under three 
main heads. 
1. True creation or that in which man h as no share. 
, a) The production of novelties and emerge n ts within 
God 's experience, or in other words , in t h e evolving (but 
eternally e x isting and uncreated) physical world such as 
took place before man appeared and such as continues to 
take place now. 
b) The production of selves and persons e x ternal to 
God . Although at some moment God may wi ll that a new being 
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shall start on its way , the creation of a new self, which 
is no part of himself, must not be viewed as a single act. 
It is a continuous act of p reserving and sustaining through-
out the whole life time of the individual and is an aspect 
of the evolutionary process. 
2 . Cooperative creation in which man shares: 
a) The development of personalities from selves 
is a process in whi ch parents cooperate in the preservation 
and development of selves until they are sufficiently ad-
vanced to will and to cooperate in their own progress. It 
is only in the very lowe st ~nimal order that God can dispense 
with the care of parents without the extinction of the 
species. Other selves as well as God are essential to the 
existence and development of a self. The mental productions 
of personality include i deas, knowledge, literary achieve-
ment, and the discovery of essences which really means think-
ing God's eternal thoughts after h i m. 
b) Man 's ideas and purposes result in new arrang e-
ments of the g iven physi c a l materials, such as works. of in-
vention, compositions of art and science, but God always 
has a p a rt in the processes. No thought or desire can be 
put into execution by the body without the cooperation of 
God. 
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3. Productions of man alone: his free choices within 
limits. This one t h ing only man can call his own, yet it 
does n ot take place out of all relations. Every act of '!'!ill 
has a phy sical counterpart in the nervous system which is 
God's a ctiyity and r e spons e. Hu..'11an mind is creative by 
virtue of its free-will and power of selection. Men seek-
ing God 's will and striving to ach ieve it may h elp him to 
create something new which he could not have produced alone. 
E ssences are often thought of as eternally existing, but they 
may not be a fixed quantity. It seems probable that the 
living creative God of evolution would add from time to time 
to his truth. If the ph ysical world is growing in comp lex-
ity, the thought world which is continuous with it must be 
developing or adding something too. If so, perhaps man may 
have a part in the development of Truth . 
II THE RESULTAN'r tiY"PVl'HESIS 
Suw~arizing the conclusions from a ll the data on 
creativity the following statement is presented: 
All mind and only mind is creative. God alone truly 
creates (novelties and selves), but men may cooperate with 
him in producing something new which he could not have 
achieved alone. Human mind by its free-will is creative 
with in limits, because it is a crea tive member of that 
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rational, organic , dialectic society which includes Go d , 
the ultimB t e source of crea tivity. 
The nex t ch a p ter will con side r briefly the relation of 
this h y pothesis to problems in such fi e l d s as epistemolog y, 
psychology , metaphys i cs, relig ion, ethi cs, and education in 
t h e effort to d iscov e r wh a t d ifference its acceptance would 
make a nd whether it would b e compatible with coherent views 
of each of t h ese fi e l ds . 
2 18 
An admonition for the philosopher. 
It is not unimportant what any man 
thinks of mind: it is not unimpor-
tant, therefore, wha t philosophy 
represents mind to be. We dare not 
wholly i gnore what the mystics have 
told us. To reg ard the mind as the 
creative principle, they say, is not 
an hypothesis among others in meta-
physics, but the prima ry certitude 
of exp erience. 
Hocking , P61C, 21 5 . 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE RELA'riON OF THE HYPOTHESIS 
TO OTHER FIELDS 
I EPISTEMOLOGY 
Knowledge is usually accepted as a present fact without 
a question as t o hmv it is pos s ible. For the ma jority seeing 
(or sensing ) i s believing , and the spectator theory of know-
led ge (which i gnore s the f unction of will, purp o se , and 
value) has been widely accepted. It really began before 
Plato, f or he speaks of 1the re a l aborig ine s, ch ildren of 
the drag on 1 1: teeth ••• who would have obstinately asserted 
that nothing is , which they are not able to squeeze in t h eir 
hands. n1 This theory has continued down t o the pr e sent with 
v a rious r efinements. Empedocle s said , " It i s with earth that 
we s ee Earth ••• 11 the thing which knows must be of l ike na-
ture with that which knows it. Or as Bowne and Knudson say, 
The pro b lem of knowledg e implies though.t at both ends, in-
telli g ibility impli e s inte lligence b a ck o f it. On t he oth er 
hand Heraclitus believed knowledge is g ained through strife 
and opp osites . Both views can be accep ted, be c au se within 
fundamenta l likeness there r e side many small differences. 
In the permanent u nch ang ing structure of' the logos there is 
1. Pl ato, Soph., 247. 
a continuous dialectic of difference and change . 
In modern times Descartes set the philosophic fashion of 
doubting everything as a preliminary method. ~ith increase 
in knowledge t h ere is more to doubt. Can there be any know-
ledg e anyway ? What is knowledge, if there is any? How can we 
know anything , if we do? 'l1he great cleavage is that between 
the personal and impersonal views, the one involving active 
will, the other considering mind secondary, derivative, and 
passive. 'rhere are many comp lex minor problems which it is 
not necessary to g o into. But suppose t hat seven people see 
a carnation. They may make the following observa. tions: 
1. The loveliest, sweetest of all. 
2 . Depressing , reminds of funerals. 
3. Easy to grow, profitable. 
4. Ju s t an idea, exists only in consciousness. 
5. We can't be sure of anything about it. 
6. Only appearance, we can't know the carnation 
in itself. 
7. Indeed we do know it, for it is just a flo~ver . 
These provoke the following statemente: 
1) The first three suggest Herbart's law of a ppercep-
tion. Vv e react to a thing or event according to what we 
a lready know, feel, and do. Hence knovo:ledge of a thing must 
vary with the perceiving intelligence, and it is partial 
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because there are always many more aspects yet to be investi-
g ated. 
2) What one knows depends on the object but not on the 
object alone. Mind with its form, memory connections, and 
functions is also essential. "There is a brute fact element 
in knowledge which is distinguished as that which is due to 
the presence of the object; and there is an element of rela-
tion, association, or construction vrhich is distinguished 
as being due to the mind. n
2 
However, it is better to dis-
tinguish three factors: form, content, and activity, or 
reason, brute fact, and function, in order to emphasize that 
will on the part of the mind, and not merely mech anical or 
forced ac t ion, is meant. These three are in the universe, 
and are consequently emerging in selves as they develop into 
minds. 
3) If objec t and idea were identical, there could be 
no way of accounting for error. Hence, the object and the 
idea must be two different things. Yet they are not utte rly 
different if there is continuity in the universe. Also, if 
they were utterly different there could be no connection, no 
interaction, no knowledge. 11 If consciousness and its objects 
were actually as different as they seem at first glance to be, 
the daily commerce between our minds and things would be 
2 . Lewis, ~~vo , 414. 
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impossible; a purely spiritual mind could never know or be 
3 
affected by a purely material thing . n The object is a part 
of God's cont inuous activity, and the idea is the activity 
of human mind. The n knowledge is the result of' human mind 
interacting with God's activity and thought. 
4) One may never know . everything about the carnation 
because this would r e quire knowledge of everything in the 
universe, but since we assume that tbe rational is the actual, 
much can truly be knovm . 
5) The carnation is both real and ideal: real, because 
it is part of God's activity, and because human experience 
of it is real; it i s ideal, because it can be grasped as 
idea, and perfect knowleug e of it is an ideal to be pursued. 
6) Besides t h e objects of the external sens es, God has 
othe r objects for u s to know which may be called universals, 
laws, or essences, but they are more difficult to grasp and 
sensory experience must pave the way to them. As Socrates 
said, 1'he unchanging things you can perceive only with the 
mind, a.nd that b y hard work, long exp erience and education. 
7) There is no abstract knowledge in the sense of 
knowledge separated from personality, for knowledg e implies 
a knower. Although it is often forgotten, logic and analysis 
always imply logician and analyzer. Knowledge is possible 
3. Brightman, PG, 155 . 
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only :for a creative mind, and creating ideas is mainly a 
cooperative a:f:fair with God. Hence "'S Fe 1 th; · 
, o. -~ ge says, •Ve 
can know that man can know God, :' :for learning more about the 
physical world, l aw, value , beauty, r e ason, and truth, is 
knowing more about him. 
Thi s view, combining epistemolog ical dualism with quali-
tative metaphysical monism, offers rational explanation :for 
the empirical fs.cts. It avoids the errors resulting from 
dependence on analysis alone. It i s mor e reasonable and 
sati sfactory than the alternative s of bald agnosticism or 
the impersonal theories of epistemological monism. 
II PSYCHOLOGY 
P sychology is one of t h e youngest sciences, and is still 
t 1 --'~ - -· ' 4 in a state of confusion as psychologis s themse ves a~~a~. 
Blanshard well says, 11 0ne cannot settle the method of' study-
ing a thing without some notion of' what the thing is, and a 
wrong notion may p roduce a wrong meth od. 11 It is idle for 
any psycholog ist to profess indifference to philosophy . He 
does not thus exclude philosophy but take s it "unaware s in 
large and dogmatic doses.n 5 
4. See Bentley, P 19 25. 
5 . Bl a nshard, NT , I, 313. 
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Scholastics think of mind (soul) as the mysterious 
spiritual supporter of experi ence without in any way being 
i mmanent in it. They s e em to cons true the subconscious, and 
the empirical fact of God interacting with faint conscious-
ness a s mind proper; or not to distinguish environment 
(causa) from the actual esse. Self and Gestalt psycholog ists 
find a u n ity in experience which takes the place of the 
6 
transcendent soul . Structuralists would explain mind as 
being made up of element s , the f unction alists unde r stand it 
as process and adjustment. But neithe r analysis alone , nor 
abstract laws or impersonal forces can accoun t for mind. 
Cause and effe ct have been confused sadl y. Mind itself is 
nece s s ary to account for analysis, laws, and forces, and 
they can never account for it. 
Then t here a r e those who would make p sychology contin-
uous with logic, and attempt to as s emble the mind " from a 
world of independent logical or neutral entities. n Hocking 
pronounces such p sycholog y a n unqualifi e d failure leading to 
chaos. 11 The re is no world of essences. Thinking must be 
thought; r e asoning must be reasoned . If pure space is nothing , 
so also is pur e reason nothing without the actualizing ac-
ti vi ty of the thinker.... Conceptions of mind -l!'rhich cannot 
6. Bri ghtman, in King (Ed.), BEL, 308 . 
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discover the activity and unity of the finite self might well 
be characterized as mural conceptions, a variety of Near-
mind, decorative but lifeless substitutes for the reality. " 7 
Behaviorists presuppose that mind consists of bodily 
responses. The words of Descartes echoing Plato were also 
prophetic when he spoke of those who do not !!distinctly com-
prebend the na.ture of the mind" and attribute the power of 
p e rception to what they can see and touch because 11 they never 
8 
distinguish their mind from their body with enough care." 
The modern "children of the dragon's teeth" say 11 no one has 
9 
ever touched a soul, or seAn one in a test tube." They 
study behavior only, man is the mere result of stlmulus-
response mechanisms, and thinking is talking with concealed 
musculature. 10 Hocking calls this !Ia caricature of the human 
mind, and MacKintosh says, "Psychical phenomena which bave 
11 11 no reference to a self are surely fanciful monsters . 
'at son s ay s , Consciousness is neither a definable nor a usable 
concept; flit is merely another word for the soul of more an-
7. Hocking , in Bri ghtman (b d.), P6IC, 210. 
8 . De scartes, PW, I, 223, Prins., 1 2 . 
9. Watson, BEH, 3f. Cf. Blanshard, NT , I, 317. 
10. ~atson, BEH , 194; BB, 35. 
11. Hocking in P6IC, 204; MacKintosh, HH, 193 . 
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cient times,n and the psycholog y of James, Wundt, Titch ener 
and Ladd wa s Hdominated by a subtle religi ous philosophy.n 12 
"In one sweeping as sump tion after another, t he behaviorist 
threw out the conc epts both of mind and cons ciousness calling 
them carry- overs from the church dogma of the Middle Ages •••• 
The behaviorist told t h e introspectionists that consciousnes s 
-.,.• as ju s t a ma s querade for the sou1. " 13 
As Brightman says, t h e behaviorist nrefuses to believe 
in the human self l est if it admit this 'sup ernatural' fact, 
it me.y logically be driven to believe in God also. 11 1 4 Sim-
ilarly, lv1artineau quotes, "You cannot make the slightest con-
cession to metaphysics, without ending in theology! •••• If 
once you allow yourself to tbink about the origin and end of 
15 
things you will have to beli eve in a God and i mmortality." 
I t is interesting to find this agr e ement (although from a 
negative viewpoint) with the Gre ek philosophers who found 
metaph~T sics and theology inseparable. 
The physical, logical, and analytic psychologists seem 
not to have r ealized the magnitude or complexity of the na-
ture of mind. They have not recogni zed mind as a living 
1 2 . Watson, BEH , lf. 
13. Watson, WB , 7. 
14. Brightman, ITl' , 323. Also in King, BBL, 329. 
15. Martineau, SR, I, ix. 
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whole, the most r eal, most concrete entity. They have · ac-
c e pted the factor of p as s ivity (which truly exists) without 
con sidering its activity and creativity . Hock ing says: 
We must r es tore to our accounts of mind 
the boundle ss depth of selfhood, its vast 
otherness from the surface-play of c6n-
tent •••• Mind is the only org an for 
making futur e possibility actual •••• In 
t h e free action of mind t he re is a gen-
uine addition to being . If the world of 
the possible wer e that alleged eternal 
and infinite reservoir of e ssences, there 
could be no genuine creation or novelty: 
action would be limited to marking out 
certain preexistent ide as as candidates 
for being . But when we see tha t the gen-
uinely possible is on l y wha t is conceived 
possible, every hitherto unthought-of 
possibility a ppears as an absolute crea-
tion. The mind adds to t h e a ctual b y 
first adding to the possible.l6 
The t h eories which are most harmonious with t he hypoth-
e s is of this dissertation are those of the Gestal t and self 
psychologies, but it is probably true that what is required 
for a s atisfactory explanation of mind is not to be found in 
psychology as science, but in a philosophy of mind. "A kind 
of metaphysical psychology is the only satisfactory science 
of mind; and the only science that can cherish the ideal of 
becoming a perfect science, for it is the only one tha t can 
hope to understand its own data. " 17 
16. Hocking, in P6IC, 210- 21 3 . 
17. Ibid., 215. 
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III ME'rAPHYSICS 
There is no escape from metaphysics as Hegel suggests 
in a letter to Goethe concerning the Newtonians who say 
beware of metaphysics, but who have not gone far enough to 
know t hat they are talking metaphysics of a kind. 18 It is 
impossible to formulate an adequate hypothesis about mind 
without i nvolving the que stion of reality. The hypothesis 
derived in the last chapter involves the following metaphysi-
cal principles: 
1) Qualitative monism. All that exists is mental in 
nature . 
2) Quantitative pluralism. Reality is a society of 
minds ordered and sustained by a j upreme Person. 
3) Reality is rational, organic, and dialectic, involv-
ing activity, passivity, and creativity. 
4 ) Preedom and nece ssity are not mutually exclusive, 
but dialectic complements. Freedom presupposes necessity. 
Diese Wahrheit der Notwendigkeit ist s omit die Fre iheit. 19 
A world of absolute purpose would be chaos, ends without 
means or mech ani sm to carry it out. .Mech anical laws are an 
expression of divine purpose. 
How do these principle s affect some of the persistent 
18 . Hegel, Briefe, II, 38 . 
l a ' i- g 1 "...,nc 1 ~.:: g Cf. Bowne , PT , 168; TTK , 24lff . ""'. !.. .e e , _-'-''-·, t .} • 
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problems of metaphysics? 
1) Re ason and Experience. 
Heality is rational and human minds naturally seek to 
know the truth , the whole. "All human exp erience is a pro-
cess of interaction with the energy of the cosmic mind.n 20 
Then t h e two are not separate or opposed, 
Reason and experience are not to be 
thought of as two distinct entities. 
They are rather, correlative terms. 
One implies t h e other. Experience 
without reason would be formless; and 
reason without experi ence would be 
contentless. Experience presupposes 
reason, a nd..., reason exp resses itself in 
exp erience.;:;l 
2) Chang e and Identity. 
On the impersonal plane there is no solution for t his 
problem. In consciousness only is found both change and 
permanenc e . In fact each requir e s t h e other. If all were 
chang e, there would be chaos; if all were permanent, there 
would be unendurable monotony. 
3) Sp ace and Time. 
As Augu s tine said, we know what these are until asked 
to define them. Few problems have provoked so much learned 
discussion and unsatisfactory t h eory-. Aristotle gave a v e l-
uable suggestion when h e said there could be no time unless 
20. Bri ghtman in Lumina_£, 3 (1939), 4lff'. 
21. Knudson, PTRT , 249. 
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there were some one to count. The best answer then seems 
to be that space and time are both real and are part of the 
conscious experience of God. For this r e ason they are nec-
essary forms of our experience. 
4) Are essences real independent entities? Where are 
they? 
All essences are owned and are real. Ideals, laws, 
truth ( Platoni c i deas), are in the mind or experience of God. 
Some ar'e uncreated and eternally existing . Perhaps others 
are being added. They are available to human minds who 'Nill 
sufficiently exert themselves. Although Plato believed that 
nideas 11 were developed by remembering, Socrates' empirical 
doctrine of maieutics shows that ~t wa s recognized as no 
ordinary p rocess of memory but a difficult one requiring 
l abor. 
5) Are the re degrees of reality? 
An axagoras said, Some thing s have more of nous t han 
others. Spirit is spirit, that is, a ll spirit is of one 
quality, but not of one quantity. The self is g iven, but to 
make it a per sonali t y is a cooperative ach i evement; hence a 
self just becoming a personalit~ can hardl~ b e as real as it 
is after years of development t h rough struggl e . Some being s 
affect and reflect the r e st of the u n iverse more adequately 
t h an others. Ladd s ays that it is not only pos s ible for one 
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soul to be more real than another but it is an actual matter 
of fact. Be tween thos e who achieve that vvhich is riche st, 
highest, and best in life and the lowest stages of real mind-
life, t here e xist innumerable gradations in the possession 
of this priceless reality. 22 
The physical world is real for it is part of the con-
tinuous activity and experience of God. It is real to human 
being s also, in s o far as it is apprehended and experienced. 
I deas and ideals are real too. They never belong solely to 
particular minds but are always shared, a.l way s cooperatively 
obtained. They are partly discovery and partly novelty. 
Alexander rightly says: 
The tertiary qualities, truth, and good-
ness, and beauty though they differ from 
t he secondary and primary ones in b eing 
creations of' mind are not the less real. 
They belong strictly to an amalg amation 
or union of the object with the mind . 
But their dependence on the mind does not 
deprive them of their reality.23 
6. The Mind-body Problem. 
Inheriting a dualistic christian tradition of the con-
tinual battle between flesh and spirit, 24 there has been a 
strong tendency to think me anly of the body. Browning saw 
22. Ladd, PM, 199. Cf. Bowne, MET, 8, 13. 
23. Alexander, STD, 244. 
24. Gal., 5:16-26. 
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more clearly: 
Let us not always say, 
"Spite of this flesh today 
I strove, made head, gained ground upon the whole!n 
As the bird wing s and sings. 
Let us cry, "All good things 
Are ours, nor soul helps flesh more, now, than 
flesh helps soul!" 25 
The tVlo are interactive and interdependent. Either mind or 
body may take t h e initiative. Then they are not utterly dif-
ferent but e.re parts of the continuous system of nature, 
God and the universe. Body and all matter is the ceaseless 
product of divine energizing or the purposive functioning of 
the Supreme Mind. Hence, interaction of mind and body is in-
teraction with God , and the sacramental nature of all matter 
should be more generally recognized, for matter conveys 
spirit . Brightman says, "Religion exists only when there is 
some sort of contrast between the personal consciousness and 
the physical world, or to use synonymous terms , between spirit 
26 
and matter .. 11 
IV RELIGION 
The hypothesis of c r eative activity of mind postulates 
the existence of a personal God as essential to coherent 
25 . Browning, Rabbi Ben Ezra. 
26. Brightman, PR, 20. 
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thought about experience. 27 Religion has u ·sually been based 
on belief in a personal God but religious doctrines have 
been divided as to the nature of human mind. Does the c on-
cept of creative activity he lp to solve some of the problems 
of relig ious thought? 
1) How is mind related to soul? Mind and soul are one 
with consciousness. To save the soul is to develop it ac-
cording to God's will into the highest personality possible. 
I:l'ence, as Bowne says, no soul (or mind) is saved at any given 
28 time but is a. l way s in a process of being saved (or lost). 
2) Can God be known, or is he the transcendent, "the 
wholly Other"? God and Spirit are not perceived through the 
senses but are inferred. They are in consciousness, and hence 
29 in experience. God is all except other dependent spirits. 
The physical world which is constantly sensed is immanent in 
God, and he is continually sustaining and interacting with 
human minds, so that at every conscious moment they are ex-
periencing s ome part of God. As r olstoi said, " He is that 
without which one cannot live. To know God and to live is 
27. Brightman, I TP , 330, 231; Bowne, P'I1 , 265, iv; IJ.1HE, 146, 
i v, 43. 
28. Bowne, ER, 244, 153; SC, 146, 206, 219f. 
29. Hegel, Enc., 8. 
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one and the same thl. ng. n 30 Bowne said that the undivineness 
of the natural and the unnaturalness of the divine is the 
great heresy of popular thought respecting religion.31 "Both 
natur alism and supernaturalism have their roots in experience; 
naturalism in the experience of the senses, supernaturalism 
in the experience of self-consciousness, of purpose and ideal 
~2 
values. 11 ..... Hence the two ar e different but supp lementary 
ways of knowing something about God. 
3) The Problem of Freedom. 
Has man any part in his own salvation? There has been 
sharp controversy over t h is question from Pelagius and 
Augustine, Calvin and Arminius, to Barth and the personalists. 
India in the thirteenth century was also divided. The 
southern school held to the passive or " ca t hold theory, 11 
meaning that man has no more part in h is own salvation than 
the h elp less kitten which its mother seizes by the nape of 
the neck and carries out of danger. The northern branch or 
the activists held to "the moilkey doctrine" or t hat man is 
like the baby monkey, which when its mother takes it up to 
carry it to a place .of safety, hangs on with all the strength 
30. Quoted by Hocking MGHE , 467. 
31. Bowne, I G, Preface, 127. 
32 . Brightman, Sem. Quart., 6 (May, 1937), 12. 
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of its little arms. 33 The pas sive view is more closely re-
lated to materialistic or naturalistic, or at least dualistic 
philosophy than to relig ion. •ro apply it to religion means 
the discrediting of reason. Even Kant with his deistic ten-
dencies saw t h is. "Were we to put natural religion (reason) 
aside, supernatural religion would become purely passive: 
man would have to leave everything to God and would himself 
have no say and nothing to do, for everything that happened 
34 
would happen supernaturally." Failing to grasp the dia-
lectic principle has led to a demand to accept either freedom 
of man or God's grace and determinism, when synthesis is 
needed. 
Thesis (Calvinism), God does all, man's mind is passive . 
Antithesis (Humanism), Man do e s all, his mind is active. 
Synthesis: Man is always dependent on God's grace and 
will. Yet he is free within limits. Mind is both passive 
and active. 
35 
nGod does not give unless we take." In the field of our 
own obligation and responsibility God will do nothing without 
"36 
our cooperation. "What h e does will depend on what we do. 
33 . Moore, HR , I, 337. 
34 . Kant , LE , 84. 
35. Brightman, PR, 4 2 . 
36. Bowne, ER, 253. 
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4) The Problem of Missions. 
The passive view of Barth, but not of all Barthians, 
is that salvation is a strictly divine affair, God saves whom 
he wills to save, and missions are not only unnecessary and 
u s eless but presumptuous. rrhe active view is that religion 
offers "the high adventure of cooperation with God" and of 
being his messengers to others. 37 No one develops without 
the help of other persons and this obligates all to pass 
some service on to the next generation. If those who have 
knowledge do not teach, many must die in ignorance and fail 
to develop the personalities which might have been. The 
gospel by its v ery nature is good news, social, and nrust be 
shared . "Woe unto me if I preach not the gospel.n 38 The 
criterion of true religious vision is social response and 
creative living. 
5) Is relig ion a matter of feeling, will or intellect? 
Schleiermacher makes it " a feeling of absolute dependence; 11 
Kant, " t h e recognition of all duties as divine commands," or 
a question of moral will; Martineau and Tylor, as belief in 
God . Since mind is a unitary organic, functi oning whole, 
religion must involve the entire mind and not any one func-
tion alone. 
37. Brightman, RV , 219. 
38. I Cor., 9 :16. 
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6) Faith vs. Reason. 
Augustine and Aquinas subordinated reason to faith, and 
in much of the history of' the church the two have been op-
posed. Hegel found reason to be a basis for faith. Knud s on 
says, "The creative activity of faith is essential to re-
39 ligious experience," in fact all knowledge requires faith. 
There is no antithesis, but they are a llies, inseparable and 
interdependent. Faith presupposes reason, and reason, faith. 
4) 
Faith wi t h ou t reason i s unstable, emotional, and irresponsible. 
"Faith is trust, confidence, and devo.tion. Reason is analy-
sis, synth esis, and synopsis •••• A man who always reasons 
and never trusts will not reason creatively or fruitfully. 
A man who always trusts and never reasons will find his 
faith mo.-e and more mechanical. 1141 Faith is a religious name 
f or hypothesis. It is a v a lue-claim for investigation. 
7) The Problem of Authority. Revelation vs. Re ason. 
Even Xenophanes thought revelation was progressive and de-
pended on the efforts of men. Je sus h ad yet many things to 
42 
say, but the disciples were not ready for them. Never-
theless revealed theology, or the external authority of an 
39. Knudson, VRE, 30; DG, 160. 
40. Knudson, DG , 82ff, 70f. 
41. Bri&htman, ITP , 324f. 
42 . John, 16:12 . 
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infallible Bible as complete revelation, was long opposed to 
natural theology or reason. Luther opposed the supremacy 
of revelation over reason, and Locke said, "He that takes 
away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light 
Of both. " 43 S hl i h c e ermac er did not think of theology as 
static, for he noted that each generation must think things 
through for itselr' and hence theology is progressively chang-
ing with new interpretations of religious experience. 
Belief in creative activity of mind has changed the 
whole attitude toward scripture. The prophets and biblical 
writers did not passively receive and transmit messages un-
changed. They were active creative thinkers mediating divine 
impulses through their own personalities. It is not to be 
expected that tb~y could be inerrant. 44 Nor does this fact 
diminish the value of the scripture. It is rather enhanced 
as a book of progressive reve lation of religious experience. 
It is now seen that "the highest insights of reason are them-
selves divine revelations. 11 The standard is in the mind 
itse1f. 45 The functional theory of revelation has displaced 
the static view. Revelation is everything which brings man 
43. Locke, EHU, IV, xix, 4 . 
44. Knudson, PTRT, 122f. 
45. Knudson, DG, 173; VRE, 231, 197. 
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nearer to God. It is "as wide as the divine activity in 
human life.n 46 It i th lt f G., d s e resu__ o o seeking man, and man 
reaching out for God . 
8) Sin . 
If mind is entirely passive then all action, right or 
wrong, is necessary and there can be no meri t or guilt . 
Unless mind is active and free there is no responsibility 
for what one does. Sin is voluntary, and yet as Knudson 
says it is never the pure choice of evil. It does not begin 
as conscious hostility to God. TIIt is always a choice of a 
47 lesser as over against a higher good. " It may be one's 
decision to be passive when action is needed. It was to 
t he empty mind seeking rest that the seven devils 48 came. 
The pas s ive mind never se ems to realize its status. ~nen 
challenged, it always evades responsibility. Adam report ed 
that Eve gave him the apple, then Paul unfortunately made a 
49 
scape-goat of Adam, and Augustine and Aquinas perpetuated 
the imputation. But as Brightman says, sin is no inherited 
taint or status . It exists only where there is a voluntary 
disloyalty to knovm truth; righteousness is the will to be 
46. Brightman, FG, 42 . 
47 . Knudson, DR, 259. 
48. Matt ., 12:43ff.; Luke, 11: 24ff. 
49. I Cor., 15:2lf. 
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completely loyal to the highest, best and fullest life we 
50 
know. The really righteous life that wants God is active 
(not merely passive) and doing its best. Kant believed that 
whatever affects the rule of conduct is r~ligious. If the 
goal is worthy and rational, it is doubtless true t hat when 
most a ctive, one is most religious. 
9) " Good-and-Evil. 1151 
In dealing with the problem of evil, the dialectic prin-
ciple has been too much neglected. Good is also a problem. 
As passivity and activity coexist, s o it is with good-and-
evil. Kant found nothing unqualifie d ly good except good-will, 
but human life is part of an org anic dialectic sys tem, and 
pure g ood-will is not found in isolation. It is an abstrac-
tion. One cannot choose the pure g ood but must choose t h e 
best possible, for some evil is found with everything we ex-
per·ience. 
The social nature of evil was early noted: (Plato) . 
Few reflect that "from the evil of othe r men something of 
evil is communicated to themselves," 52 and Paul said, 11Evil 
communications corrupt good manners. n 53 .11.ristotle observed 
50. Bri ghtman, "First Principles of Personalismn in Luminar. 
51. See Chapt. VI II in Brightman 1 s forthcoming Phil. of Rel . 
52. Rep., 606. 
53 . ~Cor., 15:33. 
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"Suffering injustice does not rest with one's self; there 
must be some one to do injustice." 54 (Paul) 11For none of us 
liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself," we are in-
55 dependent nBither of men nor of God . 
Brightman says, "The evils of life, dysteleological 
facts, are the most serious obstacle to faith in God; both 
theoretically and practically , they challenge the belief 
56 
that the universe has a coherent ideal purpose. u This 
doubtless applies more particularly to the passive, thought-
less, superficial, timid spirits. Then what should be the 
relig ious (i.e. the active creative) attitude toward the 
problem of evil: 
a) Material good must be given secondary status as 
means to the development of spirits. 
b) Much evil is due to man's wrong use of freedom 
which not only brings suffering to himself but to others who 
are innocent. 
c) Some evil is necessary to provoke exercise, and 
strugg le ,_IIThich is so essential for the deve lopment of per-
sonality. The dialectic principle is universal and necessary. 
It can't be suspended for t h e convenience or happiness of 
54. Nic. Eth., V, ix, 7. 
55 . Rom. -, 14:7. 
56. Brightman, I'JlP, 332. 
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individuals. 
d) God is infinitely good and does not will that his 
children should suffer unnecessarily. He suffers with them. 
e) Vv hen evil appears which leads to no observable 
g ood, but is actually seen to destroy the opportunity for 
life and development, , it must be assumed that God cannot 
help it, either because he cannot destroy some other greater 
value in his plan, or break his eternal uncreated la1.11T s of 
reason. 
f) God's aim must be the achievement of the good, 
and the a ctive creative mind should cooperate with him for 
the same end. 
g) It is a fact that some seem to be hal..,dened , em-
bittered, and turned fr om God by suffering and misfortune, 
and fall i n to passive and even rebellious attitudes. 'l'his 
is most unfortunate. One should try to keep the active 
mood, endure as a soldier, struggle for light and improve-
ment, holding fast to God (sinc e there is no other) like 
Jeremiah. Then some of the lessons may come which others 
have gained--a deeper consciousness of God , a new vision or 
ideal, increased sympathy for others, or new resolution for 
greater ach ievement. 
h) Every one actively striving to sublimate evil and 
transform misfortune into some new g ood which otherwise 
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would never have been, always finds that he has unseen aid. 
Spiritual reward never fails. 
10) The Relation of Jesus to God. 
'I'his question has probably been the most difficult one 
for the christian church.. It was rendered more so by the 
philosophical concept of passive (though iro~aterial) substance. 
The idea of reality as active agent, or creative conscious-
ness relieves much of the difficulty. Jesus represented 
human nature in its most highly develope d form. God was 
immanent in him to the highest degree yet attained. He was 
uniquely conscious of his dependence upon God and was in 
unique interaction with God. This is "the incarnation.tt 
His sinlessness was a spiritual achievement, 
not a metaphysical inheritance. His perfect 
relig ious experi ence was a p roduct of crea-
tive energy, not a passive reflection of an 
objective order. Vl.'hen we, then, speak of 
his revelation of God, we must do so in 
terms of creativity, not of mere receptivity. 07 
11) Inmwrtali ty. 
There is not a great deal to add to the main points of 
Plato. More stress might be given to his suggestions that 
only an evil b e ing would wish to undo what is harmonious and 
happy; and that immortality is something that must be achieved. 
Re ligious experience strengthens all of the arguments . Crea-
tive ac tivity of mind here and now indicates that immortality 
57. Knudson, VRE, 224. Cf. DR, 322-333 . 
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is not only possible but probable. It cannot be proved im-
possible. It may be said to rest chiefly on the existence 
of God, his goodness, and the value .of souls. 
V ETHICS 
Much has already been said of ethical nature, especially 
in the t wo p receding sections. Brightman's normative defini-
tion of r e lig ion reveals t he close relation between reli g ion 
and e .t h i cs: 
Re lig ion ought to be charac terized 
by t h e fe e ling of dependence on a .per-
sonal God and dominated by (love or) 
the will to cooperate with God in the 
conservation and increase of values. 58 
Lotze concludes his last work (Metaphysics) with the thought 
that the true beginning of metaphysics lies in ethics or at 
any rate, tt i still feel certain of being on the right track 
when I seek in that which ought to be, the ground of that 
which i s .'' 
Royce r efers to Rickerts' vi ew t h at logic is t h e eth ics 
of thought (Die Moral des Denkens). 
thus, 1 is prior to the p roposition: 
58. Bri ghtman, I TP , 321. 
59 . Hoy c e , Liv I, 237. 
"'I ought to think 
59 1 'I'hi s is so.' r; 
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Brightman adds , 
Furthermore, truth includes truth about 
consequences. Truth-seeking cannot then 
be wholly indifferent to moral conse-
quence s without destroying its own founda-
tions. 'I'he truth -seeker must be loya l to 
rational i deals and must0 seek the whole truth about all ideals. 6 
Herrma,n and I ant believed morality to be b asic to r e lig ion. 
On t he oth er hand Knudson be lieves that the r e lig ious a p riori 
d e notes an original and underived capacity of t h e h mnan s p ir-
it ••• t hat it is a creative princip le underlying t he re lig ious 
life as a whole ••• and is not dependent on anyth ing out side 
itself for its validity. n61 
The question ari ses is ethics t hen basic to religion, 
me t aphysic s , and log ic? Wha.t Knudson s ays concerning reli-
g ion seems to apply to t he whole question: The ultimate basi s 
is to be found 11 in the me taphysi c a l reality of the mind. 11 a nd 
in its creative activity . 6 2 The subject to which one g ives 
most at tention is naturally t h ought to be most important, 
and basic. Et h ics does not do anything , anc'l. aside from m,ind 
is an abstraction. All sys tems of t h ought reside i n living 
a ctive-pa ssive-creative minds. The pri n ciple of d iale ctic 
and the f'act t hat mind acts as a whole - seems to indicate 
60. Br i gh tman, PI, 1 26f. 
61. Knudson, VRE , 17 5 . 
6 2 • Lo c • cit • 
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that the ego a lterna t e s between the various closely related 
subj ect s and that each st ep i n the development of one contri-
butes to the development of the other . 
"Ve cannot talk of value or end except in terms of 
63 
consciousnes s. " All v a lues depend on personality . The 
individua l owns t h em but they 2..re not entirely relative to 
t he individual. 'l'hey are in part given or discove red, a n d 
in p art nov e lty . Any thing one likes or desires is a value. 
Hence, values need to be tested by reason. Some are trivial 
and irr ational, others a re eternal. The eth ical ideal die-
tates that one must seek to choose not merely a value or even 
a r ati onal value but must strive a t a ll times to e_tta i n t h e 
highe st possible v a lue . Pas s ivity is t be enemy of t h e good 
life . 
0 t h en we bring f orth weeds 64 
When our quick minds lie still . 
Bowne says , we c an never a ttain ideal living "by p assively 
resting in t he convent iona l conscience ' which is always being 
outgrown and a l ways fails to corre s p ond to t h e total situa-
tion. Mora l progr e ss can be made only as the g ood wi ll is 
active and i nformed vd th high ideals, and is guided by t h e 
63 . Maciver, Phil. Re v., 24 (191 5 ), 507. 
64 . Shakespeare, Ant. & Cleop. 
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critical reason. But as we face the unspeakable horrors 
of war-torn Europ e does progress seem possible now? Jensen 
points out that this is mor e than an ethical problem: It 
is a s cientific problem of process, for we must know what 
it is poss ible to strive for; it is a technological problem 
of means , for we must develop tools and institutions neces-
sary to attain it; and it is a psychological problem in 
motivation, for the behavior of groups must become willed 
and socialized. \.ill civiliza tion solve this four fold 
problem~ 
Chaos s eems to be ruling , but brutality , cruelty, and 
injustice wi ll sooner or l ater bring revolt. The divine 
spark in man cannot be entirely snuffed out. The impul s e 
to create and achieve the go od persists. Some will a lways 
strive for t h e ethical life (a remnant shall remain), and 
the living God cooperates with every soul t hat moves toward 
him. Not only may old values be restored but a dynamic 
creation of new values is pos sible. As Brightman says, 
Wherever ther e is Chaos, t he re is some 
law expressed in it and controlling it. 
Law and order are not set forth in pure 
spiritual form in this world . 1'hey are 
a l ways i n a struggle with Chaos. But 
they alway s control it. Chaos can never 
extend beyond the bounds of l aw . In the 
wi ldest madness of nature or of the human 
65. Bowne, PE, 152 . 
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heart, there is at work a principle of 
form, whe t her a law subject to mathe-
matical expression or a p rinciple of 
self-preservation or of adjustment, or 
a creative power t ha t hlilds new and 
h i gher l evels of life and mind. Order 
torn down is built again. Lif e stamped 
out will be born again •••• This is a 
Cosmos of creative order, which moves 
in and through and in spite of Chaos, 
dominating it and building eternally 
more stately mansions.66 
VI EDUCATI ON 
When mind is believed to be passive, the method of edu-
cation is a "pouring in" process, a mastery of facts, a 
transmission of past k nowledge. "Compulsory edu~ationn 
67 
laws are passed, totalitarian states prescribe and dictate 
the exact content to be taught and shield the people from 
outside influences bJ controlling the pre ss. The aim of 
military education and discipline is to instil unqualified, 
unth inking obedience. Robots, pawns, tools, and "cannon 
fodder '' a re wanted. If mind is active and creative such 
methods destroy individuality and pervert personality. Is 
the damage irreparable? Perhaps for a generation, but the 
next generation will strive for its freedom and must be sub-
dued all over again. 'fhe active creative impulse, like hope, 
s prings eternally in the human breast. 
66. Brightman , Rel. in~ife, (1939 Winter), 28 . 
67. In America this merely means compulsory sch ool at tendance. 
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However, it i s not to b e supposed t h at a ll mind s a re 
e qually active . The p assive f a c t or i s always there and i n 
the less intelligent often p r e domina t e s. Some canno t t ake 
very mu ch e ducation and c a n n ever be orig inal t h i nkers. Th e 
d emocratic ide a l is to h elp each mind to deve lop h is h i e;hes t 
possibilities. Factual content i s i mportant for a ll in t h e 
e a rly st a g e s but me thod and r e asonable opportunity for fre e 
e xercise are of more importan ce than ency clopaedic informa -
tion. Some t e n dencies should be curbed, some encouraged. 
Above all youth should b e t aught to choose wisely and to 
t h ink, i. e . to analy ze, synth esize, and by pur p o s ive control 
to seek the harmonious whole through reason. 
It is prob able tha t public e ducation is more eff i cient 
t han r elig ious educa tion which h as usually been excluded 
from the public schools and left to t h e irregular and vol-
untary methods of t h e home and church . Education vvi t hout 
r e lig ion loses . its highest dynamic. People with noble pur-
poses may unconsciously cooperat e with God and attain high 
efficiency, but t h e highest achievement is gained only 
through the conscious cooperation and communion with God. 
Then what a r e the most important r e lig ious ideas which ch il-
dren should be taught? Brightman su ggests: nThe beli ef that 
t h ere is a God, that he is immanent in h i s world, that h e is 
2 50 
moral, that every person is immortal, and that no theory 
about God has a right to disrega rd the facts of experience.n 68 
Descartes believed that the first certainty is the ego , 
God is second, then the world. Others hold that the orig inal 
certainty is ''Thou. u The dialectic principle indic a tes that 
there is much semi-conscious confused alternation between 
self and not-self before ideas of either become clear. They 
seem to g row together and neither the " rn nor the a thou ~~ 
really come s first . r he physi cal world is early perceived 
through the senses but its relation to reality is an ad-
vanced problen1 involving the final capstone of thought which 
is God . As soon as possib le the child should be taught that 
he vms g iven a self which he may help develop into a person-
ali ty. Parents and other persons vvill aid, but it is a 
life time p rocess and each one must consciously work his own 
way to God ·who cooperates in all efforts. 
Lastly, whHt of h:l. gher education? America has been too 
much absorbed with the idea of universal {or mass) education, 
and universities are of ten noted more for their nuraber of 
students than for the quality of their training . The m~j-
ority who reach the universities have not learned the mean-
ing of scholarship , self-denial, and rigorous thinking. 
Some have found life too easy and luxurious. Others have 
68. Brightman, Rel. Ed ., 16 {19 21), 25. 
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been hampered by the necessities of self support. They 
desire degrees for social or financial reasons. The g oal 
is often enough 11 crarmning 11 for a pass, with little regard 
for training sufficiently thorough to make creative produc-
tion possible in later years . The great u n iversities of 
Europe, which were once centers of scholarship for the 
world are now destroyed and can hardly hope to be restored 
for a hundred years. This is a challeng e to America . Can 
she raise the standards high enough to fill the gap and win 
leadership in research and creative thought? 
Summarizing, this sketch indicates the correctness of 
the statement frequently made that the vi ew of the nature 
of mind is fundamental to all problems. The hypothesis of 
an active-passive-creative mind: 1) makes possible a con-
sistent theory of knowledge; 2 ) reveals the inadequacy and 
error of many psycholog ical theori e s and calls for a more 
thorough development of self-psychology; 3 ) offers better 
answers to the vexing problems of metaphysics; 4) throvlfs 
much light on the difficulties of early christian dogma and 
opposes naturalistic and transcendent t h eories, in favor of a 
rational reli g ious experience; 5) in eth ics it gives hope for 
progress in the midst of c b.aos; and 6) calls for sounder 
methods in education to promote scholarship and creative 
work. 
252 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Belief in creative activity seems to be justified: 
a. Historical research into the rational thought of 
philosophers, and in the experience of the prophets and 
seers both point to creative activity. 
b. Observation of the processes of evolution, pro-
gress, a nd the development of civiliz a tion reveals creativity. 
c. Examination of self-consciousness and of reli-
gious experience yields the mnst certain sing l e line of 
evidence . 
d . The rational consideration of all the facts indi-
cates that the principle of creative a ctivity is essential 
to a h armoni ous system of t h ought about reality. 
e. ifiJhen applied to some of the important fields of 
though t the principle of creative activity of mind is found 
to contradict many t h eories, to offer better solutions, and 
to a id greatly in solving many of the perplexing problems 
of the past and present. 
2. Then the following conclusions may be drawn: 
1 ) Creative activity of mi nd does not exclude pas s ivity 
but p resupposes it, just as freedom presupposes mechanism. 
2 ) ~he dialectic principle i s one of the metho d s of 
creative activity. 
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3) Reason is another principle of creative activity. 
4) Both of these principles involve will which is the 
centra l and essential function in all c re ative activity but, 
5) Since mind is a unitary organic functioning whoJe , 
it is mind which create s rather than any particular process 
or function. 
6 ) Mind may be called active-passive-creative. 
7) To create is to produce something new, internal 
or external to the creating mind. 
8) Mi nd e.nd only mind can create. 
9 ) Real, true, or absolute creation is only by God . 
10 ) God 's creations are either within h is own ex-
perience, such as the emergents observed in the physical 
world; or the production and sustaining of selves external 
to himself, and capable of· freedom within limits. 
11) Purely human creation consists in acts of free 
will . 
12) God cooperates with man in the development of 
personality, and in the creation of new values and es s ences. 
Man with the cooperation of God produces many new combina -
tions, rearrangements and inventions from materials. 
13) Man may be called creative because of hi s free 
will, thought productions , secondary cre a tions, and because 
he i s an essential factor in s ome of God's creations. 
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The problem of this dissertation is the definition of the nature and limits 
of the creative activity of mind. Is the mind passive or creative or both? If 
mind is creative, in what sense and to v-.rhat extent is it creative? This problem 
is important for, the view of mind as passive or as active influences scientists, 
philosophers, artists, and statesmen (whether consciously or unconsciously), in 
their aims and methods of procedure. Augustine's complaint (that men study 
everything except themselves) can still be made. 
Creation is making something new, that is to say, something which was 
not given in the situation prior to creation and is not logically implied in that 
situation. Creation has traditionally been regarded as an exclusively divine 
prerogative. In the past twenty years, however, much has been written about 
human creativity. Does man have a right to speak of his own mind as creative, 
that is, able to produce new qualities, new relations, or even new realities? 
Many represent mind as merely passive; such a mind cannot be creative. 
Others exclude all passivity and hold that mind is wholly active; but such a 
mind could not even receive impressions from without. A systematic study of 
the problem of activity, passivity, and creativity by comparing data from 
historical, rational, and broadly empirical sources, such as this dissertation 
undertakes, has not previously been attempted. 
I. The Historical Approach. 
1. Greek Philosophy is investigated, as one of the main sources of West-
ern civilization. The great thinkers with few exceptions viewed mind as 
active. From Pythagoras on, there was a tendency to regard reality as im- . 
material or spiritual rather than material. Anthropomorphism, originally 
crude, was first criticized by Xenophanes (and Deutero-Isaiah), and then 
transformed into the clear idea of an organic universe in· Plato. The dialectic 
principle emerges with the discovery of the self, its logos (Heraclitus) and 
nous (Anaxagoras). There is a tendency to identify mind, reality, and God. 
Creative activity was suggested especially by Plato through love, imitation, 
imagination, thought, effort, and the Idea of the Good. 
2. Later contributions after the union of Greek and Judaeo-Christian 
influences show: ( 1) From Augustine and Descartes on, frequent recognition 
of the prime certainty of the self; (2) in Plotinus, Augustine, and Kant, 
acceptance of the activity of mind even in sensation; (3) since Berkeley and 
Leibniz renewed emphasis on activity and individualism (a metaphysic com-
bining qualitative monism with quantitative pluralism) ; ( 4) in Berkeley, 
freedom, the immanence of God in nature ("divine language"), the belief 
that God can be known empirically and by reflection on experience, and the 
suggestion that mind-body interaction is cooperation with God ; (5') in Hegel, 
interpretation of the principles of mind as an organic whole, the emptiness of 
abstraction, spirit as reality, a universal dialectical movement, the rational as 
the actual, and God as the most concretely universal personality; (6) in 
Bowne, personality as the center of a systematic philosophy, 'INith freedom, 
individuality, activity and creativity of mind as fundamental principles. 
II. The Empirical Approach. 
1. The creative results of the more empirical Hebrew mind are reviewed 
and compared with those of the more rational Greek, revealing many similari-
ties. The philosopher searching for truth and the prophet seeking religious 
satisfaction arrive at like views of a creative spiritual universe. 
2. Progress, discoveries and inventions in the sciences and the arts reveal 
the creative genius of the mind of man. 
3. An examination of individual consciousness is made, distinguishing 
its esse from its causa. Introspection reveals the prime certainty of the self, 
the experiences of passivity, activity, and creativity involving body, physical 
world, other minds, and God. Single functions of mind indicated by various 
authorities as responsible for creativity are then examined, with the conclusion 
that the functions are all interdependent, no one ever acting alone, and that 
it is the whole mind which creates. 
III. Resultant Hypothesis. 
Interpretation of the data from all the above-mentioned sources suggests 
sixteen specific explanatory hypotheses. These lead to the conclusion that all 
creativity involves divine action wholly or in part, and to the following 
classification of types of creativity: 
1. Creations by God's will alone. 
( 1) The production of novelties and emcrgcnts within God's experi-
ence (for example, the evolution of the physical world, as viewed by personal 
idealism). 
(2) The production of selves and persons external to God (the crea-
tion of conscious ' selves as an aspect of the evolutionary process). 
2. Creations by mans' will alone; free choices within limits. 
3. Cooperative creations of divine and human wills: 
( 1) Mental productions spch as ideas, knowledge, literary achieve-
ments, the discovery of essences (or thinking God's thoughts after him), and 
the development of selves into personalities. 
(2) Novel rearrangements of physical mM.terials( initiated by human 
purposes: works of invention, compositions of art and science, and the birth 
of new organisms. 
The Resultant Hypothesis. 
Mind and only mind is creative. God alone truly creates, but men may 
cooperate with him in producing something new which he could not have 
achieved alone. Human mind by its free will is creative within limits pro-
ducing novelties because it is a creative member of that rational, organic, 
dialectic society which includes God the ultimate source of creativity. 
IV. Relation of the Hypothesis to Other Fields. 
The hypothesis is then related to epistemology, psychology, metaphysics, 
religion, ethics, and education to discover what difference its acceptance would 
make and whether or not a coherent view of each of these fields would be 
compatible with it. 
The main conclusions of the dissertation, resting on the metaphysical hy-
pothesis that reality is a society of minds sustained and ordered by a supreme 
and rational, mind, are as follows: 
1. A mind is a unitary, organic, functioning whole. 
2. Mind is active, passive, and dialectical or interactive. Every moment 
contains some activity and some complementary passivity. 
3. The highest most nearly independent creation of man is in his free 
choices, but man may be called creative if he is a cooperative factor essential 
to some of God's creations. 
4. The human mind creates ideas and knowledge by cho<;>sing nev.~ 
relations and ·discovers essences by communicating with other minds and 
by cooperating with God. 
) . By a process of interaction with God, mental creations of man lead 
to new material productions through the skilled use of the body. 
6. Revelation is both a historical fact and also a present and future 
possibility, which is actualized only in active creative minds. 
7. Only God creates in the highest sense of bringing minds into being 
external to himself; and the production of all novelties (except acts of choice 
within human experience) always involves divine creativity. 
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